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Adam J. Levitin† 
Banking is based on two fundamentally irreconcilable functions: safekeeping 
of deposits and relending of deposits. Safekeeping is meant to be a risk-free func-
tion, but using deposits to fund loans inevitably poses risk to deposits, thereby un-
dermining the safekeeping function. The expensive, inefficient, and unreliable ap-
paratus of bank regulation is an attempt to square the circle between safekeeping 
and lending: government liquidity and deposit insurance facilities, capital and re-
serve requirements, investment restrictions, and supervisory examinations are all 
aimed at keeping the risks of the lending function in check so as to ensure the safe-
ty of deposits. 
This Article argues for splitting the lending function from the safekeeping 
function in both traditional- and shadow-banking markets through what it terms 
“Pure Reserve Banking.” In a Pure Reserve Banking regime, “safe banks” would 
offer safekeeping and payment services, and nothing else. Loans would be a func-
tion solely of capital markets, which would operate without government facilitation 
of shadow-banking deposit substitutes. Historically, a separation between deposits 
and lending was not possible, but it is now feasible with today’s deep and efficient 
capital markets, which already provide the funding for much of the borrowing in 
the economy. 
Splitting the lending function from the safekeeping function would protect 
both the money supply from the market and the market from the money supply. It 
would enable the government to end its massive support of both formal-banking 
markets and shadow-banking markets and would thereby remove the moral haz-
ard that encourages asset bubbles through overlending. At the same time, divorc-
ing lending from safekeeping would instill greater market discipline on lending 
markets because lending institutions could be allowed to fail without endangering 
the money supply. Decoupling deposits and lending would eliminate the root cause 
of financial market instability and enable truly safe banking that is not dependent 
on an increasingly complex, politicized, and untenable regulatory system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Modern banking holds out two promises. Banks promise 
safekeeping of and ready access to depositors’ funds (the “Depos-
it Function”). Banks also promise to be a ready source of funding 
for borrowers (the “Lending Function”). This Article argues that 
these two promises are fundamentally inconsistent and irrecon-
cilable and that the tension between them is the root cause of 
instability in the financial system. 
The institutional combination of deposit-taking and lending 
is known as “fractional reserve banking,” because only a fraction 
of deposits are retained as reserves; the rest are reloaned. Frac-
tional reserve banking is an inherently unstable system. The 
risks involved with lending cannot be squared with an absolute 
promise of safekeeping and liquidity absent the expensive, inef-
ficient, and unreliable apparatus of modern bank regulation: 
central bank liquidity facilities, deposit insurance, capital and 
reserve requirements, investment restrictions, and supervisory 
examinations. The machinery of modern bank regulation is pri-
marily (if sometimes indirectly) an effort to square the circle be-
tween the Deposit and Lending Functions, and it inevitably re-
sults in more-elaborate and more-cumbersome regulations as 
well as the erosion of market discipline. 
Modern banking regulation, however, covers only part of the 
market providing Deposit and Lending Functions. The past sev-
eral decades have witnessed the development of a shadow-
banking system—financial markets such as the markets for 
money market funds, repos, credit derivatives, commercial pa-
per, and securitization, which provide substitute deposit and 
lending products but exist outside the bank regulatory system. 
Shadow-banking markets exist because of a range of govern-
ment interventions that encourage investors to view shadow-
banking products as functional substitutes for bank deposits in 
terms of safety, while offering greater yield. Shadow banking is 
effectively subsidized by favorable regulatory treatment. The ex-
istence of shadow banking enables regulatory arbitrage between 
highly regulated formal deposits and largely unregulated deposit 
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substitutes, and the regulatory subsidization of shadow banking 
further encourages the growth of the shadow-banking sector. 
This Article argues that many of the problems in financial 
regulation could be solved by cutting the Gordian knot that in-
stitutionally twines the Deposit and Lending Functions by 
adopting what it terms “Pure Reserve Banking.” Pure Reserve 
Banking means both (1) prohibiting formal depositaries from en-
gaging in any form of lending and (2) withdrawing all forms of 
government support and regulatory subsidization for the shadow-
banking system that enable shadow banking to provide ersatz 
deposits. 
If Deposits were split asunder from Lending, the Deposit 
Function would be served by “safe banks” with all deposits kept 
on hand as “reserves.”1 This is a concept known as “100% reserve 
banking.” In a Pure Reserve Banking world, 100% reserve banks 
would take deposits and provide payment services, and nothing 
else. Banks would not make loans, would not otherwise reinvest 
deposits, and would keep all deposits on hand. Instead, the 
Lending Function would be served entirely by capital markets, 
in which investors would expressly assume risk. Because Pure 
Reserve Banking would also withdraw all government support 
for the shadow banking that occurs in capital markets, investors 
would price risk more appropriately; risk would not be under-
priced because of government interventions signaling the “safety” 
of shadow-banking investments. In effect, Pure Reserve Banking 
would withdraw all government subsidies from both the regulated-
banking and the shadow-banking markets. 
Historically, a division between the Deposit and Lending 
Functions was not possible because of the immaturity of capital 
markets; banks were the only reliable source of a large volume 
of funding. Fractional reserve banking might have been efficient 
 
 1 US banks are currently required to maintain a graduated reserve equal to 3 per-
cent of net transaction accounts from natural person depositors that are between $14.5 
to $103.6 million and 10 percent of their deposits from natural person depositors that are 
over $103.6 million. 12 USC § 461; 12 CFR § 204.4. See also Reserve Maintenance Manu-
al *16 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, June 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/XN9U-98RX. Some countries have eliminated reserve requirements alto-
gether. See Gordon H. Sellon Jr and Stuart E. Weiner, Monetary Policy without Reserve 
Requirements: Case Studies and Options for the United States, 82 Fed Res Bank Kan 
City Econ Rev 5, 9 (2d Q 1997) (examining the experiences of Canada, New Zealand, and 
the United Kingdom without reserve requirements). See also Yueh-Yun C. O’Brien, Re-
serve Requirement Systems in OECD Countries *4 (Finance and Economics Discussion 
Series, July 23, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/9QUY-RX38 (noting substantial varia-
tions in the structure of reserve requirements). 
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relative to its historical alternatives. Today, however, we have 
sufficiently developed capital markets to imagine a separation of 
these Functions. Many loans are already funded through the capi-
tal markets via loan syndication, participation, and securitization. 
The development of deep and efficient capital markets enables us 
to move to a more rational and stable market structure that sepa-
rates the Deposit Function from the Lending Function. 
Divorcing the Deposit Function from the Lending Function 
through Pure Reserve Banking would have benefits for both 
safekeeping and lending. Safe banks with 100% reserves pose no 
risk of bank runs; even if all depositors withdrew their funds, a 
100% reserve bank would not be rendered insolvent. Accordingly, 
there would be no need for government liquidity facilities such 
as the Federal Reserve’s discount window, for the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC’s) deposit insurance, or for 
the rest of the extensive bank regulatory apparatus. Consumers 
and businesses that want safe assets would have truly safe as-
sets in the form of bank deposits. 
Separating the Deposit Function from the Lending Function 
through Pure Reserve Banking would protect capital markets from 
bubbles created by the moral hazard of both formal-bank- and 
shadow-bank-created money. Bank lending functions as a type of 
money creation, multiplying the money supply beyond central 
bank–created currency. Banks’ role in creating money is a major 
reason for the government’s provision of liquidity facilities and 
deposit insurance. Government liquidity facilities, deposit insur-
ance, and the implicit guaranty of “too big to fail” institutions re-
sult in a moral hazard for banks because there is an asymmetry 
between the banks’ privatized gains and their socialized losses. 
This moral hazard encourages banks to overproduce money. An 
overexpansion of the money supply encourages inefficient over-
production in the economy and results in asset bubbles. “Safe 
banks” with 100% reserves would not engage in money produc-
tion, so the moral hazard–fueled bubble problem would disappear. 
Shadow banking also effectively expands the money supply 
but is not formally backed by government liquidity facilities or 
insurance. When the shadow-banking money supply was threat-
ened in 2008, the result was massive temporary government in-
tervention.2 Despite post-2008 reforms that have reduced the 
 
 2 This intervention included the Treasury Department’s $700 billion Troubled Asset 
Relief Program and several Federal Reserve credit and liquidity programs (the Term Secu-
rities Lending Facility, the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, the Asset-Backed Commercial 
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size and improved the stability of some shadow-banking mar-
kets, the problem of the implicit guaranty of the shadow-
banking market still remains. While the impulse of some reform 
proposals has been to regulate the entire shadow-banking mar-
ket like banks,3 an alternative would be to withdraw all of the 
forms of government support that enable the existence of the 
shadow-banking market in the first place. 
A separation of the Deposit and Lending Functions through 
Pure Reserve Banking would protect the money supply from the 
market’s volatility by making all money creation a government 
function. Eliminating the private creation of money means that 
a broker-dealer’s failure would not endanger the money supply 
as it did in 2008 when Lehman Brothers collapsed. If capital 
markets were separated from banks, regulators could afford to 
let financial institutions that were engaged in capital market 
operations fail. Splitting Deposits from Lending would impose 
market discipline on the financial institutions that are involved in 
capital markets. Moreover, if Deposits were separated from Lend-
ing, it would allow Deposits to serve as a safe base of capital that 
could be deployed by depositors to recapitalize firms that were 
temporarily undervalued because of crashes in the Lending 
markets. 
Finally, separating the Deposit and Lending Functions 
through Pure Reserve Banking would eliminate the enormous 
transaction and political costs of bank regulation. Bank regula-
tion creates tremendous compliance costs for banks as well as 
costs for the government. Modern bank regulation is also unreli-
able. As the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s and the finan-
cial crisis of 2008 showed, regulation can fail. Indeed, regulation 
is inevitably subject to significant asymmetric political pressure 
that erodes its effectiveness. As long as we continue to rely on 
quotidian bank regulation rather than on structural changes in 
 
Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, the Commercial Paper Funding 
Facility, the Money Market Investor Funding Facility, and the Term Asset-Backed Secu-
rities Loan Facility), as well as orchestrations of the bailout of Bear Stearns and AIG 
through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s various Maiden Lane LLC special-
purpose subsidiaries. See Adam Veness, et al, Developments in Banking and Financial 
Law: 2009, 28 Rev Bank & Fin L 383, 492–505 (2009). 
 3 See, for example, Morgan Ricks, A Regulatory Design for Monetary Stability, 65 
Vand L Rev 1289, 1292 (2012) (proposing federal licensing and insurance of all short-
term debt instruments); Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow 
Banking System *268 (Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2010), archived at 
http://perma.cc/HM6B-L63X (proposing federal insurance for money market mutual 
funds). 
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the banking business to ensure financial stability, we will contin-
ue to be at risk of serious financial crises. Moving to Pure Reserve 
Banking would reduce the influence of politics on financial regu-
lation and, in so doing, would contribute to financial stability. 
Technological and market changes have made Pure Reserve 
Banking technically feasible, but it is not on the political horizon 
for the foreseeable future, at least in the United States.4 None-
theless, this Article’s first principles critique of fractional re-
serve banking matters because it highlights the implicit political 
choices and distributional effects of retaining a fractional-
reserve-banking system and of subsidizing the shadow-banking 
sector. 
Fractional reserve banking and the subsidization of shadow 
banking foster economic volatility, the distributional conse-
quences of which are highly regressive but inure to the benefit of 
financial institutions. At the same time, fractional reserve bank-
ing and the subsidization of shadow banking obscure monetary 
policy—thereby reducing its democratic accountability, despite 
its enormous distributional impact. Retaining the current sys-
tem of state-subsidized volatile growth with privatized gains 
and socialized losses is a choice that society may well be willing 
to make. It is not a choice that can be meaningfully made, how-
ever, unless the decision and its consequences are clear to all in 
society. If this choice is made by a subset of private parties or by 
mere stasis, society will have forfeited democratic control over 
finance. 
This Article highlights how financial markets are constitut-
ed, structured, and supported by governments. Once govern-
ment’s pervasive role in the market is recognized, the question 
 
 4 Subsequent to the dissemination of this Article in draft form, an Icelandic gov-
ernment report proposed the adoption of a “Sovereign Money” proposal that is very simi-
lar to Pure Reserve Banking. The proposal features separate transaction and investment 
accounts, with transaction accounts kept at the central bank and investment accounts at 
commercial banks. See Frosti Sigurjonsson, Monetary Reform: A Better Monetary System 
for Iceland *14 (Prime Minister of Iceland, Mar 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/BR2Q 
-3W6P. See also Iceland’s Daring Raid on Fractional Reserve Banks: Reykjavik Considers 
Wresting Money Creation from Financial Sector, Fin Times 6 (Apr 10, 2015) (providing 
background on the Icelandic report). The Green Party of the United Kingdom has also 
endorsed a “Positive Money” proposal with many similarities to Pure Reserve Banking. 
See Ben Dyson, Green Party ‘Gets It’ on Monetary Policy (PositiveMoney, Mar 29, 2012), 
archived at http://perma.cc/FG3R-CUY6. Switzerland is scheduled to hold a referendum 
on full reserve banking in 2016. See Mehreen Khan, Switzerland to Vote on Banning 
Banks from Creating Money (Telegraph, Dec 24, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
WMX4-9WG2. 
  
364  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:357 
   
of how to regulate financial markets is a question not of letting 
the market decide but of democratic decision-making. By under-
scoring how deeply legally constructed our financial markets 
and the choices made in our financial system’s structure are, 
this Article advances the policy conversation about how to re-
store democratic control over finance. Financial markets are not 
organic developments steered by the invisible hand. Instead, 
they are marionettes, manipulated by the strings of the govern-
ment. Market forces operate within the framework created by the 
government. Accordingly, finance is not an issue just for markets. 
Finance is also an issue for democracy. Because the government 
shapes financial markets and because finance determines distri-
butions of wealth and power in society, finance should be subject 
to democratic control. Thus, even if the policy prescriptions of this 
Article are not adopted, the identification of the policy choices 
that are entailed in our current system is important. 
Beyond the Article’s larger attempt at highlighting the nex-
us of finance and democracy, the Article also contributes to the 
economic and legal literature on macroprudential regulation in 
two ways. First, it brings 100% reserve–banking proposals into 
the twenty-first century by incorporating modern capital mar-
kets and shadow banking into the concept. And second, it under-
scores the legal-political consequences of fractional reserve 
banking. 
The 100% reserve–banking component of Pure Reserve 
Banking is not new. Variations of 100% reserve banking have 
been periodically bruited in macroeconomic literature for over a 
century, and the United States nearly adopted a 100% reserve–
banking proposal during the Great Depression.5 The economics 
literature, however, has never adapted the 100% reserve–
banking idea to the realities of modern capital markets and 
shadow banking. 
Modern capital markets make a purer version of 100% re-
serve banking far more feasible than before. At the same time, 
however, the existence of shadow banking makes 100% reserve 
banking an incomplete and futile reform if not paired with the 
withdrawal of government support for shadow banking. As long 
as government support for shadow banking holds out the implicit 
 
 5 See Ronnie J. Phillips, An End to Private Banking: Early New Deal Proposals to 
Alter the Role of the Federal Government in Credit Allocation, 26 J Money, Credit & 
Bank 552, 555 (1994); William R. Allen, Irving Fisher and the 100 Percent Reserve Pro-
posal, 36 J L & Econ 703, 705 (1993). 
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promise that certain non-deposit assets are “safe,” there will be 
an inevitable arbitrage between deposits and shadow banking. 
100% reserve banking would actually exacerbate this arbitrage 
by decreasing the yield that banks could pay on deposits, there-
by increasing the disparity in yield between deposits at 100% re-
serve banks and shadow-banking deposit substitutes. 
Existing 100% reserve proposals universally fail to address 
the problem of shadow banking, as do other bank-reform pro-
posals, such as those that would massively increase bank capital 
requirements.6 Without addressing shadow banking, reforms 
will inevitably be undermined by regulatory arbitrage between 
formal and shadow banking. 
To date, the macroeconomics literature has generally not 
recognized that shadow-banking deposit substitutes are funda-
mentally legally constituted rather than organic market devel-
opments.7 The legal foundations of shadow banking mean that 
the shadow-banking sector can be substantially reformed by 
withdrawing the various types of government support that ena-
ble shadow banking to provide credible deposit substitutes. This 
Article advances the economics literature by arguing for the 
pairing of 100% reserve banking with the elimination of all gov-
ernment support for shadow-banking deposit substitutes. A 
pairing of such reforms is the only way to make 100% reserve 
banking successful. 
The legal literature has only recently begun a serious en-
gagement with macroprudential regulation. The legal literature 
has never previously engaged with the 100% reserve–banking 
concept, although it has recognized the legally constituted na-
ture of various shadow-banking products. Pure Reserve Banking 
is rich in regulatory and political implications, particularly the 
ability to eliminate most of the complex, costly, and politicized 
structure of prudential bank regulation and government support 
of financial markets. It also has profound implications for the 
transparency and democratic accountability of monetary policy. 
This Article marks the first exploration of the regulatory and po-
litical consequences of the macroeconomic reforms attendant to 
 
 6 See, for example, Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig, The Banker’s New Clothes: 
What’s Wrong with Banking and What to Do about It 216 (Princeton 2013) (recognizing 
the problem of shadow banking but limiting reform proposals to formal banking).  
 7 But see John V. Duca, What Drives the Shadow Banking System in the Short and 
Long Run? *4 (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Feb 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/GHA4-42TU (explaining how the shadow-banking system is affected by 
short- and long-run factors stemming from regulatory burdens and information costs). 
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both 100% reserve banking and the elimination of government 
support for shadow banking. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the dual 
functions of modern banking and presents a just-so story of how 
these two incompatible functions came to coexist in the same in-
stitutions. Part II considers attempts to square the circle and 
have the Deposit and Lending Functions coexist. It reviews at-
tempts to create “safe” financial instruments, government 
banks, and deposit insurance. Part III presents an alternative 
approach, namely, splitting the Deposit and Lending Functions 
institutionally through Pure Reserve Banking, while also elimi-
nating the regulatory arbitrage of the Deposit Function that is 
facilitated by government support for shadow banking. Part III 
considers what Pure Reserve Banking would look like, how it 
would affect the Deposit and Lending Functions, and how it 
would affect bank regulation. A conclusion summarizes. 
I.  THE DUAL FUNCTIONS OF MODERN BANKING 
The business of banking involves two functions: the Deposit 
Function of safekeeping and payments, and the Lending Func-
tion of making loans and investments. 
A. The Deposit Function 
Banks’ distinctive function is to provide safekeeping for de-
posits.8 The taking of deposits is what makes a bank a bank. The 
Deposit Function is about the protection of value. It is not specif-
ic to money, other than to the extent that money is defined 
merely as a store of value. Thus, banks offer not only deposit ac-
counts but also safe-deposit boxes. In both cases, the bank is be-
ing entrusted with the depositor’s assets. The bank makes an 
absolute promise to return those assets (or equivalent ones, in 
the case of fungible assets) to the depositor intact. 
Consumers and businesses value the safekeeping function 
because banks are able to specialize in safekeeping in ways that 
individual consumers and businesses are not. Because of banks’ 
focus on safekeeping, it makes sense for them to invest in security 
measures like fireproof vaults, security guards, and computer 
security systems that might not be cost-effective for any individ-
ual consumer or business. 
 
 8 See Richard A. Lord, The Legal History of Safekeeping and Safe Deposit Activities 
in the United States, 38 Ark L Rev 727, 728 (1985). 
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At the same time, however, consumers and businesses like 
to have ready access to their funds. They have liquidity needs 
and want to be able to withdraw their funds at any time. Be-
cause withdrawals are typically for the purpose of transferring 
funds to third parties, consumers and businesses also want 
payment services that link with their safely kept funds. 
The payments function is not the core of the Deposit Func-
tion, but it is a standard ancillary piece of the safekeeping busi-
ness that adds significant value for consumers and businesses. 
Imagine a world in which banks did not offer payment services. 
Consumers and businesses would have to withdraw currency 
from the bank and physically transfer it to their payees (or to 
payment agents). It would be cumbersome and would increase 
risks of theft. Combining payment services with safekeeping 
creates efficiencies by eliminating transaction costs.9 
The key point to understand about the Deposit Function is 
that it is driven by consumers’ and businesses’ risk aversion. 
Consumers and businesses want zero risk that their funds will 
disappear when held by the bank or in transit for payment. The 
Deposit Function is meant to be risk-free. 
B. The Lending Function 
Banks’ second function is to be a source of funds for con-
sumers and businesses. This is not a function that is specific to 
banks; anyone can provide funding for others’ enterprises. I can 
make you a loan and vice versa. But banks specialize in provid-
ing funding, which they do in the form of loans. These loans nec-
essarily involve assuming some amount of risk. The level of risk 
can be tailored and controlled to some degree, but it cannot be 
eliminated. 
Because the Lending Function involves risk, it is fundamen-
tally in tension with the Deposit Function. The money that 
banks loan out is primarily depositors’ funds rather than the 
bank’s own equity capital or other borrowed money. 
Bank deposits are either general or specific deposits.10 Un-
less a bank and depositor otherwise agree, a deposit is a general 
 
 9 This is not to say that payment services are costless. All payments involve some 
measure of credit risk and also have their own transaction costs. But banks have economies 
of scale for payments that help reduce payments’ transaction costs. 
 10 Donald Resseguie, 1 Banking Law § 9.06 at 9-19 (LexisNexis 2015); Commercial 
Bank of Pennsylvania v Armstrong, 148 US 50, 59 (1893); Marine Bank v Fulton Bank, 69 
US (2 Wall) 252, 256 (1864). For a normative treatment of the debt versus bailment issue 
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deposit,11 and general deposits are usually what we think of 
when we think of bank deposits. A general deposit is a loan 
made to a bank. This means that the bank is the general deposi-
tor’s debtor,12 but that the bank has legal title to the funds de-
posited; these funds may be commingled with the bank’s other 
funds.13 All the general depositor has is a general, unsecured 
claim against the bank, not a claim to the specific funds. 
In contrast, with a specific deposit, the bank is in the posi-
tion of a bailee for the depositor.14 Title to the specially deposited 
funds or to assets placed in the safe-deposit box does not trans-
fer to the bank but instead remains with the depositor.15 A bailee 
holds specific property in trust for the bailor and must return 
that same property when required to do so by the terms of the 
bailment. Moreover, because the bailment is held in trust, the 
bailee is a fiduciary. Accordingly, a bailee may not use a bail-
ment for his own benefit, and to the extent that he does, he is 
 
regarding bank deposits, see generally Timothy C. Harker, Bailment Ailment: An Analysis 
of the Legal Status of Ordinary Demand Deposits in the Shadow of the Financial Crisis of 
2008, 19 Fordham J Corp & Fin L 543 (2014). Roman law makes a finer distinction than 
the Anglo-Saxon tradition that is based not only on whether repayment must be of the spe-
cific item loaned or of a fungible item but also on whether repayment is on demand or per 
term. Thus, in Roman law there is a loan contract (mutuum) requiring repayment of only 
the same number of units of the same sort and quality received (tantundem) at the end of a 
term, a loan contract requiring the return of the specific items loaned at the end of a term 
(commodatum), and a deposit contract (depositum) requiring return of the item that was 
entrusted on demand. See Jesús Huerta de Soto, Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles 
1–20 (Mises Institute 2006) (Melinda A. Stroup, trans) (noting the problem from the depos-
it of a fungible good, or a depositum irregolare). Renaissance Italian bankers distinguished 
between time deposits (depositi a discrezione), which were legally considered equity in-
vestments rather than debts, and demand deposits (depositi). See Raymond de Roover, 
The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank: 1397–1494 98–102 (Harvard 1963). 
 11 See Resseguie, 1 Banking Law § 9.06 at 9-19 (cited in note 10). 
 12 See In re Interborough Consolidated Corp, 288 F 334, 347 (2d Cir 1923); Bank of 
the Republic v Millard, 77 US (10 Wall) 152, 156 (1869). 
 13 See Resseguie, 1 Banking Law § 9.06 at 9-19 (cited in note 10). 
 14 See id; Commercial Bank of Pennsylvania, 148 US at 59. Whether a safe deposit 
is a bailment is a matter of contention. The majority position holds that it is a bailment, 
even though the bank may not know the contents of the safe-deposit box. See, for exam-
ple, Martin, Lucas & Chioffi, LLP v Bank of America, 714 F Supp 2d 303, 311 (D Conn 
2010); Cohen v Manufacturers Safe Deposit Co, 78 NE2d 604, 606 (NY App 1948). A mi-
nority of cases have held that the safe-deposit box relationship is actually similar to a 
landlord-tenant relationship. See Resseguie, 1 Banking Law § 10.03 at 10-10 (cited in 
note 10). Safe-deposit agreements themselves often purport to be mere leases of storage 
space rather than bailments. See, for example, Your Deposit Account Agreement (US 
Bank, June 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/H58J-755X. 
 15 See, for example, In re Kountze Brothers, 27 F Supp 1002, 1003 (SDNY 1938); 
Pitts v Pease, 39 F2d 14, 15 (5th Cir 1930); State v Bartley, 58 NW 172, 176 (Neb 1894); 
Preston v Prather, 137 US 604, 615 (1891). 
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answerable to the bailor for any gains and losses.16 A bailee en-
joys no upside from the use of the bailment. 
In contrast, a general deposit is a loan from the depositor to 
the bank. Thus, the bank is free to use the deposit as it sees fit. 
While the bank has an obligation to repay the principal amount 
of the deposit and any interest owed at the promised maturity, 
the bank is not answerable to the depositor for any gains made 
from the use of the deposit beyond those specified in the con-
tract. A bank enjoys the upside from relending a deposit beyond 
any interest that is promised to the depositor. 
This subtle legal distinction matters quite a bit, because it 
means that banks reloan deposits but not safe deposits. Relending 
deposits necessarily involves risk. The bank is willing to take the 
risk of relending deposits because it can keep the upside. Thus, 
banks will often pay interest on deposits, but that is not a neces-
sary feature of deposits. Instead, it is a competitive means of at-
tracting deposits, and it is possible only because the bank be-
lieves it can profitably relend the deposits even if it pays interest. 
There is always the risk, however, that a bank’s relending of 
deposits will go badly and that the bank’s losses will exceed the 
bank’s capital and make it impossible for the bank to repay the 
deposits when they come due. Thus, by engaging in the Lending 
Function, banks necessarily impair the Deposit Function. It is not 
possible, absent government support, for a bank to credibly offer 
absolute safekeeping to its depositors and to also make loans. 
C. How the Banker Got His Business: A Just-So Story 
Despite the tension between the Deposit and Lending Func-
tions, we take it for granted that a bank is a place where we both 
place deposits and obtain loans. But it hardly has to be this 
way—and indeed, it was not for most of history. As economist 
Professor James Tobin has observed, “[t]he linking of deposit 
money and commercial banking is an accident of history.”17 There 
is some evidence of fractional reserve banking in the Hellenistic 
 
 16 See, for example, Magruder v Drury, 235 US 106, 119 (1914). As a young lawyer, 
President Abraham Lincoln famously (and successfully) defended a trover action against 
a bailee of a horse. See Johnson v Weedman, 5 Ill 495, 496 (1843). The bailee had ridden 
the horse and was sued for conversion for the wear and tear on the beast. The Illinois 
Supreme Court held that there was no conversion because there was no evidence of ac-
tual damage. Id at 497. 
 17 James Tobin, A Case for Preserving Regulatory Distinctions, 30 Challenge 10, 14 
(Nov/Dec 1987). 
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and Roman worlds,18 as well as in Jewish practice.19 Nonetheless, 
the historical development of fractional reserve banking remains 
shrouded, and it seems fair to say that its modern practice devel-
oped in Spain and northern Italy in the Middle Ages20 and then 
took off in seventeenth-century London.21 In other words, the de-
velopment of banks as institutions offering both safekeeping and 
loans is a fairly recent development. This institutional combina-
tion likely arose from simple opportunism, although we cannot be 
sure.22 Still, we might tell a just-so story that serves as a crea-
tion myth of the modern bank and its combination of the Deposit 
and Lending Functions.23 
1.   The Goldsmith’s Tale. 
It is the year 1300 CE. Bartolomeo, a goldsmith in Renais-
sance Florence, has invested in a very secure strongbox, in which 
he stores his wares when they are not on display. Bartolomeo’s 
neighbor, Cosimo, a prosperous silk merchant, has recently con-
cluded a large sale and is in possession of a small fortune of 
five thousand gold florins. Banks do not yet exist, so what is 
Cosimo to do with the money? Cosimo fears that if he keeps the 
coins in his house, he will be the target of theft. Cosimo knows 
 
 18 See Huerta de Soto, Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles at 49 (cited in 
note 10); W.V. Harris, Rome’s Imperial Economy: Twelve Essays 236 (Oxford 2011); Sitta 
von Reden, Money in Ptolemaic Egypt: From the Macedonian Conquest to the End of the 
Third Century BC 287–90 (Cambridge 2007); W.V. Harris, A Revisionist View of Roman 
Money, 96 J Roman Stud 1, 10–12 (2006); Peter Temin, Financial Intermediation in the 
Early Roman Empire, 64 J Econ Hist 705, 722 (2004); Jean Andreau, Banking and Busi-
ness in the Roman World 39–41 (Cambridge 1999) (Janet Lloyd, trans). 
 19 See, for example, Talmud, Baba Metzia 3:11 (describing a presumption under 
which a bailment with a money changer is reloanable unless specially indicated other-
wise by the depositor’s tender of the funds in a sealed bag); id at 43a; Maimonides, 
Mishneh Torah, Sefer Mishpatim, She’elah u-Fikkadon 7:6; Joseph Karo, Shulẖan Arukh 
188:1. These texts represent the major codifications of Jewish law from the second centu-
ry through the sixteenth century of the Common Era. 
 20 See Meir Kohn, Early Deposit Banking *1 (unpublished manuscript, Feb 1999), 
archived at http://perma.cc/S7WT-KHZ4 (discussing the growth of deposit banking out of 
money changing in medieval Italy); Abbott Payson Usher, 1 The Early History of Deposit 
Banking in Mediterranean Europe 15–20 (Harvard 1943) (detailing the emergence of 
fractional reserve banking in the late Middle Ages). 
 21 See, for example, George Selgin, Those Dishonest Goldsmiths *5–6 (unpublished 
manuscript, Jan 20, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/UQ9U-B6SR. 
 22 See id at *2–3 (arguing that there is no evidence of London goldsmiths clandes-
tinely lending coins that they were supposed to store).  
 23 I am not the first to tell a story like this. See, for example, William J. Baumol 
and Alan S. Blinder, Economics: Principles and Policy 626–27 (Cengage 12th ed 2012); 
Stuart I. Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor, Contemporary Financial Intermediation 95 
(Elsevier 2d ed 2007). 
 2016] Safe Banking: Finance and Democracy 371 
 
of Bartolomeo’s strongbox, and he trusts Bartolomeo. Cosimo 
asks Bartolomeo if he can store his coins in the strongbox and 
offers to pay for the privilege of doing so. Bartolomeo accepts the 
offer, promising Cosimo access to the coins whenever he wants. 
Thereafter, Cosimo regularly makes withdrawals from and de-
posits to Bartolomeo’s strongbox. At this point, we have the 
safekeeping function of banking. Bartolomeo the Bank keeps 
funds for Cosimo the Customer. 
Bartolomeo makes Cosimo’s funds available to him in the 
form of a deposit—gold florins—rather than in any other medi-
um, such as Venetian grossi or Hungarian forints or gold ingots 
or jewelry. Not only is the total value of Cosimo’s funds pre-
served but so is their precise liquidity and spendability. 
Cosimo is planning a business trip to Venice to buy silk from 
Levantine merchants there.24 Cosimo needs funds to pay for the 
silk and comes to claim his coins from Bartolomeo. Cosimo tells 
Bartolomeo about the trip and mentions that he is worried that 
he will be robbed while traveling with his coins. Bartolomeo sug-
gests a solution: Salomone, a Venetian goldsmith, owes him a 
debt of one thousand gold florins. Bartolomeo will give Cosimo a 
letter instructing Salomone to pay the florins to Cosimo when 
he arrives in Venice, in satisfaction of the debt to Bartolomeo. 
That way, Cosimo need not carry coins with him on his journey. 
Bartolomeo will get paid by taking one thousand gold florins from 
those that Cosimo deposited with him. Of course, Bartolomeo 
charges Cosimo a small fee for this payment service. 
Bartolomeo has invented the bill of exchange, one form of 
what we now call a check. Thus, we now have the payments 
function of banking that enables the depositor to transfer his 
funds without actually physically withdrawing them, by means 
of paperization (which today is often done digitally). Spendabil-
ity is thus enhanced. 
Up to this point, Cosimo’s stash of gold florins has been sit-
ting securely in Bartolomeo’s strongbox. Bartolomeo often has 
customers who need ready funds. These customers sell him their 
jewelry, which Bartolomeo promises to sell back to them in three 
months at a 10 percent markup. If the customers fail to repur-
chase the jewelry, Bartolomeo will sell it to someone else. Thus, 
Bartolomeo is also doing business as a pawnbroker. And because 
 
 24 For a discussion of the legal aspects of Venice’s Levantine trade, see E. Natalie 
Rothman, Brokering Empire: Trans-imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul 77–
84 (Cornell 2012).  
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he cleverly structures his loans as sales and repurchases, he 
does not run afoul of the Church’s prohibition on usury—lending 
money on interest.25 
Bartolomeo finds the pawn business quite profitable, but he 
has to turn down some potential borrowers because he simply 
does not have adequate funds of his own to make all of the loans. 
After several months of Cosimo making deposits and withdraw-
als, Bartolomeo realizes that Cosimo never withdraws all of his 
money. Cosimo always maintains at least five hundred gold flor-
ins on deposit. Bartolomeo decides to take five hundred of the 
gold florins that Cosimo has deposited with him and use them to 
fund more pawn loans, figuring that the loans will be repaid or 
the collateral jewelry sold before Cosimo ever asks for his mon-
ey. In other words, Bartolomeo is going to make money by lend-
ing out Cosimo’s money, without Cosimo’s permission. At this 
point, we have combined the Deposit Function with the Lending 
Function, and Bartolomeo has invented “fractional reserve” 
banking, meaning that only a fraction of the funds deposited 
with him will be kept on hand as reserves. 
Bartolomeo has also embarked on one of the major functions 
of financial intermediation, namely, maturity transformation. 
While Bartolomeo’s liability to Cosimo is on demand, his pawn-
loan customers’ liability is on a trimonthly basis. This maturity 
transformation is valuable to the pawn-loan customers, as they 
are able to lock in longer-term capital than if Bartolomeo had 
just passed through Cosimo’s funds on an on-demand basis. 
Thus, if Fortuno the Farmer, a prosperous peasant, takes out a 
pawn loan in the spring, he might not be able to repay it until 
the summer’s harvest is brought in. Fortuno needs capital with 
maturities that fit with his own income pattern. Bartolomeo is 
 
 25 Alternatively, Bartolomeo and Cosimo might enter into a contract known as a 
depositum confessatum, which would declare that the parties had entered into a deposit 
contract, rather than a loan, but would also provide for “penalties” if the deposit were not 
returned after a certain period of time. These penalties would function as interest. See 
Huerta de Soto, Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles at 65–66 (cited in note 10). 
Bartolomeo might also evade usury restrictions through a technique known as “dry ex-
change,” or cambium siccum, in which a borrower would pay a bill of exchange with an-
other bill of exchange for a greater amount equal to the amount of the loan plus the fi-
nance charge on the loan. See Daniel R. Coquillette, The Mystery of the New Fashioned 
Goldsmiths: From Usury to the Bank of England (1622-1694), in Vito Piergiovanni, ed, 
The Growth of the Bank as Institution and the Development of Money-Business Law 91, 
97 (Duncker & Humblot 1993); Raymond de Roover, What Is Dry Exchange? A Contribu-
tion to the Study of English Mercantilism, 52 J Polit Econ 250, 252 (1944). 
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providing a valuable maturity-transformation function. But it 
comes at a serious risk, as we shall see. 
For a couple of years, this relending scheme works very well 
for Bartolomeo. But one day, Cosimo comes in and announces 
that he would like to withdraw all of his money. He has decided 
to take up holy orders and give all his money to the Church. 
Bartolomeo is horrified because he does not have all of Cosimo’s 
funds on hand, as he has loaned them out and they are not due 
for a couple of weeks. Bartolomeo is solvent, but he has an asset-
liability duration-mismatch problem. 
Bartolomeo realizes that Cosimo could report him to the 
Signoria (the government), which would severely punish him 
for defalcation. Desperate, Bartolomeo offers Cosimo a deal—if 
Cosimo does not turn him in and keeps his funds on deposit, 
Bartolomeo will pay Cosimo twenty-five gold florins a month—
half of what Bartolomeo is making on the pawn loans. Lured by 
lucre, Cosimo reconsiders his decision to live a life of monastic 
penury and accepts the deal. While Cosimo was not originally a 
willing source of funds for the pawn loans, now he is entrusting 
his money to Bartolomeo for financial intermediation. Now the 
Lending Function has become a type of investment function. 
Cosimo is now keeping his funds on deposit with Bartolomeo not 
just for safekeeping but also to get an investment return. 
Now authorized to invest Cosimo’s funds, Bartolomeo de-
cides to invest Cosimo’s money, along with all of his own, in a 
voyage planned by Marino the Mariner. It is a can’t-miss expedi-
tion to bring back exotic spices from the Levant. The voyage 
promises exponentially greater returns than the pawn loans. 
Alas, one day Bartolomeo hears the terrible news: Marino’s ship 
was lost at sea with all its cargo. His investment is worthless. 
No sooner has he heard of the tragedy than Cosimo shows 
up and asks for all of his money back because he needs to pro-
vide a dowry for his homely daughter. Bartolomeo’s problem 
now is not an asset-liability duration mismatch but instead in-
solvency. This time his pleading with Cosimo is for naught; 
without the dowry, Cosimo’s daughter’s prospects are ruined. A 
vengeful Cosimo reports Bartolomeo to the Signoria, which 
hauls Bartolomeo away for condign punishment.26 
 
 26 Perhaps ordering this punishment himself, Durante degli Alighieri, also known as 
Dante, serving as one of the six priors of the Republican Florentine Signoria, will take 
note and assign Bartolomeo and other usurers to the Seventh Circle of Hell in his Inferno. 
Dante Alighieri, The Inferno 112–13 (Temple Classics 1900) (H. Oelsner, ed) (Carlyle, 
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As part of Bartolomeo’s humiliation, his stall on the Ponte 
Vecchio is smashed in two by the officers of the Signoria, signify-
ing that he is a banca rotta—a “broken bench” or a bankrupt. 
While Cosimo was happy to take the upside of the investment in 
the Bartolomeo “bank,” he still expected safekeeping. In the end, 
he got neither. 
To complete our story, Bartolomeo’s clever nephew Prospero 
the Pawnbroker grows up shamed by his uncle’s disgrace, but he 
realizes that the basic banking business actually worked pretty 
well and recognizes a way to make it work better: he will diver-
sify his funding and thus the liquidity demands that he must 
meet. Prospero replicates Bartolomeo’s business, but instead of 
taking funds from just one depositor, he takes deposits from all 
of the silk and wool merchants in the city. Prospero realizes that 
not all the merchants are likely to simultaneously seek to with-
draw their funds absent unusual conditions. Thus, Prospero is 
able to lend out some of the funds as long as he maintains a suf-
ficient liquid reserve to satisfy those depositor claims that arise 
from time to time; he does not need to maintain all of their funds 
on hand. 
Prospero’s depositors also learn from Cosimo’s experience 
with Bartolomeo. They insist that Prospero invest only in safe 
investments like pawn loans, which are made on good collateral 
that is worth more than the value of the loan. None of these 
loans is particularly large, so the depositors are protected to 
some degree by diversification. But these pawn loans will never 
bring in returns equal to a successful voyage to the Levant. So 
the depositors sacrifice some yield for safety. 
Prospero’s depositors still have a problem, however: How do 
they know that Prospero is only making pawn loans? How do 
they know that he is not investing their funds in the voyage of 
Marino’s nephew, Narcisso the Navigator, or speculating on 
Tuscan farmland, which will become worthless if the peasantry 
is decimated by the Black Plague? And some of the depositors 
recognize that if Florence is threatened by a papal or French ar-
my, there will be a run on Prospero’s bank because depositors will 
scramble to flee the city with their funds, lest their funds be loot-
ed if the city is sacked. How can these forward-looking depositors 
 
trans). See also John Addington Symonds, An Introduction to the Study of Dante 57–58 
(Macmillan 4th ed 1899). 
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be sure that they will be repaid when Prospero has reloaned 
their funds? 
The depositors start demanding that Prospero undergo peri-
odic audits by their representatives and that he maintain a cer-
tain level of reserves on hand. And thus, bank regulation is born 
in an attempt to square the circles of safekeeping and invest-
ment risk. 
The invention of bank regulation does not completely solve 
the depositors’ problem, however. How can they trust their rep-
resentatives to get it right? What if Prospero has bribed the au-
ditors? Or what if the auditors are clueless or simply incapable 
of sniffing out Prospero’s financial knavery? The depositors re-
quire their auditors to swear a sacred oath on their eternal souls 
and in the end rely on the auditors’ good faith and acuity. Not 
surprisingly, not all of the depositors sleep soundly at night. 
One day, the auditors discover that Prospero has in fact 
loaned out funds beyond his reserve limit to some very specula-
tive ventures. The auditors triumphantly report their discovery 
to the depositors. But what good does this do? Prospero will be 
disgraced and punished, but the depositors’ funds are still at 
risk. Absent some type of deposit insurance system, the pruden-
tial regulation alone may not protect the depositors. Thus, the 
depositors find themselves demanding that the state guaranty 
their deposits. 
In the story above, fractional reserve banking emerged from 
a tawdry tale of opportunism. Today, it is a system that has be-
come universally accepted and that has had several centuries of 
staying power. Thus, even if fractional reserve banking’s origins 
were in opportunism, it may well have been an efficient devel-
opment. One can spin out multiple efficiency yarns, but two 
compatible stories we might consider are the Depositor’s Tale 
and the Banker’s Tale. 
2.   The Depositor’s Tale. 
The Depositor’s Tale is a microeconomic-efficiency story. In 
this story, depositors are willing to tolerate fractional reserve 
banking because it is the best option relative to their alterna-
tives. Cosimo went along with Bartolomeo’s scheme because it 
was the best opportunity available. 
Until the development of deep and liquid capital markets, 
savers like Cosimo had few options for liquid investments (and far 
fewer investment options in general). Moreover, depositors lacked 
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credible safekeeping alternatives. How could Cosimo ever be sure 
that Bartolomeo was not relending some of his funds? No bank or 
other depositary could credibly commit to 100% reserves prior to 
the development of modern bank regulatory systems. In these cir-
cumstances, fractional reserve banking was, despite its risks, the 
best deal that depositors could get: it offered them liquidity and a 
reasonable measure of safekeeping plus some modest yield. 
Even if this story were once true, it is no longer clear why it 
would hold today. Capital markets now offer an enormous range 
of liquid investment alternatives, such as Treasury securities; 
investment-grade corporate, municipal, and structured bonds; 
and money market mutual funds. At the same time, modern bank 
regulatory regimes mean that a bank can today much more credi-
bly promise not to reloan deposits than could Bartolomeo the 
Bank. Technological and market changes may have changed the 
efficiency of fractional reserve banking. 
3.   The Banker’s Tale. 
There is also a possible macroeconomic-efficiency story re-
garding fractional reserve banking. Both fractional reserve 
banking and payment systems enabled the creation of private 
money.27 Bank deposits are effectively a form of money. When a 
bank makes a loan, the loan is seldom disbursed in cash. No 
currency actually changes hands. Instead, the loan is disbursed 
to the borrower’s deposit account at the bank. The result is that 
the bank’s balance sheet gains both an asset (the loan) and a li-
ability (the deposit). The borrower’s balance sheet also gains an 
asset (the deposit) and a liability (the loan). Because both banks 
and borrowers are able to spend their newly created assets, the 
money supply has effectively expanded.28 
Prior to the Renaissance, money creation was primarily pub-
lic. The pre-Renaissance money supply consisted of coins minted 
by governments.29 This situation was less than optimal. Govern-
ments might not in fact have had the means to produce sufficient 
 
 27 See Felix Martin, Money: The Unauthorised Biography 108 (Knopf 2014); Christine 
Desan, Making Money: Coin, Currency, and the Coming of Capitalism 25 (Oxford 2014) 
(noting that fractional reserve banking “allows people to expand the number of units cir-
culating beyond that produced by the fiscal activity of the stakeholder or government at 
the center, supplementing the amount of money generated by public spending alone”).  
 28 See Michael McLeay, Amar Radia, and Ryland Thomas, Money Creation in the 
Modern Economy, 54 Bank Eng Q Bull 14, 16 (2014). 
 29 See Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World 23–24 
(Penguin 2008). 
 2016] Safe Banking: Finance and Democracy 377 
 
currency by minting, which was expensive and dependent on 
supplies of precious metal.30 More troubling, however, was that 
governments often debased their currencies to obtain immediate 
increases in their spending capacities.31 If a king wanted to fi-
nance a war or a new palace or some other project, a simple way 
to do so was to debase the currency. The pre-Renaissance money 
supply was driven not by market supply and demand but by the 
needs of the state.32 
The development of fractional reserve banking and non-real-
time payment systems enabled private money creation, which 
was arguably the great economic development of the Renais-
sance.33 Private money creation loosened the supply constraint 
that existed because of state control of monetary production. It 
also reduced the ability of the state to engage in financial re-
pression through debasement. 
In this efficiency story, the European economy boomed once 
it was freed from a fettered money supply, and this growth was 
furthered by the development of new markets (especially after 
1492), new technology (especially in terms of navigation), and 
new payment systems that enabled long-distance commerce and 
movements of capital. 
According to this story, countries that stayed tied to public 
money lagged behind, while those that developed private money 
creation boomed. Thus, Spain’s coffers, bloated with gold and 
silver extracted from New World mines, allowed its banking sys-
tem to stagnate. Meanwhile, the economies of the Netherlands 
and England, which had developed very advanced banking sys-
tems, punched above their weight in part because of the ability 
of their financial systems to provide the capital and liquidity 
needed for business ventures.34 
Obviously, this story is reductionist and oversimplifies a 
range of social, political, and economic factors that might explain 
the relative success of some states. It also ignores the booms and 
busts accompanying private money, which could constrict much 
more rapidly than public money precisely because it was ulti-
mately convertible into specie or other legal tender money, of 
 
 30 Id at 24. 
 31 See Martin, Money at 88–89 (cited in note 27). See also The Case of Mixed Money 
in Ireland, 2 Howell’s St Trials 114, 114–15 (PC 1605) (describing the history of the de-
basement of English currency).  
 32 See R.G. Hawtrey, Currency and Credit 279–84 (Longmans, Green 1919). 
 33 See Ferguson, The Ascent of Money at 41–52 (cited in note 29). 
 34 See id at 51–52. 
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which there was a more limited supply. Built into this 
macroeconomic-efficiency story is also the assumption that econ-
omies grew faster than they otherwise would have because of the 
private money supply. Perhaps this is true, but it is not a falsifi-
able assumption and correlation does not imply causation. There 
is no way to readily net out the effects of the booms and busts, 
much less of private money as a whole. The macroeconomic-
efficiency story, like the microeconomic-efficiency story, is as 
much of a just-so story as the Goldsmith’s Tale. 
Yet, even if there were once a macroeconomic efficiency to 
private money creation, that efficiency might no longer hold 
given changes in markets, governments, and technology. Gov-
ernments can create money themselves much more efficiently in 
today’s age of paper currency and electronic benefit transfers 
than in the minting days of yore. Money is no longer tied to spe-
cie extraction.35 
There is also much more massive government spending 
(which puts government money into circulation) and government 
borrowing (which creates government obligations that operate 
as money) today than there was prior to the twentieth century.36 
In the developed world, government fiscal activity is now gener-
ally subject to some measure of democratic accountability; fiscal 
activity no longer reflects the whims and caprices of a monarch 
but is instead an expression of democratic politics. 
Finally, governments are now much more actively and 
adeptly involved in control over the private production of money. 
The operation of the money supply is much better understood 
today than it was in past centuries, and this allows for much 
greater and more-skillful government stewardship of the money 
supply. Central banks now control the money supply by adjust-
ing the price of money through setting target interest rates.37 
Money production has become monetary policy, and it is done no 
longer simply to facilitate the monarch’s spending but instead to 
achieve the politically desired levels of growth, employment, and 
inflation.38 
These market, governmental, and technological changes 
mean that the efficiency of private money creation that stems 
 
 35 See id at 62. 
 36 See id at 65–69. 
 37 See Baumol and Blinder, Economics at 644–46 (cited in note 23). 
 38 See McLeay, Radia, and Thomas, 54 Bank Eng Q Bull at 14–15 (cited in note 28). 
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from fractional reserve banking is no longer so self-evident, even 
if its inherent instability is increasingly obvious. 
II.  SQUARING THE CIRCLE? ATTEMPTS TO MAKE BANKING SAFER 
Several market and regulatory solutions have emerged to ad-
dress the problem of the instability created by fractional reserve 
banking. They include the direct provision of depository services 
by the government; the government provision of solvency and li-
quidity backstops for private institutions; and the transactional 
construction of “safe assets.” This Part reviews these solutions 
and their shortcomings. 
A. Direct Government Credit: Government Banks 
One approach to combining the Deposit and Lending Func-
tions is to have government banks. Depositors at government 
banks have claims against the government. While government 
debt, like any debt, has some risks, a claim against the govern-
ment is as safe as debt can be. Indeed, investing in US govern-
ment debt is a way to functionally create a safe deposit—US 
government debt is as risk-free as an investment can be, and 
because it trades in highly liquid secondary markets, it also of-
fers liquidity benefits similar to those of a demand deposit. Ad-
ditionally, so-called “Agency” debt, issued by governmental 
agencies or government-sponsored entities, does not generally 
bear the “eagle”39—it is generally not expressly backed by the 
full faith and credit of the US government, but it is usually per-
ceived as implicitly guarantied and accordingly it has liquidity 
similar to that of government debt.40 
As of the end of 2014, there was about $14.4 trillion of out-
standing US government securities and another $7.9 trillion in 
“Agency” securities.41 While these numbers may seem eye-popping, 
 
 39 The sole exception to this general statement are Ginnie Mae securities, which 
are privately issued mortgage-backed securities guarantied by the Government National 
Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae”). See note 143. 
 40 See Frank J. Fabozzi and Michael J. Fleming, US Treasury and Agency Securi-
ties, in The Handbook of Fixed Income Securities 1, 10 (Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York 7th ed 2004). See also Sean Campbell, Canlin Li, and Jay Im, Measuring Agency 
MBS Market Liquidity with Transaction Data (Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, Jan 31, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/582K-A5XS (noting that bid–ask 
spreads (a measure of liquidity) on Agency mortgage-backed securities are very similar 
to those on Treasury securities). 
 41 Financial Accounts of the United States: Flow of Funds, Balance Sheets, and In-
tegrated Macroeconomic Accounts; Third Quarter 2015 *113 (Board of Governors of the 
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they are in fact small relative to demand. Government debt and 
Agency debt are issued based on government and Agency needs 
rather than on market demand. Moreover, government debt and 
Agency debt, although highly liquid, are not linked with a pay-
ment system, which limits liquidity in the real economy. To 
spend a Treasury bond on most purchases, one must first sell it 
for cash and then spend the cash on the ultimate purchase. Ac-
cordingly, government and Agency debt cannot satisfy the full 
market demand for the Deposit Function. 
Governments can meet the Deposit Function not only 
through direct debt issuance but also by accepting formal depos-
its at government banks. The United States has had a couple of 
experiences with government banks. From 1911 to 1967, the US 
Postal Service ran a Postal Savings Bank.42 From 1919 to the 
present, the Bank of North Dakota has operated as a state-run 
bank.43 The Postal Savings Bank offered only passbook savings 
accounts of limited size, as well as some payment services.44 Un-
like a checking account, a passbook savings account cannot be 
used to make payments. It merely offers safekeeping of the de-
positor’s funds, withdrawable in cash but not transferrable via 
check or other payment medium. When the Postal Savings Bank 
existed, the Postal Service was still a cabinet-level US govern-
ment agency, and postal savings deposits were backed by the 
full faith and credit of the United States.45 What’s more, the 
Postal Savings Bank paid interest on deposits at a statutory rate 
of 2 percent.46 This combination of absolute safety and yield made 
postal savings deposits incredibly attractive during the Great 
Depression. Privately owned banks were failing and offered little 
yield on their deposits. As a result, the Postal Savings Bank’s 
 
Federal Reserve System, Dec 10, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/S2LA-6675 (showing 
the total outstanding US government securities in line 3 of Table L.208 and the total 
outstanding Agency securities and mortgage-backed securities in line 4 of Table L.208). 
 42 See generally Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat 814, repealed by Act of Mar 28, 1966, 
Pub L No 89-377, 80 Stat 92. Democratic presidential candidate Bernie Sanders has 
called for the revival of postal banking. See Text of Bernie Sanders’ Wall Street and 
Economy Speech (MarketWatch, Jan 5, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/PMM6 
-NWMW. 
 43 See Early Days of the BND (Bank of North Dakota), archived at 
http://perma.cc/F7WP-9FD5. 
 44 See Act of June 25, 1910 §§ 3–6, 36 Stat at 815–16. 
 45 See Act of June 25, 1910 § 16, 36 Stat at 819. 
 46 Act of June 25, 1910 § 7, 36 Stat at 816. 
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deposits swelled to around 10 percent of the total deposits in the 
commercial banking system.47 
While the Postal Savings Bank offered a limited Deposit 
Function (with safekeeping, but not linked payments), its Lending 
Function was more limited. The Postal Savings Bank did not 
make loans to private enterprises. Instead, it was required, by 
statute, to either redeposit its deposits with commercial banks 
in the geographic area where postal deposits were received (re-
lending money to commercial banks) or invest in Treasury bonds 
(relending money to the US government, but with a maturity 
transformation).48 
Yet some risk remained. To the extent that the Postal Sav-
ings Bank reinvested in Treasury bonds, the Lending Function 
created some liquidity risk but no meaningful credit risk, as the 
credit risk remained that of the US government. But when the 
Postal Savings Bank reinvested in local commercial banks, it did 
assume real credit risk—and indeed, it assumed the very credit 
risk that postal savings depositors had chosen to avoid. The 
Postal Savings Bank thus squared the circle of the Deposit and 
Lending Functions only through the pledge of the full faith and 
credit of the United States. 
Obviously, there is still some risk when dealing with a sov-
ereign. Sovereigns will sometimes encounter liquidity problems. 
And the Leviathan can always choose to change the terms of its 
bargain and either formally renounce its obligations or impose 
bank holidays or inflate the currency (a risk for any deposits de-
nominated in that currency). But these risks exist in any finan-
cial system with government-controlled currency.49 
The United States’ other experiment with government bank-
ing is the Bank of North Dakota. The Bank of North Dakota 
both takes deposits and makes loans to private enterprises, but 
it is not backed by the full faith and credit of the United States 
 
 47 Maureen O’Hara and David Easley, The Postal Savings System in the Depres-
sion, 39 J Econ Hist 741, 741 n 1 (1979). 
 48 Act of June 25, 1910 § 9, 36 Stat at 816–17 (explaining that “postal savings funds 
received under the provisions of this Act shall be deposited in solvent banks” and that 
funds “may at any time be withdrawn by the trustees for investment in bonds or other 
securities of the United States”). 
 49 One claim of cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, is that they are immune from po-
litically controlled inflation. See Stephen Small, Bitcoin: The Napster of Currency, 37 
Houston J Intl L 581, 608 n 163 (2015). These cryptocurrencies, however, carry with 
them a host of other risks that more than offset their inflation stability. See Kevin Dowd 
and Martin Hutchinson, Bitcoin Will Bite the Dust, 35 Cato J 357, 359 (2015). 
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(it is instead backed only by that of the state of North Dakota)50 
and its deposits are not federally insured.51 While states cannot 
discharge their obligations in bankruptcy, it is also very difficult 
to force states to pay obligations that they either do not wish to 
or cannot pay. The credit of the state of North Dakota may well 
be better than that of the privately owned banks operating in that 
state, but because the state of North Dakota does not have control 
over the currency, it is limited in its ability to readjust its obliga-
tions; thus, the safety offered by the Bank of North Dakota is not 
absolute but only relative. 
Moreover, the Bank of North Dakota also engages in only a 
limited Lending Function: it is permitted to make direct loans 
for student loans, farm real estate, and the acquisition of bank 
stock, as well as for a few other limited and specifically enumer-
ated purposes.52 All other commercial or consumer lending is 
done through participation in loans made by other banks. Like-
wise, the Bank of North Dakota offers only limited payment ser-
vices: it does not provide debit cards, credit cards, or online bill 
pay, because its policy is to not compete with the private sector 
for retail deposits.53 
The Postal Savings Bank offered and the Bank of North 
Dakota offers limited banking services because of political con-
cerns about competition between a governmental entity and the 
private sector. In theory, however, there is no reason that a pub-
lic option in banking need be so limited.54 Theoretically, a public 
option in banking (or even a government-banking monopoly) 
would be able to offer the full panoply of Deposit and Lending 
Function services. Government banks are able to successfully 
combine the Deposit and Lending Functions, but only because of 
government debt’s status as the ultimate “safe asset” and the 
government’s nearly limitless liquidity due to its taxation power 
and as backed by its monopoly on violence. 
 
 50 See ND Cent Code § 6-09-10. 
 51 See Frequently Asked Questions *3 (Bank of North Dakota), archived at 
http://perma.cc/9N6M-JSSP. 
 52 See ND Cent Code § 6-09-15(g). 
 53 See Frequently Asked Questions at *7 (cited in note 51).  
 54 See Adam J. Levitin, Public-Private Risk Sharing in Financial Regulation *48 
(unpublished manuscript, Apr 5, 2013) (on file with author); Adam J. Levitin and Susan 
M. Wachter, The Public Option in Housing Finance, 46 UC Davis L Rev 1111, 1115–17 
(2013); Adam J. Levitin, Public-Private Competition in Payments: The Role of the Federal 
Reserve *5 (Georgetown University Law Center Business, Economics and Regulatory 
Policy Working Paper Series, June 23, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/D433-VQ4H. 
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The design of both the Postal Savings Bank and the Bank of 
North Dakota shows a concern about public competition with 
private entities. But for both public options and government mo-
nopolies, another problem exists: politicized allocation of credit. 
When the government is in a position to decide which borrowers 
may obtain credit and on what terms, the credit-granting deci-
sion may be made not solely on the basis of the expected return 
on assets for the loan but may include political considerations. As 
a result, the Lending Function can become plagued with public-
choice problems. While government banks can successfully com-
bine the Deposit and Lending Functions, this combination comes 
at the expense of concerns about politicized finance. 
B. Government Guaranties: Deposit Insurance and Liquidity 
Provision 
An alternative attempt to square Deposits with Lending 
is to hold these inconsistent functions together through bank 
regulation. Bank regulation seeks to ensure that banks do not 
assume excessive risks and that they have the capital and li-
quidity to absorb losses while still honoring all depositor 
withdrawals. 
As we saw with the unfortunate Bartolomeo, banks face two 
distinct problems: liquidity and solvency. Even if a bank is sol-
vent, meaning that its assets are worth more than its liabilities, 
it may be illiquid, and to a depositor, the difference may not 
matter much, because time may be of the essence for the deposi-
tor’s withdrawal. 
To solve these problems, modern bank regulation has come 
up with a host of devices. Foremost among them are capital reg-
ulation and government deposit insurance to address solvency 
concerns, and reserve requirements and government liquidity 
facilities to address liquidity concerns. Layered across these sol-
vency and liquidity protections are regular supervisory exami-
nations, activity restrictions, and investment limitations—all of 
which are aimed at preventing banks from having to turn to the 
solvency and liquidity protections in the first place.55 
Solvency, liquidity protections, precatory supervision, and ac-
tivity restrictions are the core of modern bank regulation. While 
bank regulation has grown to include consumer-protection, 
 
 55 See Jeremy C. Stein, Liquidity Regulation and Central Banking *3–6 (Federal 
Reserve Bank of Richmond, Apr 19, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/RJ9Y-FXLP. 
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fair-lending, and anti-money-laundering regulations, these regu-
lations are meant to address a different set of problems that are 
not connected with the linkage of the Deposit and Lending Func-
tions. Title 12 of the United States Code and Title 12 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations (Banks and Banking) together currently 
stand at nearly 11,000 pages (10,902 to be precise),56 and this is 
without the completion of all of the rulemakings mandated by 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act57 (“Dodd-Frank Act”). This count excludes certain banking-
related statutes (such as the Truth in Lending Act58 and the 
Electronic Fund Transfer Act59) and regulations (such as Federal 
Housing Administration insurance regulations60) that are codi-
fied in other titles. 
By way of comparison, the 10,902 pages of banking statutes 
and regulations are fewer than either the 19,651 pages of tax 
statutes and regulations61 (which administer an ex post tax sys-
tem rather than an ex ante regulatory system) or the 12,226 
pages of agricultural statutes and regulations,62 but far more 
than the 5,155 pages of food and drug statutes and regulations63 
or the 4,231 pages of commerce and trade statutes and regula-
tions (including securities regulations).64 It is unlikely that any 
single individual is familiar with most of these, much less with 
all of the existing banking regulations. 
In contrast, in 1952, federal banking statutes and regula-
tions totaled only approximately 700 pages, a body of knowledge 
more conceivably mastered by a single person. The sheer volume 
of federal banking laws now makes it nearly impossible for regu-
lators to understand all of the laws’ interactions, much less how 
 
 56 Title 12 of the United States Code was 1,946 pages in the 2012 GPO printing. 
Title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations was 8,956 pages in the 2014 GPO printing. 
 57 Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010). 
 58 Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act (“Truth in Lending Act”), Pub L No 
90-321, 82 Stat 146 (1968), codified as amended at 15 USC § 1601 et seq. 
 59 Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978 § 2001 
(“Electronic Fund Transfer Act”), Pub L No 95-630, 92 Stat 3641, 3728–41, codified as 
amended at 15 USC § 1693 et seq. 
 60 See 24 CFR Part 203. 
 61 Title 26 of the United States Code was 3,864 pages in the 2012 GPO printing. 
Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations was 15,787 pages in the 2014 GPO printing. 
 62 Title 7 of the United States Code was 2,014 pages in the 2012 GPO printing. Ti-
tle 7 of the Code of Federal Regulations was 10,212 pages in the 2014 GPO printing. 
 63 Title 21 of the United States Code was 769 pages in the 2012 GPO printing. Title 
21 of the Code of Federal Regulations was 4,386 pages in the 2014 GPO printing. 
 64 Title 15 of the United States Code was 2,101 pages in the 2012 GPO printing. 
Title 15 of the Code of Federal Regulations was 2,130 pages in the 2014 GPO printing. 
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any particular regulatory change might affect the system. The 
inability for an individual to reasonably anticipate the possible 
consequences of regulatory changes is of particular concern in 
the area of financial regulation because of the hydraulic rule of 
financial regulation: finance will inevitably flow to the least regu-
lated channel. Material changes in regulation will almost assur-
edly affect the market equilibrium. For example, a change in the 
regulation of credit derivatives or bank capital requirements is 
likely to have spillover effects on mortgage-lending markets. 
While this type of unstable equilibrium is also present in some 
other areas of regulation, such as taxation, precisely because it 
deals with a highly fungible good (money), it is less likely to be a 
problem in, say, food and drug or transportation or fisheries 
regulation. Because of the hydraulic nature of finance, the com-
plexity and unknowability of the regulatory system mean that 
there are too many unforeseeable consequences from regulatory 
changes.65 
Beyond complexity, the tools of bank regulation suffer from 
epistemic and political problems. For example, capital and li-
quidity requirements are effective only until they are not. As 
long as a bank has adequate capital and liquidity, it will not 
have solvency or liquidity problems. The effectiveness of capital 
and liquidity requirements is entirely dependent on the regula-
tory determination to maintain the requirements at sufficiently 
high levels. 
It is difficult for regulators to know ex ante just how much 
capital and liquidity will be needed in the future, and regulators 
are subject to asymmetric lobbying pressures in regard to capital 
and liquidity requirements. Banks do not want higher capital 
and liquidity requirements, because higher requirements lower 
their return on equity and render them less attractive invest-
ments.66 Accordingly, banks will reliably lobby for lower capital 
and liquidity requirements, arguing for requirements closer to 
those necessary for times of normal stress rather than maintain-
ing capital and liquidity against the rare peak-stress situation. 
 
 65 See Adam J. Levitin, The Paper Chase: Securitization, Foreclosure, and the Un-
certainty of Mortgage Title, 63 Duke L J 637, 649 (2013) (detailing confusion about the 
legal process for transferring title to mortgages). For a discussion of the hydraulic nature 
of financial regulation, see generally Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating 
Credit Markets Upstream, 26 Yale J Reg 143 (2009). 
 66 See Admati and Hellwig, The Banker’s New Clothes at 115 (cited in note 6). 
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Given regulators’ uncertainty about proper capital levels, 
bank regulators’ close relationship with the banking industry and 
their desire to curry favor with (and obtain potential future em-
ployment in) the industry, the absence of a lobby for higher capital 
levels,67 and concern about whether higher capital requirements 
will reduce economic growth,68 there are reasons to think that 
capital and liquidity requirements will always be systemically 
biased to be too low for periods of peak stress.69 The result is a 
financial system that gooses the return on equity for banks’ 
shareholders in good times and then relies on impromptu 
bailouts to cover for inadequate capital and liquidity in bad 
times. Indeed, the 2008 crisis showed that regulators are loath to 
use their authority to order prompt corrective action of capital 
levels,70 instead preferring to turn to bailouts. Gains are privat-
ized while losses are socialized, resulting in a moral hazard that 
disincentivizes banks from taking care in their lending activities. 
A similar problem exists with deposit insurance. Deposit in-
surance is either implicitly or explicitly backed by the govern-
ment.71 The value of deposit insurance is the pledge of government 
 
 67 See Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of 
Financial Politics: A Review Essay, 127 Harv L Rev 1991, 2042–49 (2014). 
 68 Higher capital (equity) requirements may reduce economic growth by reducing 
banks’ returns on equity, which would make them less attractive investments and thus 
reduce their ability to lend to the extent that returns on equity are not offset by reduced 
debt finance costs. See id at 2033–37. But see Admati and Hellwig, The Banker’s New 
Clothes at 109–10 (cited in note 6) (contending that higher capital requirements will not 
affect growth based on the Modigliani-Miller theorem of capital structure irrelevance). 
 69 See Erik F. Gerding, Law, Bubbles, and Financial Regulation 313–18 (Routledge 
2014) (discussing procyclical regulations). 
 70 See 12 USC § 1831(o) (requiring prompt corrective action to resolve the problems 
of insured depository institutions). See also William K. Black, Why Is Geithner Continu-
ing Paulson’s Policy of Violating the Law? (Huffington Post, Mar 26, 2009), archived at 
http://perma.cc/K5YX-HJUZ (asserting that regulators violated 12 USC § 1831(o) by fail-
ing to take prompt corrective action before troubled banks became insolvent). 
 71 Contrary to popular belief, deposit insurance in the United States is actually pri-
vately funded. The FDIC, a federal regulatory agency, oversees the Deposit Insurance 
Fund (DIF). The DIF is a mutual insurance fund for the banking industry. It is funded 
by the banks, rather than through congressional appropriations. See The Deposit Insur-
ance Fund (FDIC, Sept 2, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/U2L5-9CN6. Although the 
FDIC’s logo, which insured banks are required to display, states “Backed by the Full 
Faith and Credit of the United States,” the logo does not state exactly what is backed by 
the full faith and credit. See Ordering & Using FDIC Signs & Logos (FDIC, Oct 27, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9UNV-YQ39. Indeed, it would seem to be the FDIC 
itself, rather than the DIF, that is backed by the full faith and credit; there is no pledge 
of the credit of the United States to support the DIF. (Query, however, whether the 
United States would be estopped from denying the pledge of full faith and credit to back 
deposits.) Instead, the credit of the United States is explicitly pledged only to support 
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credit to back the Deposit Function of banks. This pledge cre-
ates the moral hazard that can exist with any type of insurance 
if premiums underprice for risk. This moral hazard is exacerbat-
ed by an agency problem: a bank’s losses are not necessarily the 
losses of the bank’s employees, who may have short-term com-
pensation and an ability to easily redeploy their human capital 
if their employer fails. 
While the structure and pricing of insurance can limit the 
moral hazard, as can prudential regulation, it exists neverthe-
less, because gains are privatized while losses are socialized. 
This imbalance creates an inherent moral hazard in the banking 
system that encourages greater levels of risk-taking, meaning 
more and riskier loans. Unless a deposit insurance system has 
an explicit government guaranty, and that guaranty is properly 
priced, then this greater level of risk-taking will be inefficient 
because it does not account for its costs. An implicitly guaran-
tied system, such as that in the United States, is nothing more 
than a subsidy to the banking system. 
It may well be that we want this subsidy because we think 
that it encourages economic activity and growth. As long as 
banks keep risk in check, it would seem that we can have our 
cake and eat it too: more economic growth, but with no cost to 
the government. 
This is wishful thinking. A deposit insurance system neces-
sitates intensive regulation of banks, as the over eleven thou-
sand pages of codified banking statutes and regulations in the 
United States underscore. The government ends up in the situa-
tion of Prospero’s depositors in Renaissance Florence, trying to 
stay on top of the risks of the banks. This is a costly and likely 
inefficient process, as regulations are unlikely to ever be perfect-
ly tailored. What is more, it is unreliable, as the savings and 
loan crisis of the 1980s and the financial crisis of 2008 showed.72 
 
any bonds that the FDIC might issue. The FDIC, however, does not typically issue 
bonds. See FAQs (DIF), archived at http://perma.cc/RNU3-WJGP. 
 The formalities of the FDIC arrangement hardly matter, though. While the DIF is a 
mutual insurance fund, it is implicitly backed by the US government—and that is suffi-
cient. See Alan J. Kaplan, Full Faith and Credit of U.S. Government behind the FDIC 
Deposit Insurance Fund (FDIC, Nov 9, 1987), archived at http://perma.cc/2F36-QNDE. 
 72 Even though the 2008 crisis was not primarily a commercial banking crisis, large 
depositories did fail, including Wachovia, Washington Mutual, and IndyMac; but for 
massive federal intervention, Citibank would have failed as well. See Levitin, 127 Harv 
L Rev at 2014–15 (cited in note 67). Moreover, the bailouts of the large investment banks 
were undertaken because of the risk they posed to the commercial banking system. In-
vestment banks are frequently counterparties of commercial banks; the failure of Morgan 
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Irrespective of whether these crises were caused by factors be-
yond regulators’ control or by regulatory decisions,73 the ines-
capable fact is that regulation did not prevent these crises. 
The same story can be told for liquidity support facilities 
from the Federal Reserve and the Federal Home Loan Banks.74 
While nominally these lender-of-last-resort facilities are meant 
to provide liquidity under the Bagehot principle by lending at 
punitive rates against sound collateral,75 in practice they often 
lend at non-punitive rates against dodgy collateral,76 meaning 
that all the upside is held by the borrowing financial institution 
while all the risk is held by the government. 
Government solvency and liquidity support is a costly and 
inefficient form of subsidization that creates a moral hazard in 
banking because losses are socialized while gains are privatized. 
The result is to encourage excessive risk-taking and over-
extension of credit, which can result in leverage-fueled asset 
bubbles—the collapse of which comes at a cost to the public fisc. 
C. Shadow Banking: Government Facilitation of Deposit 
Substitutes 
Another approach to combining the Deposit and Lending 
Functions has been through transactional innovations. Transac-
tional innovations have created a number of deposit substitutes, 
such as repos, swaps, securitization, commercial paper, and 
money market funds that form what is known as the “shadow-
banking” system—financial markets that provide bank-like 
functions without bank-like regulation. Thus, shadow banking 
not only fulfills the Lending Function by providing financing for 
 
Stanley, for example, threatened to bring down not only other investment banks but also 
the commercial banks that serve as the investment banks’ clearing banks, and hence the 
whole commercial banking system. See James Bullard, Christopher J. Neely, and David C. 
Wheelock, Systemic Risk and the Financial Crisis: A Primer, 91 Fed Res Bank St Louis Rev 
403, 407 (2009). 
 A similar story exists with insurance company AIG. AIG’s largest credit book was its 
so-called regulatory capital portfolio, comprising billions of swaps with European banks 
that were designed to reduce those banks’ regulatory capital requirements. Had AIG 
failed, these banks would have been massively undercapitalized. See Congressional 
Oversight Panel, The AIG Rescue, Its Impact on Markets, and the Government’s Exit 
Strategy *41, 111–12, 123 (GPO, June 10, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/PJH8 
-WQYT. It was not AIG itself that was the concern but the impact of its failure (directly 
or indirectly) on commercial banking counterparties.  
 73 See Levitin, 127 Harv L Rev at 2039–49 (cited in note 67). 
 74 See Kathryn Judge, Three Discount Windows, 99 Cornell L Rev 795, 814 (2014). 
 75 See Levitin, 127 Harv L Rev at 1997 (cited in note 67). 
 76 See id. 
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borrowers but also fulfills the Deposit Function by generating 
apparently low-risk “safe assets” for investors. 
Shadow banking is often assumed to be an organic develop-
ment. One of the insights of legal scholarship, however, is that 
various shadow-banking products, like all financial instruments, 
are legally constituted.77 Most of this scholarship has examined 
specific shadow-banking products, not the system as a whole.78 
Moreover, the insight into the legal construction of shadow-
banking products is more implicit in the literature than it is di-
rectly discussed in such terms. 
Professors Anna Gelpern and Erik Gerding, however, have 
demonstrated that shadow banking’s ability to produce “safe as-
sets” is the product of a wide range of government interventions 
that serve to make, label, or guaranty investments in shadow-
banking instruments as “safe.”79 While some measure of the 
“safety” of “safe assets” comes from private ordering, govern-
ment intervention is what actually facilitates the “safety” of the-
se assets. The legal construction of “safe assets” is qualitatively 
different from the general legal construction of markets because 
of the product- and institution-specific nature of the regulations 
creating “safe assets,” which go beyond generally applicable or-
dering principles of contract and tort. 
The ability to produce credibly “safe assets” is essential to 
the vitality and size of the shadow-banking system. Absent 
the ability to promise investors “safety” as strongly as a 
 
 77 See, for example, Katarina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J Comp Econ 
315, 315 (2013) (arguing that financial markets are legally constructed). To be sure, all 
markets—not just financial markets—are legally constructed, as market terms depend 
on which obligations are enforceable and how. Markets are built on contract and tort ob-
ligations (and on what does not constitute an enforceable obligation), and enforcement of 
those obligations requires a legal apparatus—which must in turn be funded, and which 
requires some sort of tax regime. 
 78 See generally, for example, Jill Fisch and Eric Roiter, A Floating NAV for Money 
Market Funds: Fix or Fantasy?, 2012 U Ill L Rev 1003; Mark J. Roe, The Derivative Mar-
ket’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 Stan L Rev 539 (2011) (examin-
ing the subsidy for derivatives counterparties in bankruptcy law); Kenneth C. Kettering, 
Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 29 
Cardozo L Rev 1553 (2008) (analyzing the legal construction of securitization, repos, and 
credit derivatives); Frank Partnoy and David A. Skeel Jr, The Promise and Perils of 
Credit Derivatives, 75 U Cin L Rev 1019 (2007) (analyzing the legal construction of credit 
derivatives and regulatory licenses that are implied through credit ratings). 
 79 See Anna Gelpern and Erik F. Gerding, Inside Safe Assets *19 (unpublished 
manuscript, Oct 5, 2015) (on file with author). See also Edward J. Janger, The Costs of 
Liquidity Enhancement: Transparency, Risk Alternation, and Coordination Problems, 4 
Brooklyn J Corp, Fin & Comm L 39, 40 (2009) (noting how commercial law is focused on 
enhancing the liquidity of debt). 
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government-facilitated market would, the shadow-banking mar-
ket would assuredly be substantially smaller, as shown by the 
post-2008 collapse of the investor confidence in the private-label 
mortgage-backed securities market.80 
Scholars have noted that there is an insatiable market de-
mand for “safe assets”—deposit substitutes with slightly more 
yield—from institutional cash pools.81 The existing supply of in-
sured bank deposits and government debt is inadequate for this 
demand.82 FDIC insurance caps make bank deposits unworkable 
for large institutional cash pools, and government debt issuance 
is too limited relative to the demand. Moreover, investors want 
not just safety but also yield. 
Institutional cash pools require safety—the investors often 
have fixed obligations of their own, such as pension plan pay-
ments—but they are also reluctant to lose the time value of mon-
ey on huge cash pools by having them sitting in non-interest-
bearing accounts. Instead, institutional cash pools seek to obtain 
yield to offset lost time value and inflation while still protecting 
the integrity of their principal. In other words, investors want to 
have their cake and eat it too. Shadow banking offers the solu-
tion in the form of “safe assets”: short-term debt or debt-like 
 
 80 See generally Adam J. Levitin, Housing Finance Reform: Fundamentals of a 
Functioning Private Label Mortgage Backed Securities Market (Georgetown University 
Law Center, Oct 1, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/2M7C-TWDJ (documenting written 
testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs detail-
ing the post-2008 private-label mortgage-backed securities market). 
 81 See, for example, Gary B. Gorton and Guillermo Ordoñez, The Supply and De-
mand for Safe Assets *1 (NBER Working Paper Series, Jan 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6T9V-5GV6; Global Financial Stability Report: The Quest for Lasting 
Stability *81 (International Monetary Fund, Apr 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/CL5P 
-F8RS; Zoltan Pozsar, Institutional Cash Pools and the Triffin Dilemma of the U.S. 
Banking System *8 (International Monetary Fund, Aug 2011), archived at 
http://perma.cc/G8BB-ECBT; Arvind Krishnamurthy and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, 
The Aggregate Demand for Treasury Debt, 120 J Polit Econ 233, 234–35 (2012); Jeremy 
C. Stein, Monetary Policy as Financial-Stability Regulation *7 (NBER Working Paper 
Series, Mar 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/UKZ3-CZBJ; Ben S. Bernanke, et al, In-
ternational Capital Flows and the Returns to Safe Assets in the United States, 2003-2007 
*13–14 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Feb 2011), archived at 
http://perma.cc/8JJQ-75VG; Gary B. Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 
2007 45–50 (Oxford 2010); Ricardo J. Caballero, The “Other” Imbalance and the Finan-
cial Crisis *2–3 (NBER Working Paper Series, Jan 2010), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7ZT4-5G9Z; Viral Acharya and Philipp Schnabl, Do Global Banks Spread 
Global Imbalances? The Case of Asset-Backed Commercial Paper during the Financial 
Crisis of 2007–09 *3 (International Monetary Fund, Nov 2009), archived at 
http://perma.cc/DE8B-D9N5. 
 82 See Pozsar, International Cash Pools at *9–10 (cited in note 81). 
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instruments, particularly repos, commercial paper, asset-backed 
commercial paper, and money market mutual funds. 
Short-term debt promises the Holy Grail of safety plus yield. 
Short-term debt appears safe. The short term reduces interest-rate 
risk and credit risk. Moreover, short-term debt is often collat-
eralized, which further reduces credit risk. And most important-
ly, a range of government interventions facilitates the appear-
ance or fact of safety. The effect of these government 
interventions is to subsidize shadow-banking markets through 
an implied guaranty. 
The government guaranty of shadow banking is most obvi-
ous in the case of regulatory capital requirements. Regulated 
depositories are required to hold a minimum amount of capital 
(defined by regulation) against their risk-weighted assets. As-
sets with lower risk weights require less capital, which enables 
the banks to be more highly leveraged and to potentially gener-
ate a higher return on equity, all else being equal. Regulatory 
capital requirements can be understood as acting as a type of 
tax on transactions; asset classes with higher risk weights are 
less attractive than those with lower risk weights. Every major 
type of shadow-banking product benefits from favorable risk 
weighting. Not only does the low risk weighting convey a mes-
sage of implied safety but it also incentivizes banks to engage in 
shadow-banking transactions. 
The following sections review (but far from exhaustively) 
the government interventions facilitating various shadow-
banking products. Readers who are not concerned about the de-
tails of these facilitations should skip to Part III. 
1.   Repos. 
Repo contracts—sale and repurchase agreements for securi-
ties or mortgages—are formally sale instruments, but they func-
tion as loans from the buyer-lender to the seller-borrower. A repo 
loan is collateralized by the asset sold and repurchased, with the 
difference in sale and repurchase prices constituting the finance 
charge to the seller-borrower. Repos thus involve the Lending 
Function and act as a type of money creation.83 Repos also involve 
the Deposit Function because of various features that enhance 
 
 83 See Erik F. Gerding, Credit Derivatives, Leverage, and Financial Regulation’s 
Missing Macroeconomic Dimension, 8 Berkeley Bus L J 29, 51–52 (2011); Gorton and 
Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System at *266, 277 (cited in note 3); Gorton, 
Slapped by the Invisible Hand at 27 (cited in note 81). 
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the likelihood of repayment and liquidity. The collateralized na-
ture of repos enhances the likelihood of repayment, and repos’ 
short-term (often overnight) maturity enhances their liquidity. 
The repo market benefits from a range of government sup-
port. Repo counterparties are protected from counterparty credit 
risk through exemptions from the bankruptcy stay and clawback 
provisions.84 These exemptions have provided an important im-
petus to the growth of repo markets, which grew significantly af-
ter Congress exempted them from the Bankruptcy Code in 
1984.85 The bankruptcy exemptions for repos greatly enhance 
their liquidity by rendering them “informationally insensitive 
debt[s]” that are “immune to adverse selection by privately in-
formed traders” and normally have low-valuation search costs, 
like bank deposits.86 The special treatment of repos in bankrupt-
cy functions as a subsidy for repo lenders that is funded through 
the transfer of value from other creditors in bankruptcies. 
Repo-market participants also benefit from being able to 
piggyback on implied government guaranties of central-market 
participants. Sometimes repos are done through bilateral con-
tracts, but many of them are cleared in a tri-party market with 
both repo parties contracting with a clearing bank. This process 
involves the clearing banks assuming intraday credit risk on the 
repos. 
There are two clearing banks in the tri-party market: 
JPMorgan Chase and Bank of New York Mellon.87 The clearing 
banks assume enormous intraday risk that is not subject to regular 
capital requirements88 or to the correspondent exposure limitation 
 
 84 See 11 USC §§ 362(b)(7), 546(e), 559.  
 85 See Viral V. Acharya and T. Sabri Öncü, The Repurchase Agreement (Repo) Mar-
ket, in Viral Acharya, et al, eds, Regulating Wall Street: The Dodd-Frank Act and the 
New Architecture of Global Finance 319, 330 (Wiley 2011). 
 86 Gerding, Law, Bubbles, and Financial Regulation at 324 (cited in note 69).  
 87 See Tri-party Membership (Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure Reform Task Force, 
Sept 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ZG3Y-CCCQ. 
 88 Repurchase agreements with securities firms have either a 0 percent or a 20 per-
cent risk weighting under US bank capital regulations, meaning that they result in a 
0 percent or 2 percent regulatory capital charge, respectively. See 12 CFR Part 3, Ap-
pendix A, § 3(a)(1)(viii), (2)(xiii)(C)(3). Under the Basel I capital regime that was in place 
in the United States until 2009, banks were required to hold regulatory capital equal to 
8 percent of their risk-weighted assets, but only for their banking books and not for their 
trading books. See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence 
of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards *14 (July 1988), archived at 
http://perma.cc/5NBP-2LLB. Under Basel I, a bank’s trading book was subject to capital 
requirements solely for market risk. See Hal S. Scott and Anna Gelpern, International 
Finance: Law and Regulation 477–82 (Sweet & Maxwell 3d ed 2012). Clearing banks, 
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of 25 percent of capital.89 For example, before Lehman Brothers 
filed for bankruptcy, JPMorgan was advancing Lehman Broth-
ers over $100 billion in intraday credit through the repo-clearing 
process.90 
If JPMorgan had been required to hold regulatory capital 
against its intraday repo-clearing exposures, it would have 
needed as much as another $8 billion in capital for the Lehman 
Brothers exposures alone (at a time when JPMorgan’s market 
capitalization was never more than $181 billion), and Lehman 
Brothers was only part of JPMorgan’s repo-clearing business.91 
Similarly, the exemption from the standard single-counterparty 
exposure limitation of 25 percent of capital enabled JPMorgan to 
assume an additional $55 billion in intraday exposures just for 
Lehman Brothers.92 The lack of capital requirements and single-
counterparty exposure limitations for intraday repo exposure 
functions as a significant subsidy for repo markets. 
Tri-party repos bear the implied guaranty of the two clearing 
banks—both of which are “too big to fail,” so their obligations bear 
an implied government guaranty that benefits the repo counter-
parties.93 Moreover, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York is an 
active participant in the repo market,94 signaling the safety of the 
market. Furthermore, since 2009, the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York has also been active in encouraging reforms in tri-
party-repo clearing aimed at reducing the clearing banks’ intra-
day credit exposure by 90 percent.95 While these reforms have 
 
however, historically made repo loans on an uncommitted basis, which exempted them 
from capital charges altogether. See 12 CFR Part 3, Appendix B, § 2 (defining a 
“[q]ualifying securities borrowing transaction”). See also Bruce Tuckman, Systemic Risk 
and the Tri-party Repo Clearing Banks *5 (Center for Financial Stability, Feb 2, 2010), 
archived at http://perma.cc/2R4W-B7QD. 
 89 See 12 CFR § 206.4(a)–(b) (setting limits on credit exposure and defining 
“[c]alculation of credit exposure” to exclude both “exposure related to settlement of 
transactions” and “intraday exposure”). 
 90 See Tom Junod, The Deal of the Century (Esquire, Sept 11, 2009), archived at 
http://perma.cc/EK2T-C9YA. On Lehman Brothers’ repo exposure, see generally William 
O. Fisher, Predicting a Heart Attack: The Fundamental Opacity of Extreme Liquidity 
Risk, 86 Temple L Rev 465 (2014). 
 91 See Fisher, 86 Temple L Rev at 482 (cited in note 90). 
 92 See id. 
 93 See Tuckman, Systemic Risk and the Tri-party Repo Clearing Banks at *8 (cited 
in note 88).  
 94 See Tracy Alloway and Michael MacKenzie, Repo Market Turns Corner as Fed 
Bolsters Role, Fin Times 15 (June 20, 2014). 
 95 See Tri-party Repo Infrastructure Reform (Federal Reserve Bank of New York), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/DX85-HAU8; Daniel K. Tarullo, Shadow Banking and Systemic 
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been purely voluntary and are not binding regulations, the role 
of the New York Fed (which often serves as the agent for the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) in facilitat-
ing the reforms puts a government imprimatur of good house-
keeping on the tri-party-repo market. 
2.   Swaps. 
Credit derivatives such as credit-default swaps and total-
return swaps can be used to create synthetic loans, in which the 
swap counterparties agree to pay each other based on the per-
formance of the swap’s reference asset. Thus, the seller of credit-
default-swap protection receives periodic cash payments from 
the protection buyer until and unless a defined credit event on 
the reference asset occurs and the payment stream reverses, 
with the protection seller paying the protection buyer. Neither 
counterparty needs to have any preexisting legal or economic in-
terest in the reference asset. 
The swap counterparties are not just wagering on the per-
formance of the reference asset.96 They are also assuming credit 
risk from exposure to each other. As a result, swaps are fre-
quently collateralized and are often for relatively short terms, 
such as one year.97 Credit derivatives do not directly fill either 
the Deposit or the Lending Function, but they are often paired 
with other financial instruments to achieve such a function. A 
lender can match a credit derivative to a loan so as to hedge out 
the credit risk on the loan, resulting in something close to the 
Deposit Function of safekeeping. (There is limited liquidity in 
this arrangement, but both the loan and the swap positions can 
be sold.) Credit derivatives can also bolster the Lending Func-
tion. As Professor Erik Gerding has noted, “[b]y allowing finan-
cial institutions—those institutions that borrow to lend—to in-
crease leverage, credit derivatives can operate to increase the 
overall amount of liquidity in financial markets. This increase in 
 
Risk Regulation *7 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Nov 22, 2013), 
archived at http://perma.cc/U47W-VQRK. 
 96 See Nazanin Baseri, Credit Default Swaps and Clearing, 3 Legis & Pol Brief 39, 
41–43 (2011). 
 97 See Cameron A. Gee and Dean N. Gerber, Collateralization of Swap Obligations 
in Leveraged Financings (Vedder Price, May 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/6RAX 
-C7RD (noting the “increased incidence” of collateralized swap transactions). 
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liquidity can be thought of as increasing the effective supply of 
money in the market.”98 
The market for credit derivatives is facilitated by a range of 
government interventions. First, credit derivatives are typically 
collateralized, and the collateral is often in the form of securi-
ties.99 The sufficiency of the securities as collateral is evaluated in 
part based on the credit rating of the securities. Credit ratings, as 
discussed below, are a major part of the government facilitation of 
shadow banking.100 Second, credit derivatives may be used to re-
duce banks’ regulatory capital requirements.101 Third, credit de-
rivatives can receive favorable risk weightings for regulatory 
capital.102 
Perhaps most importantly, credit swaps are protected from 
counterparty credit risk through exemptions from the Bank-
ruptcy Code’s automatic stay and clawback provisions.103 The 
automatic stay prevents most creditors of a bankrupt firm from 
proceeding with collection actions outside of the bankruptcy pro-
cess.104 Non-debtor counterparties to various types of financial 
contracts, including credit derivatives, are exempted from the 
automatic stay for the purpose of terminating and accelerating 
their contracts and liquidating any margin that is posted to the 
contracts. Similarly, these non-debtor counterparties are ex-
empted from actions to recover voidable preferences, voidable 
setoff preferences, unperfected liens, and constructive fraudu-
lent transfers.105  
Credit derivatives trade over-the-counter through a handful of 
large dealer banks, which frequently serve as swap counterparties 
themselves.106 These dealer banks are all “too big to fail” financial 
institutions, so their counterparties benefit from the implicit 
 
 98 Gerding, 8 Berkeley Bus L J at 32 (cited in note 83) (citation omitted). 
 99 See generally Collateral Use for OTC Derivatives (International Swaps and De-
rivatives Association, Oct 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/4FEG-AJA6. 
 100 See Part II.C.3. 
 101 See William W. Bratton and Adam J. Levitin, A Transactional Genealogy of Scan-
dal: From Michael Milken to Enron to Goldman Sachs, 86 S Cal L Rev 783, 812–21 (2013) 
(describing relief from regulatory capital requirements via synthetic securitizations). 
 102 See 12 CFR Part 3, Appendix A, § 4(c)–(d). 
 103 See 11 USC §§ 362(b)(7), 546(e), 559. 
 104 See Franklin R. Edwards and Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bank-
ruptcy Code: Why the Special Treatment?, 22 Yale J Reg 91, 95 (2005). 
 105 See id at 96. 
 106 See Annette L. Nazareth and Jeffrey T. Dinwoodie, Clearinghouse Regulatory 
Basics for Swap Market Participants *1 (GlobalCapital, Mar 14, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/4939-A8P3. 
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government guaranty of their liabilities, thereby relieving the 
counterparties of much of the counterparty credit risk. Since 
2010, most swaps have been required to clear through clearing-
houses.107 The clearinghouses serve as novated counterparties to 
the swaps, meaning that the original counterparties assume the 
counterparty risk of the clearinghouse. This has the effect of 
concentrating risk on the clearinghouses, which in turn have be-
come implicitly guarantied as “too big to fail” entities and which 
potentially have the ability to call on an emergency Federal Re-
serve liquidity facility.108 The clearinghouses also have the abil-
ity to call on their members for additional capital.109 Given that 
clearinghouse members are “too big to fail” dealer banks, the 
clearinghouses are able to piggyback on the implied guaranty of 
these banks’ liabilities. 
3. Securitization. 
Securitization is a financing technique that involves the is-
suance of debt securities against an isolated pool of cash flow–
generating assets. The payments on the debt securities (known 
as “asset-backed securities” or ABS) are serviced from the cash 
flows from the securitized assets, such as a pool of mortgages or 
credit card receivables. Critically, the securitized assets are le-
gally segregated from the other assets and liabilities of their 
creator, so the investors in the ABS do not assume the opera-
tional risks of the assets’ creator but instead assume only the 
risks of the specific assets’ performance.110 
Securitization is a close substitute for traditional banking. 
It provides financing for borrowers by relending the funds that 
were provided by capital market investors. Most ABS function 
similarly to deposits because they are highly liquid and low 
risk.111 
Although there is limited liquidity through sale for most 
ABS, there is tremendous liquidity available to investors 
through hypothecation. ABS can be pledged as collateral for 
 
 107 See id. 
 108 See Stephen J. Lubben, Nationalize the Clearinghouses! *5 (Seton Hall Public 
Law Research Paper, June 24, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/39U4-DE9Q. 
 109 See Adam J. Levitin, Response: The Tenuous Case for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 
101 Georgetown L J 445, 462 (2013). 
 110 See Jonathan C. Lipson, Re: Defining Securitization, 85 S Cal L Rev 1229, 1239–
40 (2012). 
 111 See Douglas J. Elliott, Bank Liquidity Requirements: An Introduction and Over-
view *2 (Brookings Institution, June 23, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/NZ5N-Z7B7. 
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loans, such as in repo transactions. Prior to 2008, ABS often 
served as repo collateral at par.112 ABS thus offer investors a 
high level of liquidity. 
Most private-label ABS (those issued without a guaranty 
from the government or a government-sponsored entity) are low 
risk because the securities are tranched in a senior-subordinate 
structure rather than being pure pass-throughs.113 The tranching 
focuses most risk on the junior positions.114 Additionally, private-
label ABS frequently feature credit enhancements such as over-
collateralization, excess spread, shifting interest, reserve ac-
counts, and pool and bond insurance.115 Moreover, some securiti-
zations utilize various swaps to hedge out other types of risk, 
such as interest-rate risk. As a result, most private-label ABS 
are low-risk investments; even with the housing market’s col-
lapse, although over 90 percent of mortgage-backed ABS were 
rated AAA at issuance, relatively few of these AAA-rated securi-
ties have incurred realized losses.116 Instead, investors’ losses on 
these securities have mainly been in market value. Securitiza-
tion functions as a substitute banking market providing both the 
Deposit and Lending Functions to borrowers and investors. 
Securitization markets are facilitated by a range of govern-
ment interventions. ABS are loosely regulated through special 
securities-law disclosure requirements117 and, since 2010, 
through a yet-to-be-implemented risk-retention requirement.118 
Regulation can be seen as a form of licensing. 
The ABS market is also highly dependent on credit ratings. 
Institutional investors comprise the bulk of ABS investment.119 
Many institutional investors are restricted to investing solely in 
investment-grade securities.120 Credit ratings are given by federally 
 
 112 See Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Re-
po, 104 J Fin Econ 425, 428 (2012) (illustrating the change in repo haircuts on ABS). 
 113 See Nicola Cetorelli and Stavros Peristiani, The Role of Banks in Asset Securiti-
zation, 18 Fed Res Bank NY Econ Pol Rev 47, 49 (July 2012). 
 114 See Andreas Jobst, What Is Securitization? *49 (Finance & Development, Sept 
2008), archived at http://perma.cc/GD4R-87X3. 
 115 See Adam J. Levitin and Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 
Georgetown L J 1177, 1191–92 (2012) (detailing credit enhancements). 
 116 See id at 1190. 
 117 See 17 CFR § 229.1100(a)–(b).  
 118 See 15 USC § 78o-11. 
 119 See Asset-Backed Securities (SEC, Oct 23, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
AC7M-CNX6. 
 120 See Andrew Baum and David Hartzell, Global Property Investment: Strategies, 
Structures, Decisions 361 n 5 (Wiley 2012). 
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licensed nationally recognized statistical rating organizations 
(NRSROs).121 This gives a government imprimatur to credit rat-
ings that suggests their reliability.122 
The government imprimatur on credit ratings is furthered by 
the incorporation of credit ratings by NRSROs in SEC regula-
tions;123 in Basel risk-weighting standards for bank capital;124 in 
other federal bank capital regulations;125 in Federal Reserve 
discount-window and daylight-overdraft collateral require-
ments;126 in state insurance company reserve and investment re-
quirements;127 in state banking regulations;128 in state regula-
tions on investment of public funds;129 and even in state 
regulations relating to retirement homes,130 workers compensa-
tion,131 and public utilities.132 The incorporation of NRSRO credit 
ratings in a range of investment requirements and in capital 
risk weightings encourages investment in rated asset classes. In 
particular, the use of NRSRO ratings in Basel I risk weightings 
encouraged depositary institutions to invest in highly rated ABS 
because Basel I required little capital to be held against highly 
rated ABS—less than for mortgages themselves.133 Indeed, the 
 
 121 See 15 USC §§ 78o-7 to -9; 17 CFR §§ 240.17g-1 to -7.  
 122 NRSROs also benefit from judicial determinations that they are not engaged in 
“professional speech” when issuing credit ratings and that they therefore must be found 
to have acted with “actual malice” to be liable for negligent misrepresentation in their 
ratings. See, for example, In re Enron Corp Securities, Derivative & “ERISA” Litigation, 
511 F Supp 2d 742, 810 (SD Tex 2005) (finding that the First Amendment shielded a 
credit rating agency from negligent misrepresentation absent “actual malice”); Lowe v 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 472 US 181, 210 (1985) (holding that an expres-
sion of opinion about a commercial product is commercial speech that is protected by the 
First Amendment). 
 123 See, for example, 17 CFR § 270.2a-7 (requiring ratings from NRSROs for money 
market mutual fund investments). 
 124 See, for example, 12 CFR Part 3, Appendix A, § 4(c) (showing Basel implementa-
tion for national banks in Tables C and D). 
 125 See, for example, 12 CFR § 932.4 (setting Federal Home Loan Bank capital 
requirements). 
 126 See Discount Window and Payment System Risk Collateral Margins Table (Fed-
eral Reserve Discount Window), archived at http://perma.cc/3VXZ-A3RL. 
 127 See, for example, Iowa Code § 511.8; Iowa Admin Code § 191-49.5; NY Ins Law 
§ 1405. 
 128 See, for example, 7 Tex Admin Code § 91.802. 
 129 See, for example, Ohio Admin Code Ann § 113-6-01; 200 Ky Admin Reg § 14:091; 
Utah Admin Code § R628-10-4. 
 130 See, for example, 11 NY Codes, Rules & Regs § 350.6. 
 131 See, for example, 34 Pa Admin Code § 125.9. 
 132 See, for example, NJ Admin Code § 14:4-4.6. 
 133 See, for example, 12 CFR Part 3, Appendix A, § 4(d) (assigning a 20 percent risk 
weight to AAA-rated ABS); 12 CFR Part 3, Appendix A, § 3(a)(3)(iii) (assigning a 50 per-
cent risk weight to performing loans secured by first mortgages on one- to four-family 
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mere fact that regulated financial institutions are permitted to 
invest in ABS legitimizes ABS as “safe assets.” 
The ABS market benefits from legal rules that shield ABS 
from bankruptcy and bank receivership. Many types of ABS are 
issued by non-business trusts, which are ineligible for bankrupt-
cy protection.134 Even when ABS issuers are eligible for bank-
ruptcy, the issuers’ corporate structures are often designed to 
prevent bankruptcy filings by making it difficult for the issuer to 
authorize the filing of a bankruptcy petition.135 True-sale and 
substantive consolidation doctrines protect most securitized as-
sets from getting clawed back into the bankruptcy estate of the 
assets’ originator,136 and even when an ABS issuer ends up in 
bankruptcy, the securities-transaction safe harbor against most 
clawback actions137 is likely to protect the ABS investors from 
avoidance of preferential or fraudulent transfers. Similarly, fed-
eral banking regulations also create safe harbors that protect 
securitizations from being clawed back into bank and credit un-
ion receiverships.138 
Certain ABS—most notably ABS that are backed by residen-
tial or commercial mortgages—also benefit from favorable tax 
treatment. The Internal Revenue Code allows for pass-through 
tax treatment for deals that qualify as “real estate mortgage in-
vestment conduits” (REMICs).139 This means that the entity issu-
ing the ABS is not taxed on its earnings as a regular company 
 
residential properties); 12 CFR Part 3, Appendix A, § 3(a)(4) (assigning a 100 percent 
risk weight to all assets not specified for lower risk weights). 
 134 See 11 USC § 101(9) (defining “corporation”); 11 USC § 101(41) (defining “per-
son”); 11 USC § 109(e) (limiting bankruptcy to “persons”).  
 135 See generally In re General Growth Properties, Inc, 409 BR 43 (Bankr SDNY 
2009); In re Kingston Square Associates, 214 BR 713 (Bankr SDNY 1997). 
 136 See generally, for example, Major’s Furniture Mart, Inc v Castle Credit Corp, 602 
F2d 538 (3d Cir 1979) (applying the true-sale doctrine and holding that a transaction 
intended to create a security interest in an account was not a sale); In re Owens Corning, 
419 F3d 195 (3d Cir 2005) (discussing substantive consolidation doctrine). But see gen-
erally In re LTV Steel Co, 274 BR 278 (Bankr ND Ohio 2001) (treating securitized assets 
as part of the bankruptcy estate of the originator for purposes of adequate protection). 
 137 See 11 USC § 546(e). 
 138 See 12 CFR § 360.6 (creating a securitization safe harbor for FDIC depositary 
receiverships); 12 CFR § 709.10 (creating a securitization safe harbor for National Credit 
Union Administration (NCUA) credit union receiverships).  
 139 26 USC § 860D. For the federal regulations governing these conduits, see 26 
USC §§ 860A–G. Prior to 2010, ABS further benefited from favorable accounting treat-
ments that enabled off–balance sheet treatment. See Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 140 *6 (Financial Accounting Standards Board, Sept 2000), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7HV3-V4NQ (amended by Statements of Financial Accounting Standards 
Nos 166–67). 
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would be—only the investors in the ABS are taxed. The favora-
ble tax treatment of mortgage-backed ABS is a subsidy of these 
ABS (and of the real estate market). 
All ABS also come with various representations and war-
ranties about the quality of the securitized assets.140 The repre-
sentations and warranties are frequently made by federally in-
sured depositaries, thereby giving ABS investors indirect 
recourse to federal deposit insurance for certain risks. Finally, 
ABS are accepted as collateral by central banks, ensuring a 
modicum of liquidity even during market freezes.141 
4. Agency securities. 
Another class of securities that function as deposit substi-
tutes are so-called “Agency” securities. Most Agency securities are 
securities issued or guarantied by privately owned but federally 
chartered entities such as the Federal National Mortgage Associ-
ation (“Fannie Mae”), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpora-
tion (“Freddie Mac”), and the Federal Home Loan Banks.142 Agen-
cy securities include the corporate debt of these private, federally 
chartered entities as well as mortgage-backed securities that are 
guarantied by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.143 
Agency securities (other than Ginnie Maes) are not express-
ly backed by the US government; indeed, in the case of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, the government backing is expressly dis-
avowed by statute.144 Nonetheless, these securities have long 
 
 140 See SEC Adopts Asset-Backed Securities Reform Rules (SEC, Aug 27, 2014), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/7D8T-GKUA. 
 141 See François Koulischer and Daan Struyven, Central Bank Liquidity Provision 
and Collateral Quality, 49 J Bank & Fin 113, 113–14 (2014). 
 142 See Levitin and Wachter, 100 Georgetown L J at 1187–88 (cited in note 115). 
 143 Also included under the rubric of “Agency” securities are securities guarantied by 
Ginnie Mae, an executive branch agency of the federal government. Ginnie Mae pledges 
the full faith and credit of the United States to guaranty the timely payment of principal 
and interest on privately issued securities backed by the payments from pools of mort-
gages that are themselves insured by the Federal Housing Administration, the Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs, or the Department of Agriculture. See Our History (Ginnie 
Mae, Oct 2, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9WV4-LK8H. Ginnie Mae–insured securi-
ties (“Ginnie Maes”) are generally referred to as securitizations, but transactionally they 
are distinct from other securitizations because legal title to the loans backing the securi-
ties remains with the issuer, even though the loan documentation is transferred to a 
document custodian. See Federal Reserve System, Truth in Lending, 74 Fed Reg 60143, 
60146 (2009). Thus, Ginnie Maes more closely resemble covered bonds than conventional 
securitizations. 
 144 See 12 USC § 1455(h)(2); 12 USC § 1719(b), (d)–(e). 
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been understood to bear an implicit government guaranty,145 in 
part because of the centrality of these institutions in supporting 
the politically critical housing market, which serves as a major 
repository of household wealth. Beyond the market importance 
of these institutions, the case for an implicit guaranty of Agency 
securities (again, other than Ginnie Maes) is bolstered by their 
federal chartering (limiting competition);146 their federal audit-
ing rights;147 their federal prudential regulation;148 their tax149 
and securities-law exemptions;150 their special, favorable status 
that is accorded in Basel bank capital risk weightings;151 their 
acceptance as Federal Reserve discount-window and daylight-
overdraft collateral;152 and their often special treatment in reg-
ulated institutions’ investment rules.153 Moreover, Agency secu-
rities are deemed by statute to qualify as federal government 
securities for purposes of state and federal investment limita-
tions.154 These regulatory features serve as an endorsement of 
Agency securities, and indeed, the federal government’s bailout of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 2008 is the best evidence of gov-
ernment facilitation in the market for Agency securities. 
Agency securities are highly liquid in part because their credit 
risk is assumed to be that of the federal government and because 
they are accepted as collateral by the Federal Reserve.155 Accord-
ingly, Agency securities trade in a forward contract market156 and 
 
 145 See David Min, How Government Guarantees Promote Housing Finance Stability, 
50 Harv J Legis 437, 457 (2013).  
 146 See 12 USC §§ 1452, 1723(a).  
 147 See 12 USC §§ 1456(b), 1723a(j). 
 148 See 12 USC § 4511 (creating the Federal Housing Finance Agency). 
 149 See 12 USC § 1452(e) (providing a tax exemption for Freddie Mac); 12 USC 
§ 1723a(c) (providing a tax exemption for Fannie Mae); 12 USC § 1719(f) (prohibiting the 
assessment of fees and charges by the United States). 
 150 See 12 USC § 1455(g) (providing an exemption from SEC regulation for Freddie 
Mac); 12 USC § 1717(c)(1) (providing an exemption from SEC regulation for Fannie Mae). 
 151 See 12 CFR Part 3, Appendix A, § 3(a)(2)(vi)–(viii) (indicating a 20 percent risk 
weight for government-sponsored-entity securities and mortgage-backed securities). 
 152 See Federal Reserve Collateral Guidelines *2 (June 3, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/W48D-YFDX. 
 153 See, for example, NY Ins Law § 1409(c) (exempting Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
securities from insurers’ investment limitations). 
 154 See 12 USC §§ 1455(e)(1), 1723c. 
 155 Bid–ask spreads are a measure of liquidity in a security, with smaller bid–ask 
spreads indicating greater liquidity. Agency securities have bid–ask spreads only slightly 
greater than those of Treasury securities but substantially smaller than those of corpo-
rate securities. See Campbell, Li, and Im, Measuring Agency MBS Market Liquidity with 
Transaction Data (cited in note 40). 
 156 See Levitin, Housing Finance Reform at *12 (cited in note 80). 
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regularly serve as collateral for repos and other borrowing 
transactions.157 The combination of perceived zero credit risk 
plus liquidity makes Agency securities near substitutes for gov-
ernment securities and hence for deposits. 
5. Commercial paper. 
Commercial paper also functions as a type of deposit substi-
tute. Commercial paper is short-term debt issued by investment-
grade issuers. These issuers are considered to be very low default 
risks, and the short maturity of the commercial paper reduces the 
risk horizon for investors. 
A subset of commercial paper is functionally collateralized. 
Asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) is short-term debt that 
is issued by special-purpose entities that do not engage in any 
business other than holding loans.158 These loans functionally 
collateralize the ABCP because there are no other claimants 
against the loans held by the ABCP issuer. Moreover, the ABCP 
issuers have liquidity and credit puts to federally insured banks, 
which ensure that the ABCP issuers are able to pay on the 
ABCP irrespective of the performance of their loan assets.159 
Issuance of commercial paper provides funding to borrowers, 
thereby fulfilling the Lending Function. Commercial paper also 
provides a safe, liquid store of value and a medium of exchange 
for investors, thereby fulfilling the Deposit Function. 
All of this is again facilitated by government intervention. 
Commercial paper issuance is based on credit ratings, which are 
facilitated by SEC regulation of the rating agencies.160 These rat-
ings are then incorporated into securities laws that restrict oth-
er types of investment vehicles from investing in commercial pa-
per and similar short-duration investment-grade securities.161 
Likewise, Basel bank capital risk weightings further incentivize 
investment in commercial paper.162 Commercial paper benefits 
 
 157 See Acharya and Öncü, The Repurchase Agreement (Repo) Market at 328 (cited in 
note 85) (noting that Agency securities are 51 percent of the collateral in the tri-party-
repo market). 
 158 ABCP is thus very short-term securitization. See Emma-Jane Fulcher, et al, The 
Difference between Traditional ABCP Conduits and SIVs *2 (Fitch Ratings, Apr 8, 2008) 
(on file with author). 
 159 See id. 
 160 See 15 USC §§ 78o-7 to -9; 17 CFR §§ 240.17g-1 to -7. 
 161 See 17 CFR § 270.2a-7.  
 162 See, for example, 12 CFR Part 3, Appendix A, § 4(c) (showing Basel implementa-
tion for national banks in Table D). 
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from exemption from bankruptcy clawbacks,163 and the Federal 
Reserve’s willingness to accept commercial paper as collateral 
for discount-window borrowing, as well as to cover daylight 
overdrafts, ensures liquidity in the market.164 
6. Money market mutual funds. 
Finally, prime money market mutual funds (MMMFs) func-
tion as a complete banking substitute.165 MMMF shares are 
technically equity in a particular MMMF, rather than debt obli-
gations. Nonetheless, MMMF shares fulfill the Deposit Function 
because they have debt-like characteristics due to their unique 
accounting treatment, which enables a stable share price of 
$1.00 per share in most circumstances.166 This stable net asset 
value (NAV) accounting means that MMMF shares are typically 
redeemable at par. Moreover, many MMMF accounts are check-
able, enabling the immediate liquidity of the funds for inves-
tors.167 MMMFs also meet the Lending Function, as they are ma-
jor purchasers of commercial paper, Treasury bills, and other 
short-term debt. 
The function of MMMFs is legally constructed. SEC regula-
tions enable MMMFs to operate as deposit substitutes that offer 
a higher return than demand deposits at banks but without a 
commensurate increase in risk. Absent such regulatory stimu-
lus, the MMMF industry would be substantially smaller, if it 
would exist at all. 
Mutual funds are generally required to price and transact in 
their shares at the shares’ current NAV, which is calculated at 
market value or fair value if market quotations are not availa-
ble.168 This means that mutual fund share prices float with the 
market. This is known as “floating-NAV” accounting and pricing. 
Because mutual fund shares are generally freely redeemable, 
 
 163 See 11 USC § 546(e). See also Enron Creditors Recovery Corp v Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., 
651 F3d 329, 334 (2d Cir 2011) (holding that the redemption of commercial paper is not 
subject to avoidance as fraudulent transfer because of the settlement-payment defense).  
 164 See Federal Reserve Collateral Guidelines at *3 (cited in note 152). 
 165 See Jonathan Macey, Reducing Systemic Risk: The Role of Money Market Mutual 
Funds as Substitutes for Federally Insured Bank Deposits, 17 Stan J L, Bus & Fin 131, 
135 (2011). 
 166 See Marcin Kacperczyk and Philipp Schnabl, Money Market Funds: How to Avoid 
Breaking the Buck, in Acharya, et al, eds, Regulating Wall Street 305, 306 (cited in note 85). 
 167 See Macey, 17 Stan J L, Bus & Fin at 135 (cited in note 165). 
 168 See 15 USC § 80a-2(a)(41)(B); 17 CFR §§ 270.2a-4, 270.22c-1(a), 270.22c-2, 
270.22e-2.  
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they offer liquidity to investors. Nonetheless, because mutual 
funds in general do not guaranty the return of principal intact, 
they do not engage in the Deposit Function. 
In 1983, however, the SEC created an exemption from 
floating-NAV accounting and pricing for MMMFs.169 MMMFs 
are mutual funds that are legally restricted to investing solely in 
diversified portfolios of short-term, investment-grade assets (a 
significant portion of which are commercial paper or repos).170 
The SEC permitted MMMFs to use an amortized cost method to 
calculate shares’ NAV and to price using a penny-rounding 
method.171 Amortized cost valuation means that the valuation of 
assets is at cost plus any amortization of premiums and accumu-
lation of discounts, rather than at market value. The penny-
rounding pricing method means that share prices can be round-
ed to the nearest penny.172 Thus, if share value is above $0.995, 
it may be rounded up to $1.00. Amortized cost valuation plus 
penny-rounding pricing enabled MMMFs to sell and redeem 
their shares at a stable price (typically $1.00 per share), irre-
spective of small fluctuations in the value of their portfolios. 
Thus, in a MMMF, it is usually yield, rather than share price, 
that fluctuates. This method of accounting is known as “stable-
NAV” accounting.173 
MMMFs do not formally promise a minimum NAV per share 
of $1.00, but this is functionally their economic promise. Funds 
that dip below that and “break the buck” fail. Accordingly, 
MMMFs that run into trouble have often been bailed out by the 
financial institutions that sponsor them.174 The result is that 
 
 169 See generally Securities and Exchange Commission, Valuation of Debt Instru-
ments and Computation of Current Price per Share by Certain Open-End Investment 
Companies (Money Market Funds), 48 Fed Reg 32555 (1983), codified as amended at 17 
CFR Part 270. 
 170 See 17 CFR § 270.2a-7(d)(1)–(2). As of the end of the first quarter of 2014, 20 per-
cent of MMMF assets were securities repurchase agreements. See Financial Accounts of 
the United States at *98 (cited in note 41) (presenting data regarding MMMF assets com-
posed of securities repurchase agreements in line 5 of Table L.121). And another 36 percent 
of commercial paper was MMMF assets. See id at *114 (presenting data regarding com-
mercial paper MMMF holdings in line 30 of Table L.209).  
 171 See 17 CFR § 270.2a-7(c).  
 172 See 17 CFR § 270.2a-7(c). 
 173 See The New Regulatory Regime for Money Market Funds: A Window into the 
Mark-to-Market NAV *1 (BlackRock, Jan 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/U2LK 
-4RUA. 
 174 See Jill E. Fisch, The Broken Buck Stops Here: Embracing Sponsor Support in 
Money Market Fund Reform, 93 NC L Rev 935, 944–45 (2015) (“MMFs rarely break the 
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MMMFs are perceived to be a deposit substitute because they 
offer guarantied return of principal on demand. 
MMMFs are able to offer highly competitive pricing to 
banks in part because they receive more-favorable tax treatment 
than banks. Bank depositors are subject to two levels of taxa-
tion: the bank is taxed on its earnings, which affects the interest 
rate that the bank can pay the depositor, and the depositor is 
taxed on the deposits’ earnings.175 In contrast, MMMFs, like all 
mutual funds that qualify as “regulated investment companies” 
under the Internal Revenue Code, receive “pass-through” tax 
treatment—so only the investor’s earnings are taxed and not the 
MMMF itself.176 While the tax treatment of MMMFs is shared 
with most other mutual funds and significantly predates the rise 
of MMMFs,177 the pass-through tax treatment is nonetheless a 
government subsidy for the MMMF industry. 
In July 2014, the SEC adopted a rule paring back MMMFs’ 
1983 exemption from floating-NAV accounting and pricing.178 In-
stitutional MMMFs that do not invest solely in governmental ob-
ligations must use floating-NAV accounting and must use pric-
ing that rounds out to the fourth decimal place.179 This means 
that all retail (consumer) MMMFs and institutional MMMFs 
that invest solely in governmental obligations may continue to 
use stable-NAV accounting and penny-rounding pricing. 
Moreover, the 2014 rule empowers the boards of directors of 
all MMMFs to impose liquidity fees on their funds and to tempo-
rarily suspend redemptions if fund liquidity declines beneath a 
minimum threshold.180 Under the 2014 rule, any MMMFs that do 
not invest solely in governmental obligations are also subject to a 
default liquidity fee in such circumstances, unless the fund’s board 
 
buck because MMF sponsors have traditionally been willing to support the $1 share 
price.”). 
 175 See Ken B. Cyree, Scott E. Hein, and Timothy W. Koch, The Impact of Taxes and 
Ownership on the Performance and Capital Structure of S Corporation Banks *3 (un-
published manuscript, May 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/9CDA-EKJP (discussing 
taxation at the corporate level and on individual dividends and capital gains). 
 176 See 26 USC §§ 851–55. 
 177 Pass-through treatment for regulated investment companies dates back to 1936. 
See Steven Leigh Gill, Tax Equalization in Mutual Funds *6 (PhD dissertation, Univer-
sity of Massachusetts Amherst, Feb 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/S5ND-6YEC. 
 178 Securities and Exchange Commission, Money Market Fund Reform; Amend-
ments to Form PF, 79 Fed Reg 47736, 47739 (2014). 
 179 See id at 47736. 
 180 See 17 CFR § 270.2a-7(c)(2)(i). 
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of directors determines that it is not in the fund’s best interest.181 
Additionally, the 2014 rule subjects MMMFs to greater asset-
diversification requirements,182 stress testing,183 and disclosure 
requirements, including the express disclosure of the fact that 
the funds are not guarantied or government backed184 and of any 
history of financial support of the funds by affiliates.185 
The effect of the SEC’s 2014 reforms is to erode MMMFs’ 
status as perfect deposit substitutes. For institutional, non-
governmental MMMFs, there is no longer a guaranty of the re-
turn of principal intact, and for all MMMFs, there is no longer a 
guaranty of redemption on demand. As a result, MMMF inves-
tors are more clearly exposed to the risk of the Lending Func-
tion, and that is what the additional required disclosures are 
meant to underscore. 
How much this will matter in terms of investor behavior is 
not clear. The implicit guaranty of fund-sponsor support of 
MMMFs will help assuage investor concerns about the return of 
principal intact, and it is hard to imagine the board of directors 
of a MMMF ever enacting redemption gates, because any fund 
that does so will have great difficulty in attracting future in-
vestment.186 Moreover, the added diversification and stress-
testing requirements are designed to ensure that MMMFs in 
fact continue to allow on-demand redemption at a $1.00 per 
share price, even if they cannot use accounting legerdemains to 
accomplish this. In other words, while proclaiming that the 
MMMFs are not deposits, the SEC has adopted regulations that 
resemble prudential regulations for depositories, rather than 
traditional securities regulations. Thus, while as of 2014 
MMMFs are no longer allowed to formally act as deposit substi-
tutes, they are still allowed to offer something very close, partic-
ularly for retail MMMFs. 
The SEC’s 2014 MMMF reforms are thus best understood as 
a type of regulatory theater that is designed to give the appear-
ance of ending MMMFs’ status as deposit substitutes without 
actually doing so and without applying prudential banking-type 
regulations to plan sponsors. Either reform would have seriously 
 
 181 17 CFR § 270.2a-7(c)(2)(ii)–(iii). 
 182 17 CFR § 270.2a-7(d)(3). 
 183 17 CFR § 270.2a-7(g)(8). 
 184 See Form N-1A *6 (SEC, May 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2EH2-TYUM. 
 185 See id at *18. 
 186 See generally Fisch, 93 NC L Rev 935 (cited in note 174). 
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diminished MMMFs’ viability as a product by leveling the play-
ing field with formal deposits. As things stand, however, 
MMMFs continue to function as an asset class principally be-
cause of the significant overlay of regulatory support. 
7. Uninsured bank deposits. 
Uninsured bank deposits would seem at first blush to be the 
very antithesis of “safe assets.” After all, the FDIC disclaims any 
insurance of these deposits, virtually all of which exceed FDIC 
insurance limits, rather than holding them at uninsured institu-
tions. And yet, often (but not always) the uninsured depositors 
at failed banks do not incur any losses. This is because the 
FDIC’s preferred resolution procedure is to sell the “good” assets 
of a failed bank to another bank over a weekend.187 
Typically the sale price of the “good” assets is reduced 
through the buyer’s agreement to assume certain uninsured lia-
bilities, including payment-system liabilities and uninsured de-
posits.188 Buyers are frequently happy to assume the uninsured-
deposit liability because it gives them a “relationship” entrée to 
gain other business from the depositors. Sophisticated unin-
sured depositors know that this is the likely outcome from a 
bank failure, so the risk that they assume on the uninsured de-
posits is actually much smaller. The FDIC’s preferred form of 
bank resolution has the effect of functionally “insuring” unin-
sured deposits. 
D. The “Safety” of “Safe Assets” 
The overall market for deposit-substitute short-term debt is 
huge. As of the end of 2014, there were $3.7 trillion in securities 
repurchase agreements outstanding; $936.4 billion of commer-
cial paper outstanding, of which $64.8 billion was ABCP; and 
$2.7 trillion in MMMF shares outstanding.189 These private “safe 
assets” total just over $7.3 trillion and do not include credit de-
rivatives. By comparison, there were $12.5 trillion in domestic 
bank and credit union deposits at the end of the first quarter of 
 
 187 See Resolutions Handbook *14 (FDIC, Dec 23, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/NQ53-3A4L.  
 188 See id at *36. 
 189 See Financial Accounts of the United States at *98, 100, 112, 114 (cited in note 
41) (providing data for repos in line 1 of Table L.207, for commercial paper in line 2 of 
Table L.209, for ABCP in line 16 of Table L.126, and for MMMFs in line 13 of Table 
L.121). 
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2014 and $22.2 trillion in government and Agency debt.190 In to-
tal, then, there was over $42 trillion in assets meeting the De-
posit Function to some degree. 
The problem with short-term debt as a solution to the Deposit-
Lending problem is that it is not risk-free. There is yield on 
short-term debt, and yield implies risk. Despite collateralization 
and guaranties (express and implied) from third parties, credit 
risk still exists for short-term debt. Collateral value can decline, 
and third-party guarantors can themselves be insolvent. There 
is also liquidity risk because of the maturity transformation that 
occurs in some types of short-term debt and because the liquidi-
ty for some types of short-term debt depends on the ability of the 
issuers to roll over the debt: new investments provide the liquid-
ity to pay off the old investments. 
Various forms of government intervention do a great deal to 
encourage investors to think of shadow-banking investments as 
“safe assets.” Yet government interventions are often in the form 
of labeling or legal rules for private parties; express pledges of 
the full faith and credit of the United States do not exist for 
shadow-banking assets, nor is an implicit guaranty assumed for 
ordinary losses. The result is uncertainty about the extent to 
which these assets are in fact implicitly guarantied against cat-
astrophic market losses. 
This uncertainty seems to have been present in the minds of 
investors after the 2008 financial crisis, as money has flowed out 
of implicitly guarantied deposit-substitute “safe assets” and into 
true deposits with express government guaranties. During the 
financial crisis, deposit-substitute markets were hit hard. Repo 
markets experienced runs, first in 2007 in mortgage repo191 and 
 
 190 See id at *84, 113 (providing data for deposits at private depositories in lines 23–
25 of Table L.110, for US government securities in line 3 of Table L.208, and for Agency 
securities and mortgage-backed securities in line 4 of Table L.208). 
 191 See Disclosure Statement in Respect of Plan of Liquidation of Mortgage Lenders 
Network USA, Inc under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, In re Mortgage Lenders 
Network USA, Inc, Case No 07-10146, *13–14 (Bankr D Del filed Mar 12, 2008) (describ-
ing spillover problems from the failures of other subprime lenders, which resulted in 
warehouse lenders demanding more collateral). Between November 2006 and August 
2007, virtually every subprime-origination specialty firm—over eighty firms in all—
failed. See Worth Civils and Mark Gongloff, Subprime Shakeout: Lenders That Have 
Closed Shop, Been Acquired or Stopped Loans (Wall St J), archived at 
http://perma.cc/L7NF-RDPM. The run on subprime-mortgage originators’ repo lines of 
credit was arguably the first sign of the financial crisis, but it has received little scholar-
ly notice. But see generally Richard Stanton, Johan Walden, and Nancy Wallace, The 
Industrial Organization of the US Residential Mortgage Market, 6 Ann Rev Fin Econ 259 
(2014) (discussing the vulnerability of warehouse lines of credit—financed in the form of 
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then in 2008 in securities repo.192 Commercial paper markets 
froze in 2008,193 and MMMFs broke the buck and experienced a 
run.194 These problems with the shadow-banking deposits were 
solved only with an incredible alphabetic patchwork of Treasury 
and Federal Reserve programs. The Treasury guarantied the 
share value of MMMFs,195 while the Federal Reserve established 
the Commercial Paper Funding Facility as a liquidity backstop 
for commercial paper issuers,196 the Asset-Backed Commercial 
Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility to finance 
banks’ purchases of ABCP from MMMFs in order to enable 
MMMFs to have the liquidity to meet their redemption de-
mands,197 and the Money Market Investor Funding Facility to 
provide greater liquidity in the secondary market in MMMF 
shares.198 
Whether the 2008 bailouts and subsequent political back-
lash have strengthened or weakened the implicit guaranty of the 
shadow-banking system is unclear. Despite the post-2008 “never 
again” rhetoric, the bailouts of 2008 are a stark reminder that 
“too big to fail” markets are implicitly guarantied. The market 
appears to have lost a substantial amount of confidence in at 
least some classes of “safe assets” as deposit substitutes, howev-
er. Thus, at the end of 2007, the last full pre-crisis year, the mar-
ket in manufactured short-term “safe assets”—including repos, 
commercial paper, uninsured deposits, and MMMF shares, but 
excluding credit derivatives—was $9.8 trillion, or 59 percent, of 
the $16.5 trillion market for deposits and deposit substitutes.199 In 
 
mortgage repurchase agreements—to runs and the calling of New Century’s warehouse 
line of credit). 
 192 See generally Gorton and Metrick, 104 J Fin Econ 425 (cited in note 112). 
 193 See Adam Davidson and Alex Blumberg, The Week America’s Economy Almost 
Died (NPR, Sept 29, 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/MJR4-FBNT. 
 194 See, for example, Tami Luhby, Run Ends on Money Market Funds (CNN, Sept 
29, 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/8NK4-72Z4. 
 195 See Treasury Announces Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds 
(Department of the Treasury, Sept 29, 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/76NM-NFPM. 
 196 See Commercial Paper Funding Facility (Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, Feb 5, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/Q9DV-T9ZH. 
 197 See Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Fa-
cility (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Feb 5, 2010), archived at 
http://perma.cc/BY48-KRXX. 
 198 See Money Market Investor Funding Facility (Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, Feb 5, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/NJ8Y-ZNGH. 
 199 See Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States: Flows and Outstandings; 
Fourth Quarter 2007 *84–86 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Mar 6, 
2008), archived at http://perma.cc/JB5V-3ZCC. From the Fed’s data, the numerator is 
the sum of Table L.205, line 9 (large time deposits); Table L.207, line 1 (repos); Table 
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contrast, as of the end of 2014, the market in “safe asset” deposit 
substitutes (excluding credit derivatives) was $9.3 trillion, or on-
ly 44 percent of a $21.3 trillion market for deposits and deposit 
substitutes.200 One should be careful not to read too much into 
these big picture numbers, as other factors could affect shifts in 
investments, but they do point to the difference between true 
deposits and “safe asset” deposit substitutes.201 “Safe assets” re-
create the banking problem of combining a Deposit Function 
with a Lending Function, but they do so without the stabilizing 
benefits of ex ante government regulation and ex post govern-
ment solvency and liquidity support. 
The shadow-banking system continues to present an un-
solved regulatory dilemma with three basic approaches possi-
ble: expanding the bank regulatory system to shadow banking, 
eliminating shadow banking through the withdrawal of gov-
ernment support, or continuing to implicitly guaranty the 
shadow-banking system. Post-2008 policy has slightly expand-
ed ex ante regulation of some shadow-banking markets. The 
Dodd-Frank Act requires the clearing of most swaps through 
clearinghouses202 and requires credit-risk retention for securit-
ization.203 Informally, the Federal Reserve has pushed for the 
reform of the tri-party-repo clearing process to reduce intraday 
overdraft risk.204 These reforms, however, have nibbled around 
 
L.208, line 2 (commercial paper); and Table L.206, line 1 (MMMF shares). The denomi-
nator is the sum of Table L.204, line 1 (checkable deposits and currency); Table L.205, 
line 1 (time and savings deposits); and the items in the numerator, excluding large time 
deposits. Id. Large time deposits are used as a proxy for uninsured deposits. 
 200 See Financial Accounts of the United States at *110–14 (cited in note 41). From 
the Fed’s data, the numerator is the sum of Table L.205, line 7 (large time deposits); Ta-
ble L.207, line 1 (repos); Table L.209, line 2 (commercial paper); and Table L.206, line 1 
(MMMF shares). The denominator is the sum of Table L.204, line 1 (checkable deposits 
and currency); Table L.205, line 1 (time and savings deposits); and the items in the nu-
merator, excluding large time deposits. Id. Large time deposits are used as a proxy for 
uninsured deposits. 
 201 One can see the decline in “safe assets” as reflecting Gresham’s Law. Gresham’s 
Law holds that bad money will drive the good money out of circulation; if a clipped coin 
has the same purchasing power as a sound coin, consumers will pay with the clipped coin 
and hoard the sound coins. Gresham’s Law holds true only when the bad money is func-
tionally equivalent to the good money. See George Selgin, Gresham’s Law (EH.net), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/CK8V-MLF4. The corollary of Gresham’s Law is that once the 
functional equivalency is removed, the bad money will cease to be in favor. Thus, the bad 
money of “safe assets” started to displace deposits as when the “safe assets” were seen as 
deposit equivalents, but once it became clear that they were not, the market’s enthusi-
asm waned. 
 202 7 USC § 2(h); 15 USC § 78c-3. 
 203 15 USC § 78o-11. 
 204 See Tarullo, Shadow Banking and Systemic Risk Regulation at *7 (cited in note 95). 
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the edge of the shadow-banking regulatory problem, and they 
have all been focused on creating private contracting protections 
for market stabilization. Indeed, the main response to the shadow-
banking problem has been declamatory through repeated denials 
of the implicit guaranty of shadow-banking markets, which the 
regulatory subsidization of shadow banking continues. Of course, 
implicitly guarantied markets are never actually guarantied—
until the guaranty becomes real. 
The economic importance of the largely unregulated shadow-
banking system remains the key financial regulatory chal-
lenge—subsuming issues such as “too big to fail,” as what often 
makes institutions “too big to fail” is their role in private money 
creation through shadow banking. The following Part of this Ar-
ticle proposes a two-part change in tack regarding both tradi-
tional and shadow banking: (1) splitting the Deposit and Lend-
ing Functions by prohibiting depositaries from making loans, 
and (2) eliminating all government facilitation and subsidization 
of “safe asset” creation by the shadow-banking market. 
III.  SAFE BANKING 
As the previous Part of this Article shows, there are a num-
ber of approaches to making banking safer, but they all come at 
a cost. Either they do not truly make banking safe, as with 
short-term debt (excluding the implicit guaranty for catastrophic 
tail risk); they impose the costs of politicized finance, as with 
government banks; or they generate moral hazard that encour-
ages bubbles, as with government guaranties. 
Yet if the fundamental problem in modern banking is the 
combination of the incompatible promises of Deposits and Lend-
ing, a solution should be readily apparent: untwine these two fi-
nancial functions. 
A. Narrow Banking 
Another approach to the problem of pairing Deposits and 
Lending can be found in the reform proposals that go under the 
rubric of “narrow banking.” Narrow-banking proposals would gen-
erally restrict the range of bank activities and investments with 
an eye toward lessening risks to deposits. Some narrow-banking 
proposals would merely restrict banks from engaging in capital 
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market activities but would allow the relending of deposits.205 
Other proposals would restrict the use of deposits to investment 
solely in “safe” investments with “little or no nominal interest 
rate and credit risk,” such as government obligations or the obli-
gations of other narrow banks.206 Some narrow-banking pro-
posals would restrict banks to short-term investments,207 while 
others would not.208 
The Banking Act of 1933209 (“Glass-Steagall Act”) and the 
Volcker Rule in § 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act210 can both be seen 
as very limited types of narrow-banking reforms. The Glass-
Steagall Act prohibited commercial banks from engaging in cer-
tain investment banking activities.211 The Volcker Rule prohibits 
certain types of bank investments.212 Neither the Glass-Steagall 
Act nor the Volcker Rule attacks the idea that banks should not 
be relending deposits, however. 
Narrow-banking proposals aim to reduce the risk that de-
positors incur with relending. But they do not eliminate it. Nar-
row banking does not separate Deposits from Lending. It sepa-
rates Deposits and low-risk Lending activities from high-risk 
Lending activities, but it does not eliminate risk for deposits. 
From the perspective of a depositor wanting safety and liquidity, 
 
 205 See, for example, Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr, Narrow Banking: An Overdue Reform 
That Could Solve the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem and Align U.S. and U.K. Regulation of Fi-
nancial Conglomerates, 31 Bank & Fin Serv Pol Rep 1, 2 (Mar 2012).  
 206 George Pennacchi, Narrow Banking, 4 Ann Rev Fin Econ 141, 142 (2012). See 
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narrow banking is inadequate because to such a depositor risk is 
a binary proposition, not a spectrum. Thus, it matters little to 
the depositor whether her deposit is used to make loans, buy 
debt securities, support derivative positions, or purchase equity 
securities. All of these investments entail risk. Indeed, even in-
vestment in Treasury securities entails some liquidity risk be-
cause of the maturity transformation involved. Investment of 
deposits in “safe assets” still entails investment risk. Not sur-
prisingly, some narrow-banking proposals expressly contemplate 
the continuation of federal deposit insurance.213 
Narrow-banking advocates have correctly noted that narrow 
banking reduces banks’ incentives to become large and complex 
because there is no additional “too big to fail” subsidy for doing 
so.214 Narrow banking would reduce moral hazard and the over-
all risk of the financial system.215 Yet this is not enough to elim-
inate the inherent risk of fractional reserve banking, as deposits 
are still used for lending, even if riskier lending activities are 
separate from deposits. Even in a very narrow banking system, 
it is still possible to construct extended chains of intermediation 
that ultimately, even if indirectly, expose deposits to the risks 
from highly speculative investments. 
Although narrow banking would be an improvement on the 
current situation, narrow-banking proposals fail to follow their 
own logic to its conclusion—namely, that Deposits should be sep-
arated from Lending altogether. Untwining the Deposit and 
Lending Functions would mean that banks could not use deposits 
to make any loans or investments whatsoever. In other words, 
banks would be required to maintain all of their deposits on 
hand. Functionally, all deposits would be special deposits. Rather 
than engage in fractional reserve banking like Bartolomeo and 
Prospero, banks would engage in 100% reserve banking. 100% 
reserve banking is the logical conclusion of narrow-banking pro-
posals, the butterfly to narrow banking’s chrysalis. 
B. 100% Reserve Banking 
100% reserve banking presents an alternative route for 
achieving safe banking and financial stability. 100% reserve 
banking would mean that banks could not reloan deposits. 
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Banks could make loans only to the extent of their equity capi-
tal. Because the deposits would not be reloaned, they would al-
ways remain safe—even if a bank lost all of its equity capital on 
bad loans, the deposits would remain untouched absent fraud or 
defalcation. Thus, if Bartolomeo had to engage in 100% reserve 
banking, it would not have mattered to Cosimo that Bartolomeo’s 
investment in Marino’s Levantine voyage foundered with Marino’s 
galley.216 
1. Historical 100% reserve–banking proposals. 
The idea of mandating 100% reserve banking is not new.217 In 
some sense, it is the original concept of banking and fractional re-
serve banking is the deviation. In modern times, various pro-
posals for forms of 100% reserve banking have been endorsed by 
a number of leading economists,218 most notably in what is 
known as the Chicago Plan, an originally anonymous 1933 bank-
ing reform proposal.219 The Chicago Plan, most closely associated 
with economists Professors Irving Fisher220 and Henry Simons,221 
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came surprisingly close to adoption during the early New 
Deal.222 In the decades since, the concept of 100% reserve bank-
ing has been endorsed both by heterodox Austrian School econ-
omists and more mainstream Chicago School economists. The 
Austrian economists hold that fractional reserve banking is in-
herently fraudulent and that banks’ creation of money from re-
lending deposits is equivalent to counterfeiting.223 The Chicago 
School economists accept fractional reserve banking as legiti-
mate, but they see it as a font of economic instability224 or as a 
tool for undesirable government interference in private borrow-
ing relationships225 and for political control over lending.226 The 
idea of 100% reserve banking has also periodically reemerged as a 
reform proposal, including in the wake of the 2008 financial cri-
sis.227 These proposals have gained little traction, in part because 
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of the political economy surrounding fractional reserve bank-
ing (as discussed in Part III.H), but they are a logical end 
point for attempts to take financial stability seriously. Thus, 
100% reserve–banking proposals have started to enter the policy 
conversation outside its traditional home among libertarian, anti-
central-banking Austrian School economists such as the UK 
Green Party and Icelandic reformers.228 
To date, 100% reserve–banking proposals have been the 
province of macroeconomists; the legal literature has not previ-
ously engaged with the idea in any depth.229 While a great deal 
of recent legal scholarship grapples with the problems of finan-
cial regulation and financial stability, most of this literature 
takes fractional reserve banking as an unquestioned assump-
tion. Some of this literature rightly recognizes the particular 
problem of “money-claim financing [as] the central challenge for 
financial policy and regulation.”230 Yet none has taken the idea of 
100% reserve banking seriously as a solution, much less worked 
through its operation and implications. 
Perhaps more importantly, all previous 100% reserve–
banking proposals have focused solely on regulation of deposi-
taries. This Article extends this literature by marrying the 100% 
reserve idea to the elimination of government facilitation of 
“safe asset” creation by the shadow-banking sector. Absent re-
form of the shadow-banking sector, 100% reserve–banking re-
quirements for depositaries are of limited use because funds will 
promptly flow into shadow-banking “safe assets” that function 
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as money, a medium of exchange that is liquid at par. For 100% 
reserve banking to work, the arbitrage between banking and 
shadow banking must be eliminated. Put another way, for 100% 
reserve banking to be successful, the government must have a 
monopoly over money creation. There cannot be any private 
money creation, be it through relending of deposits or through 
the creation of shadow-banking claims. 
2. Pure Reserve Banking. 
This Article introduces an absolutist version of 100% re-
serve banking: “Pure Reserve Banking.” Pure Reserve Banking 
differs from previous 100% reserve–banking proposals in two 
key dimensions. 
First, it would constitute a simple and absolute prohibition on 
the institutional combination of deposit-taking and lending. Under 
Pure Reserve Banking, depositaries would be forbidden from mak-
ing loans or investments of any sort. Such pure 100% reserve de-
positaries could not be institutionally affiliated with firms that are 
engaged in any other type of activities, as any affiliation could give 
rise to an implicit guaranty. Previous 100% reserve proposals have 
typically envisioned some sort of “safe” reinvestment of deposited 
funds, such as in government securities.231 
Second, Pure Reserve Banking would require the elimina-
tion of all government facilitation of shadow banking. Simply 
regulating depositaries while tolerating the continued existence 
of the shadow-banking market would make little sense, because 
the benefits of Pure Reserve Banking would be lost through ar-
bitrage with the shadow-banking market. A clear cleavage be-
tween Deposits and Lending requires not only maintenance of 
100% reserves but also the abolition of Deposit substitutes that 
enable regulatory arbitrage. 
In concrete terms, this would entail the purging of a wide 
range of legal facilitations of deposit substitutions. For example, 
the special protections for financial contracts (repos, swaps, secu-
rities and commodities contracts, forward contracts, and master 
netting agreements) in bankruptcy would have to be repealed.232 
These special protections operate to encourage the illusion that 
these types of contracts are free of credit risk and hence deposit-
like. Similarly, all MMMFs would have to be prohibited from 
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offering Deposit-type shares with a stable $1.00 per share NAV. 
Such stable value shares are possible only because the SEC con-
tinues to allow special accounting rules for some MMMFs.233 In-
stead, the NAV for all MMMFs would have to fluctuate with the 
market. Likewise, securities laws restricting MMMF invest-
ments to commercial paper and similar short-term investment-
grade securities would have to be eliminated along with special 
securities laws requiring disclosures and credit-risk retention 
for ABS. Risk weightings for insurance company investments 
would also have to be eliminated. (Bank capital risk weightings 
would necessarily be eliminated with any 100% reserve–banking 
system.) The institutional separation of swaps and repo dealers 
from depositaries would serve to abolish the implicit spillover of 
government support to these markets. Moreover, statutes that 
facilitate private money creation through negotiable instru-
ments, such as Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, would 
need to be substantially revised. 
Beyond outlining a vision for Pure Reserve Banking, this 
Article also advances the literature by underscoring 100% re-
serve banking’s legal and political implications. Most notably, 
100% reserve banking renders most of the prudential bank regu-
latory apparatus as well as federal deposit insurance and the 
Federal Reserve System entirely superfluous and unnecessary. 
The regulatory response to the growing complexity of banks has 
been to increase the complexity of regulation. This in turn sets 
off an arms race of more-complex transactions to avoid regula-
tion and of more regulation to plug the transactional gaps.234 As 
a result, bank regulation today resembles a Rube Goldberg con-
traption with layers of regulation taped and patched to a jury-
rigged structure. 
The complexity of regulation itself raises risks because dif-
ferent regulations may be at loggerheads and because no single 
regulator can see and understand the entire field. More complex 
regulation is not only potentially less workable but is also ex-
pensive, both for the government and for banks. Excessively 
complex regulation can result in deadweight loss for the entire 
system. 
The macroeconomists who have previously bruited 100% 
reserve banking have generally not recognized how the hugely 
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inefficient bank regulatory system is an outgrowth of fractional 
reserve banking. As a result, they have not recognized the regu-
latory implications of 100% reserve banking, namely that most 
of the prudential regulatory apparatus, including the Federal 
Reserve System and FDIC insurance, could be eliminated out-
right if 100% reserve banking were adopted. In many ways, 
however, this is the most important implication of 100% reserve 
banking—the total transformation and simplification of the 
American bank regulatory system. Rather than facing a system 
of heavily regulated traditional banking that is arbitraged 
through thinly regulated shadow banking, Pure Reserve Bank-
ing presents the possibility of a rationally designed system that 
produces greater financial stability with less regulation and 
without the dangers of regulatory arbitrage. 
3.   The feasibility of Pure Reserve Banking. 
Previous proponents of 100% reserve banking have also 
generally not recognized the significance of changes in the US 
economy for the feasibility of 100% reserve banking.235 When the 
Chicago Plan and Fisher’s “100% Money” proposal were made, 
the United States had fairly limited capital markets. There were 
bond and equity markets, but they provided capital only to large 
businesses, and these markets did not provide capital to small 
businesses or consumer borrowers.236 Indeed, up to the 1950s, a 
large share of consumer finance was provided by other consum-
ers rather than by financial institutions; over half of the mort-
gage dollars outstanding in 1952 were owed to other consumers, 
rather than to financial institutions.237 Accordingly, the Chicago 
Plan and the work of associated economists envisioned a world 
in which loans would be funded from banks’ capital (including 
retained earnings), savings (as opposed to demand) deposits, 
and the repayment of existing loans.238 Under the Chicago Plan, 
there would not be full institutional separation of Deposits and 
Lending. 
 
 235 See generally, for example, Rothbard, The Case for a 100 Percent Gold Dollar 
(cited in note 223). 
 236 See Gerding, Law, Bubbles, and Financial Regulation at 86–87 (cited in note 69). 
 237 See Financial Accounts of the United States: Flow of Funds, Balance Sheets, and 
Integrated Macroeconomic Accounts; Historical Annual Tables 1945–1954 *118 (Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Dec 10, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
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Since the 1930s, however, US capital markets have expanded 
and become infinitely more sophisticated and efficient. Today, 
capital markets no longer fund just large business concerns but 
also all sorts of consumer and small-business debt. Consumer 
debts—residential mortgages, credit card receivables, automo-
bile loans, and student loans—are all securitized, as are com-
mercial real estate mortgages. This means that the loans are 
purchased by special-purpose issuers that fund the purchases by 
the issuance of securities. The payment stream on the loans is 
passed on to the securities holders, either as a straight pass-
through or structured into senior-subordinate structures for 
credit risk, prepayment risk, and maturity.239 Large commercial 
loans are virtually always syndicated, meaning that the loans 
are split into smaller component shares that are funded by vari-
ous investors—sometimes banks, but also frequently hedge 
funds, pension plans, insurance companies, and other institu-
tional investors.240 The syndication interests are rated by rating 
agencies and trade in a reasonably liquid market. Syndicated 
loans have little functional distinction from debt securities.241 
Thus, as of the end of the first quarter of 2014, 70 percent of 
all home mortgages were funded by entities other than deposito-
ries and credit unions or the government.242 Depositories and 
credit unions held only 28 percent of outstanding home mortgages 
by dollar volume.243 For non-mortgage consumer credit, deposito-
ries and credit unions held 49 percent of the dollar volume out-
standing244 with finance companies and securitizations holding 
another 23 percent.245 And for non-financial corporate businesses, 
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76 percent of their $9.6 trillion credit-market financing came 
from bond and commercial paper issuance246 with another 8 per-
cent from non-bank financial institution loans.247 Non-mortgage 
bank loans accounted for only 7 percent of all non-financial cor-
porate businesses’ credit-market debt.248 None of this accounts 
for the $21.2 trillion in market value of non-financial corporate 
businesses’ outstanding equity, virtually none of which is held 
by depositories.249 
All of this means that banks no longer play as important a 
financial-intermediation role as they once did. Instead, non-
bank capital markets provide much of the credit to the US econ-
omy. While there is still plenty of financial intermediation tak-
ing place through banks, none of it requires the combination of 
the Deposit and Lending Functions. Capital markets are techni-
cally capable of assuming the entire Lending Function. There is 
no need for banks to make loans. A shift of the Lending Function 
entirely to capital markets would require some institutional ex-
pansion within capital markets, but it is all technically feasible, 
and it would not be difficult to redeploy the human capital and 
technological expertise that currently exist at fractional reserve 
banks to non-depository money brokerages. Indeed, this could, 
in many cases, be done through a corporate spin-off. 
For example, capital markets’ provision of the entirety of 
the Lending Function would require more and better-developed 
securitization pipelines, such that a consumer looking for a loan 
could go to a loan broker who would make the loan only if the 
loan could be sold into a securitization. Because securitizations 
take some time to assemble, some short-term temporary ware-
house funding would be needed. ABCP facilities already meet 
such warehouse-financing needs but would have to expand for 
such a system to work. And to facilitate securitization, there 
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would likely have to be a great deal of standardization of loan 
documentation and terms in order to offer more-standardized, 
and thus more-liquid, securitization products.250 
These are matters of scale and scope, however, and not in-
stitutional competencies. Thus, the Lending Function could be 
assumed entirely by capital markets. Accordingly, there is no 
longer any reason to tolerate the institutional combination of the 
Deposit and Lending Functions and its attendant problems. The 
United States could go not just to Chicago Plan–style 100% re-
serve banking, with Lending being done out of banks’ equity and 
pre-conversion deposit base, but to Pure Reserve Banking, with 
complete institutional segregation of Deposits and Lending, 
thereby removing any concerns of contamination and greatly 
simplifying regulation. 
4.   What would Pure Reserve Banking look like? 
In a world of Pure Reserve Banking, consumers and busi-
nesses would typically have both a deposit account and a bro-
kerage account. The deposit account would be at a 100% reserve 
bank (a “bank”). The bank would be prohibited from relending 
the funds in the deposit account. Accordingly, the funds on de-
posit would be insulated from the risk of the bank’s failure. Oth-
erwise, the deposit account would function exactly like a bank 
account currently does. The depositor would have payment privi-
leges, just like a regular bank account today. Banks would pre-
sumably charge depositors a fee for their safekeeping and pay-
ment services.251 Such fees might be higher than those charged 
 
 250 See Levitin and Wachter, 100 Georgetown L J at 1255–58 (cited in note 115). 
 251 Even with 100% reserve banking, banks would still assume some credit risk 
when offering payment services because of kiting and charge-back risks. Currently, there 
are no real-time consumer-payment systems. Therefore, funds might be made available 
to a payee before the payment has actually cleared. This presents a risk (“kiting”) to the 
bank that the payee will take the funds and abscond before the bank finds out that the 
payment is no good. The payor’s bank may also be at risk if it has warranted the validity 
of the payment. Real-time payment clearing is technically possible, however. Its adoption 
would eliminate the kiting risk in payments.  
 Payments also present a credit risk to banks because of charge-backs—the reversal 
of unauthorized or incorrect payments. The payee’s bank is obligated to repay the payor’s 
bank on charge-backs. The payee’s bank will then seek to recover the funds from the 
payee, but the payee might be unable or unwilling to pay. If so, the loss is on the payee’s 
bank. Real-time clearing does not solve this problem, because charge-backs can occur 
after payment for reasons such as the payment having been for goods that turn out to be 
defective or non-conforming. As a result, the combination of payments with safekeeping 
raises some potential conflicts, but they are likely to be small-scale. While banks do face 
real risk on payments, the losses that a bank is likely to face from payment operations 
 2016] Safe Banking: Finance and Democracy 423 
 
in today’s fractional-reserve-banking system, in which deposits 
and payments are often nominally “free” or even pay interest 
and rewards to consumers. These “free” or negative-cost deposits 
and payments are possible only because of the cross-
subsidizations that exist from Deposits to Lending and from 
Lending to Payments.252 Decoupling Deposits and Payments 
from Lending would eliminate these cross-subsidies and would 
result in greater transparency of the actual costs of Deposits and 
Payments and thus greater market discipline for banks in the 
provision of those services. 
The funds’ brokerage account would be maintained at a fi-
nancial institution (an “investment broker”) whence the con-
sumer could direct his investment. The brokerage account would 
not guaranty the on-demand return of principal invested; invest-
ment brokers would be forbidden from accepting deposits. In-
stead, there would be express credit and liquidity risk on all funds 
placed in the brokerage account. The brokerage account could be 
used for payments; the technology already exists for funding 
payments from brokerage accounts. Checks, debit cards, and cred-
it cards can all be linked to brokerage accounts already. Broker-
age accounts could even offer immediate cash redemption through 
ATMs. But an investment broker could also place limits on the 
redemption of funds, and some investments might themselves 
have no-call provisions or redemption limitations or penalties. 
In a Pure Reserve Banking world, a consumer or business 
seeking a loan would go to a capital markets institution (a 
“money broker”). Money brokers might work with various in-
vestment brokers to connect borrowers and funders or might 
serve as investment brokers themselves. A money broker might 
underwrite loans and fund them from its own corporate funds. 
Alternatively, a money broker might simply broker the loan. 
 
are unlikely to exceed the bank’s capital and private insurance. (This assumes that some 
minimum level of capital would still be required by regulation, but it would not need to 
be calculated on a complex risk-weighting basis, such as under the Basel Capital Ac-
cords; rather, it could simply be some flat ratio of deposits or payment volume to capital.) 
Thus, we should be able to transition to a risk-free world for depositors without federal 
deposit insurance. 
 252 See Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Economic Costs of Credit Card Merchant Re-
straints, 55 UCLA L Rev 1321, 1356 (2008) (noting a cross-subsidy from credit card re-
volvers to credit card transactors). Notably, the first mandatory cross-subsidy within 
payment systems was a function of the creation of the Federal Reserve System, as Fed-
eral Reserve Banks were required to clear their member banks’ checks at par rather 
than discounting them for credit risk. See Federal Reserve Act § 16, 38 Stat 251, 265–68 
(1913), codified as amended at 12 USC § 360. 
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Thus, a money broker could qualify the consumer or business for 
a loan on the basis of a preexisting set of underwriting guide-
lines or by auctioning off the funding (and possibly the servicing) 
of the loan. 
Both processes are already common. Direct lending by mon-
ey brokers would be no different from direct lending by banks 
today, other than the lack of a guarantied return of principal to 
investors. Mortgage brokers and mortgage banks regularly use 
“automated underwriting” programs to underwrite mortgage 
loans that they know they can subsequently sell to Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac.253 Similar underwriting guidelines are used by 
auto dealers that serve as agents for finance company lenders 
and were used by mortgage banks for private-label mortgage-
securitization conduits. Likewise, online payday lending in-
volves websites that serve as “lead generators,” with the “lead” 
being auctioned off to the highest bidder that wishes to fund the 
loan.254 And in the corporate-debt world, most large loans are 
syndicated, meaning that the loan actually consists of multiple 
pieces that are each separately funded by different investors. 
Syndicated loans are arranged by a lead bank, but the lead bank 
will fund only a small part of the total loan, and the loan will be 
made based on the lead bank’s assessment of whether there is a 
market of ready buyers for the other pieces of the syndication. In 
short, a great deal of consumer and business lending in the United 
States is already brokered and ultimately funded by non-banks. 
In any event, in a world in which depositaries do not make 
loans, one would expect specialized agents and brokers to expand 
their retail presence. Moreover, rather than being just single-
location shops, as mortgage brokers are today, they would likely 
also be institutional chains that would look and feel much like 
bank branches, only without the teller window for taking depos-
its. Conceivably, one could imagine co-located banks and money 
brokers or investment brokers sharing retail space, but without 
any corporate affiliation or profit-sharing arrangement that 
could give rise to an implicit guaranty of Lending activities from 
the Deposit accounts. The price-operational details are beside the 
point here other than to observe that there would need to be some 
sort of enforcement mechanism to police the extent of Deposit and 
 
 253 See Kathleen Engel and Patricia McCoy, Automated Underwriting: Ten Years 
Later (Credit Slips, Dec 14, 2006), archived at http://perma.cc/PVN3-UGYG. 
 254 See, for example, Carter Dougherty, Data from Payday Loan Applications Sold 
in Online Auctions (Bloomberg, June 7, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/29XR-BBJW. 
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Lending interaction. Such an enforcement mechanism would not 
be costless, but it would presumably be much less costly than 
the current complex regulatory system that is necessary to prop 
up fractional reserve banking. 
What all this means is that from the perspective of a depositor/ 
investor or borrower, Pure Reserve Banking would change little 
about how the world operates functionally. Consumers and 
businesses would still have the ability to have deposit or broker-
age accounts or neither, just as they do today. The sole differ-
ence between deposit and brokerage accounts would be their 
risk and yield, because the deposit accounts could not be used to 
fund loans. Both would offer payment services. Consumers and 
businesses would shift their assets back and forth between de-
posit and brokerage accounts based on their risk preferences 
and market rates of return, just as they would continue to shift 
funds among investments in their brokerage accounts.255 
Consumers and businesses would also continue to have the 
regular tools of risk mitigation at their disposal in capital mar-
kets, such as portfolio diversification, hedging, and stop-loss or-
ders, which cause automatic liquidation of investments upon a 
specified decline in investment value. Consumers and businesses 
would also continue using financial institutions for funding, just 
not the ones at which they have deposit accounts. Itemized pric-
ing might change because decoupling Deposits from Lending 
would end cross-subsidies. The total pricing, however, should 
not change—only its distribution and transparency. Because of 
the unbundling of financial services, the pricing of both Deposit 
and Lending services would be more transparent in a Pure Re-
serve Banking world, which should facilitate greater market dis-
cipline because consumers and businesses would have to choose 
whether they wanted to pay for particular services and how 
much risk they really wanted to assume.256 Thus, Pure Reserve 
Banking might also facilitate consumers’ ability to make in-
formed consumption choices. 
C. Effect on the Deposit Function 
Pure Reserve Banking would have three effects on the De-
posit Function. First, deposits would be absolutely insulated 
 
 255 The possibility of changes in consumer savings behavior or discontinuous risk 
preferences when faced with zero or negative returns is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 256 It is not clear how Pure Reserve Banking would affect the problem of the unbanked.  
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from a bank’s investment risk. (There would still be a de mini-
mis risk of defalcation, fraud, or theft that could be covered by 
private insurance.) Because banks would not be able to reinvest 
deposits, investment risk and liquidity risk would be eliminated. 
Separation of the Deposit Function from the Lending Function 
would protect the money supply from the market’s volatility; a 
broker-dealer’s failure would not endanger the money supply as 
it did after Lehman Brothers’ failure in 2008. 
Second, as a legal matter, all deposits would become some-
thing more like specific deposits than general deposits.257 While 
this need not extend to a depositor receiving back upon redemp-
tion the specific currency and specie that were deposited (because 
currency is fungible), the legal effect would be much the same: a 
bank deposit would not be a loan to the bank but a bailment, and 
the bank would have fiduciary obligations to the depositor to ac-
count for the funds that were deposited. Importantly, the deposit 
account would not simply be a piggy bank. It would still be linked 
to payment systems, and it is the combination of safekeeping and 
payments that makes deposit accounts particularly useful. In-
deed, it is access to payment services that compensates for the ze-
ro or negative yield that would exist on deposit accounts in a Pure 
Reserve Banking system. 
Third, banks would become much simpler operationally, 
with more-transparent pricing. This would improve market dis-
cipline for deposits and payments. With Pure Reserve Banking, 
depositors would pay for the safekeeping and payment functions 
that are offered by banks. Currently, some depositors pay net 
fees for their deposits in the form of monthly bank fees, service 
fees, and overdraft fees. Other depositors, however, receive net 
payments from banks in the form of interest payments on their 
balances. The cross-subsidies within this system are complex, 
varied, and beyond the scope of this Article, but they are gener-
ally regressive. If banks could not reinvest deposits, they would 
not be able to pay interest and would have no reason to do so. 
Instead, banks would compete for deposits on the basis of fees, 
service, and convenience, and regressive cross-subsidization 
among depositors would be reduced. 
Because Deposits would be decoupled from Lending, Depos-
its could not be used to subsidize Lending, as often occurs. De-
posits offer a low- or zero-cost source of funds that enables more 
 
 257 See Part I.B. 
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bank lending than otherwise and at cheaper rates because of an 
oversupply of bank credit. The result is a distortion of credit 
markets. Pure Reserve Banking would eliminate the Deposit-to-
Lending subsidy and the resulting distortion. How this might af-
fect consumer behavior or the accessibility of financial services 
is beyond the scope of this Article, although the possibility of a 
public option for 100% reserve banking, like the former US 
Postal Savings Bank,258 seems more politically feasible than a 
public fractional reserve bank that would have to make lending 
and investment decisions. 
D. Effect on the Lending Function 
1. Source of funds. 
Moving to Pure Reserve Banking would mean that the 
source of funding for all loans and investments would be capital 
markets, not banks. This is not a major change. While banks 
continue to play an important role in lending markets, banks’ 
market share of lending has continually declined vis-à-vis the 
capital markets. Moreover, banks often serve only as the origi-
nation agents for capital markets. Many bank loans are partici-
pated, syndicated, or securitized, meaning that the funding is 
ultimately from non-bank investors.259 
One concern about Pure Reserve Banking might be that it 
could result in a contraction of credit. It is not clear that this 
would be the case. Much depends on how much consumers and 
businesses really want to assume credit risk. Recall that in a 
Pure Reserve Banking world, banks would charge depositors for 
holding their funds; depositors would not be paid interest. This 
would make depositing funds in 100% reserve banks much less 
attractive, as depositors would have to pay direct fees as well as 
lose the time value of their deposits. Accordingly, there would be 
a strong incentive for consumers and businesses to place their 
funds in capital markets. To the extent that there is a contraction 
of credit, however, it is right-sizing, because the level of credit 
would reflect risk-internalized pricing rather than subsidization. 
The effect of Pure Reserve Banking on economic activity is dis-
cussed in more depth below.260 
 
 258 See notes 42–49 and accompanying text. 
 259 See Jing He, On Securitization of International Syndicated Loans, 3 Intl J Bus & 
Mgmt 151, 151 (Nov 2008).  
 260 See Part III.F.  
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A related concern about Pure Reserve Banking is that there 
could be a loss of the informational synergies that exist when 
deposit-taking and lending are centralized in the same firm. De-
posit account history can provide an important information 
source about borrower creditworthiness.261 While Pure Reserve 
Banking would result in some informational losses, it is not 
clear how important this is given that a great deal of lending is 
not bank lending262 and that banks are legally forbidden from 
mandatorily tying credit card and deposit accounts together.263 
Most lending presently depends on an independent information 
infrastructure that is derived from credit reporting rather than 
from more bespoke observations. Accordingly, it is unlikely that 
there will be much loss of “information capital” in Pure Reserve 
Banking. 
2. Maturity transformation. 
Although the Deposit and Lending Functions are at logger-
heads, their institutional combination produces one of the most 
important products of the banking system: maturity transfor-
mation. Banks transform short-term liabilities (deposits) into 
longer-term liabilities (loans) for their borrowers. Being able to 
obtain loans with appropriate maturities is critical for borrow-
ers. If a maturity is too short, a borrower might not be able to 
repay a loan and will be dependent on being able to refinance 
the obligation. For example, Fortuno the Farmer wants a loan 
that will not come due until after he has sold off his fall harvest, 
rather than a loan that comes due in the summer. 
Banks’ promises of redemption of principal on demand mean 
that they are able to engage in maturity transformation—
lending long-term against short-term liabilities—only to the ex-
tent that their deposit liabilities are stable and not redeemed en 
masse. Usually this gamble works, but when it does not, bank-
ing crises ensue. 
 
 261 See Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propa-
gation of the Great Depression, 73 Am Econ Rev 257, 259 (1983) (arguing that the Great 
Depression crimped lending because small-bank failures meant the loss of crucial infor-
mation nodes in the economy). 
 262 See Ben S. Bernanke, The Financial Accelerator and the Credit Channel (Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, June 15, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/N8AV 
-6E2M (questioning whether bank informational-screening benefits are still relevant). 
 263 See 15 USC § 1666g. 
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For example, in the United States in the 1970s, savings and 
loan institutions (S&Ls) took demand deposits to finance thirty-
year fixed-rate mortgage loans using demand and short-term 
deposits. As interest rates rose, S&Ls had to offer competitive 
rates to retain their deposit bases.264 Those that did not found 
themselves without the funding necessary to continue opera-
tions. But those that did found themselves paying higher inter-
est rates on their liabilities than they earned on their mortgage 
loan assets. The result was the decapitalization of the S&Ls and 
the beginning of the savings and loan crisis.265 
Falling interest rates in the early 2000s created a similar cri-
sis for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-sponsored 
entities (GSEs) that provide much of the capital and liquidity for 
the secondary mortgage market. The GSEs used non-callable cor-
porate debt to finance their purchases of prepayable mortgages.266 
In other words, the maturity dates of the corporate debt were po-
tentially much longer than those of the assets. When interest 
rates fell in 2001, there was an unprecedented wave of mortgage 
refinancing.267 The result was that the interest that the GSEs 
were earning on their assets declined, but the interest costs on 
the non-callable corporate debt remained fixed. The result would 
presumably have been the decapitalization of the GSEs, but ac-
counting scandals during this period prevent any definitive 
statements about the GSEs’ finances.268 
Asset-liability duration-mismatch problems also appeared 
during the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis. Structured in-
vestment vehicles (SIVs) are a class of investment funds that 
fund long-term liabilities with short- and medium-term debt.269 
In the summer of 2007, when SIVs found themselves unable to 
roll over their obligations, they failed.270 
This same problem repeated itself in 2008 in the repo market 
when commercial paper markets froze.271 Broker-dealers that 
fund themselves through repos often provided 30-, 90-, or 180-day 
term-repo funding to their prime brokerage clients but financed 
 
 264 See Levitin and Wachter, 46 UC Davis L Rev at 1163 (cited in note 54). 
 265 See id. 
 266 See Levitin and Wachter, 100 Georgetown L J at 1221 n 141 (cited in note 115). 
 267 See id. 
 268 See id. 
 269 See Bratton and Levitin, 86 S Cal L Rev at 836–37 (cited in note 101). 
 270 See id at 841–43. 
 271 See Davidson and Blumberg, The Week America’s Economy Almost Died (cited in 
note 193). 
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themselves via overnight repos.272 Normally, this duration mis-
match would have created a favorable yield spread for broker-
dealers, but when the overnight repo markets collapsed, broker-
dealers faced the problem of having loaned out non-callable 
funds and being cut off from their own funding. Only Federal 
Reserve intervention to restore liquidity to the commercial paper 
and repo markets saved the broker-dealers.273 
The examples of the SIVs and the broker-dealers illustrate 
that the maturity-transformation function is hardly exclusive to 
banks. Indeed, there are many ways to achieve maturity trans-
formation without involving a promise of redemption of principal 
on demand. 
First, a lender can always make a longer-term loan than de-
sired and rely on market liquidity to be able to sell the loan at 
the desired maturity date. Market liquidity thus functions like a 
put option for the lender. Second, lenders can use formal put op-
tions and other derivatives to achieve the maturities they want. 
A lender can make a ten-year loan but have a put option in the 
third year. From the lender’s perspective, this is a three-year 
loan; from the option counterparty’s perspective, it is a seven-year 
loan (beginning three years hence), and for the borrower it is a 
ten-year loan. A similar effect can be achieved using a total-
return swap for the excess of the borrower’s desired maturity over 
the lender’s desired maturity. These two methods of maturity 
transformation both rely on having liquid markets in either debt 
or derivatives. Such liquidity will not always exist for all types of 
instruments. Not all methods of non-bank maturity transfor-
mation are liquidity dependent, however. 
A third method of maturity transformation is securitization. 
Just like credit or interest-rate risk, duration risk can be 
tranched and allocated unequally among investors based on 
their risk preferences. Through securitization, a pool of thirty-
year fixed-rate mortgages can be transformed into a set of short-
duration bonds (say, three years), a set of medium-duration 
bonds (say, ten years), and a set of long-duration bonds (say, 
 
 272 See Kris Devasabai, Hedge Funds Face Higher Prime Broker Charges under Basel 
III (Risk.net, June 18, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/44R4-MBT6; Kris Devasabai, 
Pressure on Prime Broker Funding Model Threatens to Drive Up Financing Costs for 
Hedge Funds (Risk.net, Jan 23, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/WYE3-ZDCC. 
 273 See Ben S. Bernanke, Financial Reform to Address Systemic Risk (Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System, Mar 10, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/73MA-KM4N. 
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thirty years), in part because many of the mortgages are likely 
to prepay. 
A fourth method of maturity transformation is financing 
through non-bank finance companies. These companies raise 
funds by borrowing or by issuing equity and then invest these 
funds in loans that are purchased or made directly. Finance com-
panies play an important role in some sectors of the lending econ-
omy, such as auto lending and especially small-business finance, 
in which loans are much less standardized and hence less liquid 
than consumer obligations. Indeed, during the 2008 financial cri-
sis, the failure of finance company CIT was of much greater con-
cern than would have been predicted for an institution of CIT’s 
size because of its leading role in small-business finance.274 
Finally, crowdfunding can potentially eliminate the need for 
maturity transformation without requiring liquid secondary mar-
kets. There are many legitimate concerns about crowdfunding, 
but if it works as its proponents claim, then it offers funding for 
all sorts of unique loans. 
While maturity transformation is a valuable function that 
has long been associated with banks, there is no inherent reason 
why it must be performed by banks. Banks’ role in maturity 
transformation is because of historical path dependence. Modern 
financial markets offer the secondary market derivative liquidity, 
which makes banks’ role in maturity transformation superfluous. 
3. Money creation. 
Fractional reserve banking also means that banks are in-
volved in the creation of money through credit. There is no sin-
gle precise definition of money, but we might think of money, 
narrowly defined, as consisting of assets that serve simultane-
ously as a medium of exchange, a store of value, and a unit of 
account.275 
Currency—physical bills and coins—fits the definition of 
money. Only the Federal Reserve has the authority to create 
currency that qualifies as legal tender.276 But money consists of 
 
 274 See David Weidner, The System at Risk in a CIT Failure (Wall St J, July 17, 
2009), archived at http://perma.cc/3X8Q-GXRU. 
 275 See Jagdish Handa, Monetary Economics 5 (Routledge 2d ed 2009). 
 276 See 31 USC § 5103; Currency and Coin Frequently Asked Questions (Federal Re-
serve Bank Services), archived at http://perma.cc/F7GT-3JKJ. Technically, some legal 
tender currency is also produced by the US Mint under the authority of the Treasury, 
but virtually all currency is minted to meet orders from the Federal Reserve Board. 
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more than currency. It also includes instruments that have simi-
lar characteristics, including bank deposits, shadow-banking in-
struments, and government obligations. Because bank deposits 
are denominated in dollars (or other currencies), they serve as 
units of account. Checkable bank deposits also represent media 
of exchange and stores of value to the extent that they are liquid 
at par or near par. 
Banks create money in the form of deposits through lend-
ing.277 Bank lending creates bank deposits. When a bank makes 
a loan to a consumer, that loan is typically disbursed in the form 
of a deposit at the bank, rather than in cash. This transaction 
increases the bank’s assets (the loan) and liabilities (the deposit) 
as well as the consumer’s assets (the deposit) and liabilities (the 
loan). The process works in reverse with loan repayment. When 
a bank loan is repaid, a deposit is eliminated and thus the sup-
ply of bank-created money contracts. The money supply thus ex-
pands (or contracts) with the extent of bank credit. 
Whereas only the Federal Reserve can create money in the 
form of legal tender, money in the form of bank deposits is pri-
vately created through bank loans; this type of “bank money” 
functions as legal tender and is accepted in the payment of pub-
lic and private obligations. 
 
 277 See McLeay, Radia, and Thomas, 54 Bank Eng Q Bull at 15 (cited in note 28) 
(detailing money creation). See also generally Zoltan Jakab and Michael Kumhof, Banks 
Are Not Intermediaries of Loanable Funds—and Why This Matters (Bank of England, 
May 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3NTY-EWRJ. In contrast to the more modern un-
derstanding of banks as creating money by making loans, textbook macroeconomics 101 
teaches that banks merely intermediate from savers to borrowers by taking deposits and 
relending them. This older (but very ingrained) understanding of banks as mere inter-
mediaries of loanable funds emphasizes the role of reserve requirements as a limitation 
on relending. See Baumol and Blinder, Economics at 630 (cited in note 23). Thus, at a 
bank with a 10 percent reserve requirement, only $90 of a $100 deposit can be reloaned. 
That $90 will be redeposited, enabling $81 to be reloaned, and so on, ultimately generat-
ing an increase in the money supply that is equal to the product of the deposit and the 
“money multiplier.” The money multiplier is 1 / R, in which R is the reserve ratio ex-
pressed as a decimal. Thus, the $100 initial deposit would ultimately generate $1,000 in 
money creation. 
 Recent research, however, has indicated that the money supply is not in fact affected 
by reserve requirements. See Seth B. Carpenter and Selva Demiralp, Money, Reserves, 
and the Transmission of Monetary Policy: Does the Money Multiplier Exist? *1 (Finance 
and Economics Discussion Series, May 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/9YXB-VMWM. 
Moreover, a number of countries have abandoned reserve requirements altogether. See 
Sellon and Weiner, 82 Fed Res Bank Kan City Econ Rev at 5, 9 (cited in note 1). It is im-
portant not to confuse reserve requirements with capital regulations that require banks 
to have a particular ratio of equity to assets. Reserve requirements are about liquidity, 
not solvency. 
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Private creation of money is not limited to bank lending. 
Shadow-banking instruments also function as money. Shadow-
banking instruments are denominated in standard units of ac-
count. They are often liquid, either through sale or hypotheca-
tion, and they are often liquid at par or near par.278 
Government obligations also function as money. They are in 
standard units of account and they can be readily sold or hypoth-
ecated at or near par. The Assignment of Claims Act279 and relat-
ed legislation have enabled federal government contractors to 
obtain financing through the sale of their federal government 
invoices.280 Similar state statutes also exist.281 Consumers can 
borrow against tax refund obligations.282 Local government reve-
nue streams are sometimes securitized through either the issu-
ance of revenue bonds or the outright sale of revenue streams to 
investors,283 and government bonds trade in secondary markets 
and are easily hypothecated. Money creation through govern-
ment obligations is not centralized. Some obligations are federal, 
and some are state or local. Even within a level of government, 
the creation of obligations is not centralized. Some are voluntari-
ly created, such as through Treasury borrowing or government 
contracting, while others are created by virtue of judgments or 
refund liabilities. 
Understanding both bank deposits and shadow-banking in-
struments to be part of the money supply, we can define the 
money supply (M) as consisting of currency (C), checkable bank 
deposits (D), shadow-banking instruments (S), and government 
 
 278 Unlike bank deposits, however, shadow-banking instruments are not subject to 
formal reserve requirements. Thus, the money multiplier for shadow banking is theoreti-
cally unlimited. Practically, however, shadow-banking instruments are often collateral-
ized, and the collateral requirements function much like a reserve requirement, limiting 
the shadow-banking money multiplier. See Andy Kessler, The Fed Squeezes the Shadow-
Banking System (Wall St J, May 22, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/4RJG-QJAX. 
 279 54 Stat 1029 (1940). 
 280 31 USC § 3727 (2006). See also 41 USC § 6305 (2012). 
 281 See generally Assignment of Claims Act State Survey (International Factoring 
Association 1999). 
 282 See generally Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director of Forensic Audits and Spe-
cial Investigations, US Government Accountability Office, Letter to the Honorable John 
Lewis, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Committee on Ways and 
Means, US House of Representatives (June 5, 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/J2KP 
-SZYE. 
 283 See, for example, Khalid A. Razaki, Raymond Pollastrini, and Robert J. Moreland, 
Privatization of Infrastructure Assets: Financial Structures, Participant Motivations, and 
Lessee Tax Benefits *2–4 (Journal of Finance and Accountancy, Feb 2013), archived at 
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obligations (G). Thus, M = C + D + S + G. This measure of the 
money supply differs from either of the measures used by the 
Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve uses a measure known as 
M1 to track currency plus checkable bank deposits plus the neg-
ligible category of traveler’s checks. The Fed also uses a broader 
measure known as M2 that includes time deposits, savings ac-
counts, certificates of deposit, and retail MMMFs. Until 2006, the 
Fed also tracked a measure called M3 that further included some 
shadow-banking instruments, namely, all MMMFs and repos.284 
Functionally, however, the real money supply is even broad-
er than that tracked by M3, because M3 did not include all 
shadow-banking instruments. Thus, Professor Morgan Ricks has 
argued for measuring the money supply as including all credit 
instruments with a maturity of one year or less.285 Ricks’s dura-
tion limitation does not account for the way that longer-term in-
struments can also function as money. For example, instru-
ments such as Treasury or Agency securities can function as 
money, as they are units of account that are highly liquid at par 
(more so than some shorter-maturity instruments). While short 
duration tends to increase the likelihood of par exchange, all 
else being equal, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for achiev-
ing par or near-par exchange. Accordingly, it is best to view the 
money supply as including not only currency and bank deposits 
but also all shadow-banking instruments that are liquid—
whether through sale or hypothecation, at par or near par, and 
irrespective of duration—as well as government obligations. 
What this means is that the money supply is a function of 
deliberate federal government activity (printing currency, 
Treasury borrowing, and federal contracting); deliberate state 
and local government activity (borrowing and contracting); unin-
tentional government activity on federal, state, and local levels 
(judgments and refunds); and private activity (relending depos-
its and shadow banking). Accordingly, the US money supply is 
fundamentally decentralized, although there is federal govern-
ment intervention to correct perceived supply and demand im-
balances in pursuit of various economic growth and employment 
goals.286 The aggregate money supply, however, is neither 
tracked nor fully controllable by the central bank. 
 
 284 See Blair, 36 Seattle U L Rev at 432–34 (cited in note 230).  
 285 Ricks, 65 Vand L Rev at 1302 n 27 (cited in note 3).  
 286 See 12 USC § 225a:  
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Shifting to 100% reserve banking would shift the money 
supply from being decentralized with government corrections to 
being more (although not fully) centralized.287 Pure Reserve 
Banking would eliminate private money creation through bank 
deposits and through shadow banking. In other words, the mon-
ey supply would be limited to currency and government obliga-
tions, or M = C + G. The result would be a government monopoly 
on money creation.288 This means that monetary policy would 
shift from the Federal Reserve to the Treasury, making mone-
tary policy directly subject to political discipline. 
Whether such centralization is a good thing is an open ques-
tion; it has not been explored in the theoretical-economics litera-
ture. The theoretical literature on public versus private liquidity 
provision is very limited and models only the benefits of sup-
plementing private liquidity provision with public liquidity pro-
vision.289 And indeed, that is the system that already exists. The 
aggregate level of liquidity in the economy is determined not 
solely by market forces but additionally by a combination of 
market forces and government actions. The liquidity produced by 
the market is increased or decreased through a combination of 
(1) Federal Reserve open-market activity, (2) government fiscal 
 
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open 
Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit 
aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to increase 
production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, 
stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. 
 287 To the extent that capital market obligations would be liquid at par, there would 
still be private money creation in the economy. The ability of capital market obligations to 
be reliably liquid at par, however, is largely dependent on an implicit government guaran-
ty or other government facilitation of “safe assets”—so most, if not all, of this private-
money-creation power would disappear. 
 288 Whether this should produce a fixed rate of monetary growth, such as that advo-
cated by Professor Milton Friedman (monetarism), or a discretionary rate is an issue be-
yond the scope of this Article. The point is simply that control of the money supply 
should be public, not private.  
 289 The insight from the theoretical-economics literature is that actively managed 
government-supplied liquidity is necessary to supplement privately produced liquidity. 
See Bengt Holmström and Jean Tirole, Private and Public Supply of Liquidity, 106 J 
Polit Econ 1, 31 (1998). Privately supplied liquidity based on the relending of deposits 
suffers from the uncertainty of loan repayment. The government, in contrast, can more 
credibly commit to repayment because of its ability to commit future consumer income 
through taxation. The government has a superior ability to credibly commit to a medium 
of exchange that will be accepted at par (such as for tax and other legal obligations) and 
hence that will be liquid. In the face of market uncertainty, the government’s more cred-
ible promise of a par medium of exchange can help achieve something closer to a socially 
optimal level of liquidity.  
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activity (borrowing and spending), and (3) financial market reg-
ulation that encourages or discourages private money creation to 
achieve the politically desired economic effects. 
The existing political control of the money supply means 
that Pure Reserve Banking would not result in a shift from 
market to political determination of the money supply. The 
money supply would continue to be politically determined, but 
the politics would be more direct and transparent, as discussed 
below.290 
4. Risk management and market discipline. 
Decoupling Deposits from Lending would help foster greater 
market discipline and risk management in Lending markets. 
Capital market discipline is warped by the participation of de-
positories (including ersatz depositories, such as MMMFs) in 
capital markets. As long as Deposits and Lending are institu-
tionally twined, financial institutions are able to hold the gov-
ernment hostage by threatening to disrupt the Deposit Function 
if they are not bailed out when they run into trouble in their 
Lending activities. For example, the failure of a large broker-
dealer that finances itself primarily through repos could threat-
en one of the two clearing banks for tri-party repos, which would 
in turn threaten the stability of the whole financial system. In-
deed, the Federal Reserve’s bailout of Morgan Stanley and 
Goldman Sachs in 2008 was motivated in part by concerns about 
the effect of those banks’ failures on the clearing banks for tri-
party repos, which in turn were linked to the commercial bank-
ing system.291 
The implicit and explicit guaranties that this hostage situa-
tion produces in turn create a moral hazard of privatized gains 
and socialized losses. This moral hazard incentivizes banks to 
assume inefficiently excessive risk in their investments and to 
overproduce money through overlending. Moreover, because de-
positories’ counterparties in trades and derivative transactions 
know that depositories are likely to be bailed out if they get into 
trouble, the counterparties are willing to assume greater credit 
risk on the depositories. The result is a general erosion of mar-
ket discipline in capital markets. 
 
 290 See Part III.E.4. 
 291 See Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic 
Crisis in the United States *295–96 (Jan 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/UYE7-AFUH.  
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Separating Deposits from Lending means that lending insti-
tutions can be allowed to fail. A major brokerage house or other 
capital markets player could collapse without impairing deposits 
or the money supply. Moreover, if Deposits were separated from 
Lending, there would be a safe base of capital—Deposits—that 
could be deployed by depositors from their deposit accounts to 
their brokerage accounts to recapitalize those firms that are 
temporarily undervalued because of a collapse in the lending 
markets. Separating Deposits from Lending not only helps create 
more ex ante stability, hopefully avoiding market crashes, but it 
also helps with ex post stabilization after crashes. 
5. Bubble prevention. 
Separating the Deposit Function from the Lending Function 
would protect capital markets from bubbles created by the moral 
hazard of bank-created money. This moral hazard encourages 
banks to overproduce money because more lending results in 
more bank deposits. An overexpansion of the money supply 
makes money artificially underpriced. This has the effect of creat-
ing asset bubbles, because assets can be purchased with bor-
rowed money.292 Cheaper borrowing costs enable borrowers to 
bid up the price of assets away from sustainable fundamental 
values. 100% reserve banks do not engage in money production, 
so the moral hazard–fueled credit-bubble problem would disap-
pear if 100% reserve banking were required. 
E. Effect on Regulation 
Most discussions of 100% reserve banking pay little atten-
tion to its effects on regulation. Yet arguably the most important 
and beneficial impact of 100% reserve banking would be its 
transformation of bank regulation. 100% reserve banking would 
have a salutary effect on financial regulation in five ways. First, 
it would render much of the overly complex system of bank regu-
lation irrelevant and unnecessary, allowing the elimination of 
FDIC insurance, the Federal Reserve System, and most of the 
prudential bank regulatory apparatus. Second, it would signifi-
cantly reduce the enormous compliance costs of prudential bank 
regulation. Third, it would depoliticize bank regulation. Fourth, 
it would increase the transparency of monetary politics. And 
 
 292 See Gerding, Law, Bubbles, and Financial Regulation at 45 (cited in note 69). 
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fifth, it would eliminate the political pressure of “too big to fail” 
and thus eliminate bailouts. The result would be a much sim-
pler, more transparent, and less politically manipulable system 
of bank regulation that would serve the interests of financial 
stability far more than our current byzantine structure. 
1. Elimination of deposit insurance, the Federal Reserve 
System, and prudential bank regulation. 
The first and most obvious effect of 100% reserve banking 
on bank regulation would be the irrelevancy of most of the insti-
tutional structure of bank regulation. If Deposits were separated 
from Lending, a much less extensive financial regulatory system 
would be required. There would be no need for either the FDIC 
or the Federal Reserve System, as 100% reserve banks would 
not need either solvency or liquidity support. Indeed, prudential 
regulation in general for either banks or capital markets would 
be unnecessary. There would be no need for the complex Basel 
Accords system of bank capital regulation or for most of the 
nearly eleven thousand pages of federal banking statutes and 
regulations.293 In other words, bank regulation would become 
simpler and more comprehensible, with lower attendant regula-
tory costs. Consumer-protection regulation would continue to be 
necessary for deposits and fair lending, and antifraud regulation 
would be required for capital markets, but most of the complex 
and expensive financial regulatory state would be unnecessary. 
2. Reduction of the compliance costs of bank regulation. 
Separating the Deposit and Lending Functions would also 
greatly reduce the enormous compliance costs of bank regula-
tion. Bank regulation creates tremendous compliance costs for 
banks as well as costs for the government.294 While the estima-
tion of bank compliance costs is an imprecise exercise, the most 
comprehensive consideration, from 1998, estimated regulatory 
 
 293 See Part II.B. 
 294 There are no reliable measures of total compliance costs for banks (in part because 
there is no standard metric), but it is beyond peradventure that they are sizable and grow-
ing. For recent attempts to quantify some regulatory costs, see generally Ron Feldman, Ken 
Heinecke, and Jason Schmidt, Quantifying the Costs of Additional Regulation on Communi-
ty Banks (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis), archived at http://perma.cc/6B4L 
-A2E9; Understanding the Effects of Certain Deposit Regulations on Financial Institu-
tions’ Operations: Findings on Relative Costs for Systems, Personnel, and Processes at 
Seven Institutions (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Nov 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/73XB-PNWZ.  
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compliance costs as between 12 and 13 percent of banks’ non-
interest expenses.295 Using that estimate, regulatory compliance 
costs for insured depositories alone would have been around 
$50–$54 billion in 2013–2014.296 
The 12–13 percent estimate, however, is likely to be an un-
derestimation given the substantial expansion in bank regula-
tion since 1998. Indeed, Standard & Poor’s credit rating agency 
estimates that the Dodd-Frank Act’s reforms alone will result 
in an additional $2.0–$2.5 billion in annual compliance costs 
for the eight largest US banks.297 Nor does the $50–$54 billion 
estimate include the compliance costs of non-depository finan-
cial institutions that are attributable to bank holding compa-
nies. Additionally, there are costs to taxpayers from the gov-
ernment’s own regulatory activity in creating regulations and 
ensuring compliance.298 
Although we cannot be sure of the precise amount of com-
pliance costs for banks and the government, they are clearly 
quite large. The scope of bank regulatory costs should be taken 
as a strong indicator about how overly convoluted bank regula-
tion has become in an attempt to hold the positively charged 
ions of Deposits and Lending together. 
3. Depoliticization of bank regulation. 
Most arguments for 100% reserve banking have focused on 
the direct economic benefits of decoupling Deposits and Lending, 
but there are political economy benefits as well. Eliminating the 
massive prudential regulatory apparatus would also make the 
state of financial regulation and the stability of financial mar-
kets less dependent on regulatory discretion and the political 
climate. 
 
 295 Gregory Elliehausen, The Cost of Bank Regulation: A Review of the Evidence 
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Apr 1998), archived at 
http://perma.cc/3AAU-5XDR. 
 296 See Quarterly Banking Profile (FDIC, Aug 28, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/86TT-S99T (showing non-interest expenses of $206.8 billion in the first 
half of 2014 and $208.4 billion in the first half of 2013). 
 297 Matthew B. Albrecht and Carmen Y. Manoyan, Two Years On, Reassessing the 
Cost of Dodd-Frank for the Largest U.S. Banks *3 (Standard & Poor’s, Aug 9, 2012), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/B3LP-J3QR. 
 298 While most bank regulators, such as the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC), FDIC, and NCUA, are funded by assessments on industry, not all are (for example, 
the Federal Reserve Board). See Levitin, 127 Harv L Rev at 2043 (cited in note 67).  
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Currently, financial regulation and monetary policy are 
heavily intertwined because banks are the “transmission belt for 
monetary policy.”299 Bank regulation—formal rules and informal 
“guidance”—affects the extent of private money creation by 
banks. Financial regulation and monetary policy are indelibly 
linked in the current US arrangement, in part because of the 
role of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System as 
both a bank regulator and as part of the national monetary poli-
cy body, the Federal Open Market Committee.300 
The combination of financial regulation and monetary policy 
has two negative consequences. First, bank regulation becomes 
warped because it is serving two masters: prudential regulation 
and monetary policy. And second, because monetary policy is 
tied to bank regulation, the political choices in monetary policy 
are obscured and thus not as susceptible to democratic account-
ability as transparent policy choices. 
The entanglement of bank regulation and monetary policy 
warps bank regulation because bank regulation becomes the 
mechanism for implementing both prudential regulatory policies 
and monetary policy, the goals of which can be in tension. Pru-
dential regulation of banks (as separate from monetary policy) 
has a clear normative goal: institutional safety-and-soundness, 
which is about sustainability, stability, and limited risk-taking.301 
While there are policy disagreements about the extent to which 
certain policies will in fact produce safety-and-soundness, there 
is no dispute about the ultimate goals of prudential regulation—
only questions about how to implement them. 
Monetary policy may be in tension with prudential regulato-
ry goals because monetary policy may seek to “juice” the econo-
my by expanding the monetary base. This involves increased 
risk-taking with concomitant decreases in sustainability and 
stability. As long as monetary policy is tied to financial regula-
tion, there will be pressure for regulators to choose to privilege 
monetary policy concerns at the expense of potentially dissonant 
prudential regulatory concerns. The institutional entwining of 
monetary policy and financial regulation can compromise the 
 
 299 Annual Report 1982: Are Banks Special? (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 
Jan 1982), archived at http://perma.cc/39QG-6TSY. 
 300 See How Is the Federal Reserve System Structured? (Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, Aug 7, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/TQA8-PW4D. 
 301 See Ben S. Bernanke, Implementing a Macroprudential Approach to Supervision 
and Regulation (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May 5, 2011), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/NXF5-NHJZ. 
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stability goals of financial regulation. Because Pure Reserve 
Banking would separate monetary policy from banks (all money 
creation would be done directly by the government), it would 
have the effect of freeing what little would remain of prudential 
regulation from monetary policy pressures. Thus, bank regula-
tion would be substantially depoliticized. 
Pure Reserve Banking would also leave little room for bank 
regulatory discretion.302 Regulatory discretion is of particular con-
cern because financial regulation—formal regulations, their inter-
pretation, and their enforcement—are all highly politically de-
pendent. Following the 2008 financial crisis, the willingness of 
bank regulators to pursue the prudential regulatory goal of safety-
and-soundness, rather than to privilege economic growth, is very 
much in doubt.303 Much of the deregulation that contributed to 
the bubble and collapse was undertaken by regulators, rather 
than by Congress.304 Regulators either formally deregulated the 
banking industry, interpreted regulations so as to relax their 
impact, failed to enforce regulations, or even prevented other 
regulators from enforcing them.305 The result was an economic 
stimulus in the form of a regulatory subsidy.306 
4. Increased transparency of monetary politics. 
The combination of financial regulation and monetary policy 
also obscures the politics of monetary policy, which is democrati-
cally undesirable and increases the regressivity of monetary pol-
icy. Some monetary policy is done more or less transparently, 
such as when the Federal Open Market Committee directs its 
agent to buy or sell government bonds. But monetary policy is 
also done indirectly, through regulators encouraging tighter or 
 
 302 100% reserve banking’s reduction in regulatory discretion was recognized by 
Simons, one of its early proponents. See generally Simons, 44 J Polit Econ 1 (cited in 
note 221). Simons argued for 100% reserve banking as more consistent with the liberal 
principal of a society of rules, because it reduces regulatory discretion over the economy. 
Simons was particularly concerned about explicit political direction of investment and 
price controls. See, for example, id at 20 n 19. Perhaps because of this, his emphasis on 
the political economy benefits of 100% reserve banking has figured little in subsequent 
discussions of 100% reserve banking, as government price controls have faded from the 
scene in the post–World War II years. Yet other forms of less transparent financial re-
pression remain. 
 303 See Levitin, 127 Harv L Rev at 2041–49 (cited in note 67). 
 304 See id at 2047–49 (detailing deregulation in 1990s and 2000s by regulators). 
 305 See id. 
 306 See Gerding, Law, Bubbles, and Financial Regulation at 64 (cited in note 69) 
(discussing the “regulatory stimulus”). 
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looser bank lending standards or through the facilitation or frus-
tration of shadow-banking money creation. 
Currently, monetary politics are highly obfuscated by the 
complexity of financial regulation, which makes it harder to see 
the winners and losers of policy decisions. This obfuscation not 
only reduces democratic accountability but also makes the poli-
tics of financial regulation an insider game that inherently fa-
vors market participants who are incentivized to seek a more 
volatile financial system.307 Because market participants have 
unequal upside benefits and downside risks due to privatized 
gains and socialized losses, they effectively hold a call option on 
economic growth. Per the Black-Scholes option-pricing theory, 
the value of this option increases with economic volatility.308 Ac-
cordingly, financial market participants are incentivized to pur-
sue a system that increases volatility. The ability of financial in-
stitutions to create money through lending gives them the very 
tools needed to achieve such volatility. The problem with this 
system is that such volatility is highly regressive, because those 
with fewer means are less capable of insuring against shocks to 
savings and income.309 
At the same time, the complexity of financial regulation 
mutes outside political pressure in favor of financial stability,310 
so financial market participants’ quest for volatility generally 
goes uncountered.311 This asymmetry among interest groups be-
comes a regulatory problem, because financial market partici-
pants are a concentrated interest group that lobbies for favora-
ble regulation.312 It is further exacerbated because of the 
 
 307 See Levitin, 127 Harv L Rev at 2037 (cited in note 67). 
 308 See Mark H.A. Davis, Complete-Market Models of Stochastic Volatility, 460 Pro-
ceedings: Math, Phys & Engineering Sci 11, 11–13 (2004). 
 309 See generally Jacob S. Hacker, The Great Risk Shift: The Assault on American 
Jobs, Families, Health Care, and Retirement and How You Can Fight Back (Oxford 2006). 
 310 See Gerding, Law, Bubbles, and Financial Regulation at 149 (cited in note 69).  
 311 The important exception is when there is a symmetric policy contestation be-
tween parts of the financial services industry. See Levitin, 127 Harv L Rev at 2058–67 
(cited in note 67). 
 312 See, for example, Eric Lipton and Ben Protess, Banks’ Lobbyists Help in Drafting 
Financial Bills (NY Times, May 23, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/WG8V-3PQ6. See 
also generally Deniz Igan, Prachi Mishra, and Thierry Tressel, A Fistful of Dollars: Lob-
bying and the Financial Crisis (International Monetary Fund, Dec 2009), archived at 
http://perma.cc/SD4J-2U9L (finding a correlation between lenders’ lobbying activities 
and their risk-taking during 2000–2007). A crude measure of bank lobbying activity is 
the total amount spent on lobbying activities by the financial services, insurance, and 
real estate (FIRE) sector. From 1998 to 2015, the FIRE sector spent over $6.5 billion dol-
lars on lobbying, a total that is only barely surpassed by the health-care industry and 
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attendant regulatory-capture problems that make regulators in-
clined to adopt financial market participants’ viewpoints.313 As a 
result, the specifics of bank regulation are to no small degree 
shaped by the intensity of lobbying and political pressure 
brought to bear by the financial services industry. 
The obfuscation of monetary policy’s politics through its 
combination with financial regulation is unfortunate, because 
monetary policy is an issue that should be subject to political 
control. In contrast to bank regulation, monetary policy does not 
have clear normative goals. Should the goal of monetary policy 
be to control inflation, or should it be to maximize employment? 
There is no consensus on this because different monetary poli-
cies have enormously different distributional effects. (Indeed, 
the Federal Reserve Board is charged with pursuing both goals.) 
Inflation benefits debtors and hurts creditors, while volatility in 
interest rates benefits financial market intermediaries by gen-
erating more business due to refinancing transactions as rates 
change. 
Monetary policy is an inherently political (although not nec-
essarily partisan) exercise because of its distributional implica-
tions.314 While technocratic expertise informs an understanding 
of how to influence the money supply, technocratic expertise has 
no answer to the normative question of what the money supply 
should be.315 Accordingly, monetary policy is an area in which 
transparency should be sought because it increases democratic 
accountability over a distributional decision.316 
 
miscellaneous businesses. See Lobbying: Ranked Sectors (OpenSecrets.org), archived at 
http://perma.cc/8WX4-UP3H. 
 313 See Levitin, 127 Harv L Rev at 2041–49 (cited in note 67). 
 314 See Yanis Varoufakis, Bitcoin and the Dangerous Fantasy of ‘Apolitical’ Money 
(Yanis Varoufakis, Apr 22, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/5DXV-GY9K (noting that 
“apolitical money is a dangerous illusion”).  
 315 Indeed, the Federal Reserve’s charge of controlling inflation and maximizing em-
ployment is an attempt to have it both ways on the normative question. 
 316 Blockchain-based digital cryptocurrencies, such as bitcoin, represent an alterna-
tive approach to the tension between technocracy and democracy in monetary systems. 
On the one hand, digital cryptocurrencies appear to be a doubling down on technocracy, 
as they operate automatically through computer code and thus appear to be immune 
from whatever biases regulators might have. On the other hand, blockchain-based digi-
tal cryptocurrencies defer to the majority of computing power within the blockchain, 
which is a majoritarian principle (even though a single actor can control that majority of 
computing power). Blockchain-based digital cryptocurrencies turn out to be vulnerable to 
both technical flaws in their code as well as monopolistic manipulation. See Mike Hearn, 
The Resolution of the Bitcoin Experiment (Medium, Jan 14, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/DQ3E-ZLM2 (detailing design flaws in the size of the blocks in the block-
chain that severely limit the transaction volume possible in bitcoins and explaining the 
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Pure Reserve Banking would increase the transparency and 
hence the democratic accountability of monetary policy. In a 
Pure Reserve Banking regime, all monetary creation would be 
governmental, rather than indirect through the bank transmis-
sion belt. In Pure Reserve Banking, instead of the government 
adjusting the privately produced monetary supply to achieve the 
desired monetary supply, the government would directly deter-
mine the entirety of the monetary supply. Direct government 
monetary creation through government provision of currency and 
government borrowing and spending is far more transparent than 
monetary expansion and contraction that are undertaken 
through a combination of Federal Reserve open-market pur-
chases and financial regulatory policy affecting the scope of pri-
vate money creation.317 
Greater transparency of monetary policy decisions would in-
crease the democratic accountability of decision-makers, who are 
currently insulated not only by the opacity of monetary policy 
transmission but also by institutional design. The Federal Re-
serve Board, FDIC, and OCC are all independent regulatory 
agencies whose members serve their terms subject to removal 
only for misconduct.318 All of these regulators have terms that 
are longer than a single presidential administration.319 They are 
also all funded outside the appropriations process. The effect of 
long terms of office, subject only to for-cause removal, and budg-
etary independence makes the federal prudential regulators 
more politically insulated compared to cabinet agencies. 
Greater transparency and democratic accountability over 
monetary policy existed prior to the creation of the Federal 
 
opposition of major holders of bitcoins to remedying these flaws). These problems under-
score the limits of the blockchain technology in eliminating the problems of regulatory 
incompetence and regulatory bias—problems that merely manifest themselves different-
ly in the blockchain environment. 
 317 The question of how best to structure the administration of the money supply—
whether through an independent actor like the Federal Open Market Committee, 
through a cabinet agency, or otherwise—is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 318 See Humphrey’s Executor v United States, 295 US 602, 629 (1935) (holding that the 
removal of officers of independent agencies may be restricted to “for cause” removal); 44 
USC § 3502(5) (listing the Federal Reserve Board, FDIC, and OCC as “independent regula-
tory agenc[ies]”). But see 12 USC § 2 (permitting removal of the comptroller “by the Presi-
dent, upon reasons to be communicated by him to the Senate”). The Treasury secretary is 
specifically forbidden from delaying or preventing the implementation of an OCC regula-
tion or from intervening in any matter or proceeding before the OCC. 12 USC § 1(b)(1). 
 319 See 12 USC § 241 (setting a fourteen-year term of office for Federal Reserve Board 
governors); 12 USC § 1812(c)(1) (setting a six-year term of office for FDIC board members); 
12 USC § 2 (setting a five-year term of office for the comptroller of the currency). 
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Reserve System. During the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies, monetary policy was divorced from bank regulation and 
was at the center of broad public debates and presidential elec-
toral politics.320 The creation of the Federal Reserve System in 
1913 marked the beginning of a process of replacing democratic 
control over monetary policy with politically insulated techno-
cratic control.321 
Unfortunately, the events of the early twenty-first century 
have shown that technocrats are themselves all too political yet 
not democratically responsive. The idea that economic techno-
crats are neutral scientists merely applying the inexorable laws 
of nature has long been discredited.322 
The recent history of the Federal Reserve is instructive. 
Under the direction of Chairman Alan Greenspan, as well as 
during Chairman Ben Bernanke’s early tenure, the Federal Re-
serve was all too willing to look the other way from the signs 
that a bubble was forming because of its ideological and political 
priors that favored laissez-faire regulatory policies and limited 
inflation. 
Because monetary policy is inherently political, it is better 
that it be more democratically accountable than subject to the 
whims of unaccountable technocrats.323 Moreover, to the extent 
that some degree of technocratic involvement is unavoidable in 
monetary policy, direct government control over the money sup-
ply would improve macroeconomic forecasting because there 
 
 320 See Levitin, 127 Harv L Rev at 2050–51 (cited in note 67). 
 321 See Sayre Ellen Dykes, The Establishment and Evolution of the Federal Reserve 
Board: 1913–23, 75 Fed Res Bull 227, 228 (1989). 
 322 Part of the attraction of Bitcoin and other algorithmically based cryptocurrencies 
is that the monetary supply’s growth is mathematically regulated and thus beyond the 
manipulation of central banks. Ironically, such algorithmic currencies are arguably the 
most extreme technocratic approach to money, as money is simply reduced to an algo-
rithm. This view is also wrong. While the number of actual bitcoins or the like may be 
mathematically regulated, there is no easy way to control the volume of bitcoin deriva-
tives or bitcoin margin lending by exchanges that functionally expand the bitcoin supply. 
In short, bitcoin is a re-creation of fractional reserve banking, but without the regulatory 
overlay—making it perhaps the worst of all worlds. Bitcoin and other blockchain-based 
cryptocurrencies attempt to control the monetary supply with artificial mathematical 
regulation. Such attempts are doomed to fail, as erstwhile former–Greek Finance Minis-
ter Yanis Varoufakis has observed: “Even when capitalist economies operated under the 
Gold Standard, banks found ways of creating money by lending increasing quantities 
against the existing, stable, stock of gold.” Varoufakis, Bitcoin (cited in note 314). 
 323 See id (noting that “a Central Bank that is democratically controlled (as opposed 
to the indefensible notion of an ‘independent’ Central Bank) remains our best hope for a 
form of money that is for the people and by the people”). 
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would be no need to estimate the effectiveness of monetary poli-
cy transmission. 
The examples of Iceland and Greece underscore the im-
portance of political control over the monetary supply as an es-
sential feature of self-determination for a polity. Iceland’s 
small domestic financial system collapsed in 2008.324 Icelandic 
banks, consumers, and businesses had all borrowed heavily 
from European lenders in pound and euro denominations.325 
Iceland was able to de-lever its economy by devaluing its cur-
rency, allowing its banks (which had large foreign debts) to fail, 
and imposing legal impairments on foreign-denominated 
debts.326 Because Iceland maintained control over its own cur-
rency and legal system, it was able to manipulate its monetary 
supply to stabilize its economy. 
Whereas Iceland had maintained its own currency but simp-
ly engaged in extensive foreign-denominated borrowing, Greece 
surrendered its own currency when it joined the eurozone in 
2001.327 The Greek government, businesses, and consumers all 
borrowed in euro-denominated debt.328 When it became clear 
that the Greek economy was over-levered, the Greek govern-
ment could not inflate its way out of debt because it had abdi-
cated control of the monetary supply by virtue of being in a cur-
rency union.329 
The experiences of Iceland and Greece underscore Professor 
Christine Desan’s observation that money is a constitutional pro-
ject.330 Control over the monetary system is a fundamental part of 
the sovereign condition. When that control is outsourced, whether 
to foreign lenders (as in Iceland), to the collective judgment of the 
nations of the eurozone (as with Greece), or to private domestic 
 
 324 See Jenny Anderson and Chad Bray, Iceland to Lift Capital Controls Imposed 
after Financial Crisis (NY Times, June 8, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/SUP8-XSVR. 
 325 See Philipp Bagus and David Howden, Deep Freeze: Iceland’s Economic Collapse 
41–42 (Mises Institute 2011). 
 326 See Thorvardur Tjörvi Ólafsson and Karen Áslaug Vignisdóttir, Households’ Po-
sition in the Financial Crisis in Iceland *24 (Central Bank of Iceland, June 2012), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/SC5X-SZPE. 
 327 See Barry James, EU Invites Greece to Join the Single Currency Fold (NY Times, 
June 20, 2000), archived at http://perma.cc/YR9A-TZMK. 
 328 See Martin Feldstein, The Failure of the Euro: The Little Currency That 
Couldn’t, 91 Foreign Aff 105, 107, 115 (2012). 
 329 See Will Fleeson, Deficit of Greece—and Now Spain—Jeopardize Euro and Per-
haps Euro Zone (The European Institute, Feb 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/G3EW 
-QKH7. 
 330 Desan, Making Money at 37 (cited in note 27). 
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lenders (in all fractional-reserve-banking systems), there is an in-
herent loss of self-determination by the polity. Restoring political 
control over the monetary supply is a critical part of the demo-
cratic project. It should not be surprising, then, that Iceland is the 
country that has most seriously considered abandoning fractional 
reserve banking post-crisis.331 
5. Elimination of the political pressure of “too big to fail.” 
Pure Reserve Banking would also eliminate bailouts by elim-
inating the core of the “too big to fail” problem. “Too big to fail” is 
not a concern about size per se but a concern about any institu-
tion’s failure being so economically disruptive as to be politically 
unbearable.332 Financial failures become politically unbearable 
when they threaten the money supply, namely, when they threat-
en the safety and liquidity of deposits and deposit substitutes. 
The safety and liquidity of deposits are fundamental parts of the 
modern state’s social contract. A state that cannot ensure the 
safekeeping of its citizens’ assets is a failed state, no less than if it 
allowed barbarian hordes to pillage its citizens’ assets. Such a loss 
of assets is a loss of the state’s monopoly on violence, which in-
cludes the exclusive (but delegable) power to seize and transfer 
wealth. 
Thus, failures of depositories as well as failures of non-
depositories that offer deposit substitutes (repos, MMMFs, and 
commercial paper) on any scale or that present the danger of 
triggering an industry-wide panic are likely to be deemed suffi-
ciently disruptive so as to be politically unbearable. The inevita-
ble regulatory responses to such threatened disruptions are 
bailouts. The perceived possibility of bailouts distorts markets 
and undermines market discipline, because bailouts protect not 
only the institutions that are bailed out directly but also their 
counterparties. 
Economic failures that do not threaten the money supply 
are less likely to result in bailouts: stock investors were not 
bailed out following the bursting of the 2001 Internet bubble, 
nor were homeowners rescued in any meaningful way following 
the collapse of the housing bubble in 2008. Even the GM and 
Chrysler bankruptcies support this story. GM’s and Chrysler’s 
2009 bankruptcies functioned as bailouts for GM and Chrysler 
 
 331 See Sigurjonsson, Monetary Reform at *14 (cited in note 4). 
 332 See Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 Georgetown L J 435, 446–51 (2011).  
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employees, retirees, and suppliers, whose obligations were as-
sumed by the buyers of the failed firms’ assets—but not for capi-
tal market investors, who received little or no return in the re-
organization of the failed firms.333 The concern with GM and 
Chrysler was not about protecting capital markets, because GM 
and Chrysler did not implicate the money supply. Instead, the 
GM and Chrysler bailouts, like the post-9/11 federal rescue of 
the airline industry,334 were exceptional acts that were motivat-
ed by industrial policy concerns about employment and national 
champions. Thus, it seems unlikely that isolated capital market 
collapses would trigger bailouts. Further, without reliance on ar-
tificially created “safe assets,” capital markets are likely to ex-
hibit much better market discipline, thereby limiting systemic 
exposure. Restricting money creation to the government would 
protect the money supply from private-market disruptions and 
therefore greatly reduce the risk of bailouts, particularly for fi-
nancial firms. 
Pure Reserve Banking would decouple the risks of the Lend-
ing Function from the socially sacrosanct Deposit Function, 
which would end the “too big to fail” problem in finance. Capital 
market investments can go belly-up without undermining the 
social contract; Deposits cannot. As long as Deposits are exposed 
to capital markets through their institutional combination with 
Lending, capital market volatility will result in bailouts, which 
will undermine market discipline and increase market volatility 
in a regressive cycle. Prudential regulation attempts to limit 
this volatility and the extent of deposit exposure—but there will 
inevitably be imperfections in prudential regulation, and there 
will also be political pressure on regulators to reduce their over-
sight because it crimps the privatized upside of market volatili-
ty. Thus, if we want to truly end “too big to fail,” we need to sep-
arate Deposits and Lending. 
6. Challenges of innovation. 
Even if we were to eliminate regulations that provide legal 
facilitation for the creation of “safe assets,” we would be unlikely 
to see an end to attempts to create “safe assets.” Innovation pre-
sents a challenge to any regulatory system. The Civil War–era 
 
 333 See Adam J. Levitin, Business Bankruptcy: Financial Restructuring and Modern 
Commercial Markets 19–20 (Wolters Kluwer 2015).  
 334 See Levitin, 99 Georgetown L J at 460 (cited in note 332). 
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national bank system ended noteholder runs, but the rise of 
checking gave rise to depositor runs.335 FDIC insurance ended 
(most) depositor runs,336 but the risk of runs merely migrated to 
MMMFs, repos, and other forms of “safe assets.” 
The impetus to create “safe assets” always carries with it 
the problem of an implicit guaranty. If an asset class becomes 
sufficiently large such that losses in that asset class create polit-
ically unacceptable losses in the economy, we will see an implicit 
guaranty spring into action.337 Such was the case with the 
Treasury’s and the Federal Reserve Board’s bailouts of the mon-
ey, commercial paper, and repo markets in 2008. We cannot 
credibly and conclusively legislate around the inevitability of 
bailouts, because they are responses to exigent political pres-
sures. Splitting the Deposit and Lending Functions helps guard 
against this problem by reducing the political pressure on regu-
lators to intervene and bail out “safe assets” that have ceased to 
be safe. 
The problem of implicit guaranties will never completely dis-
appear, even with Pure Reserve Banking. Bailouts will occur in 
any market whenever the market’s failure threatens politically 
unbearable social consequences.338 Pure Reserve Banking does 
not eliminate the risk that certain sectors of capital markets will 
grow so large or vital that their collapse cannot be politically 
tolerated. The implicit-guaranty problem is already with us. 
In the past, however, bailouts have occurred when the mon-
ey supply has been threatened, not simply when there are large 
capital markets downturns, such as with the bursting of the In-
ternet bubble.339 Similarly, the bursting of the residential and 
commercial real estate bubbles in 2008 did not result in mean-
ingful government bailouts of homeowners, despite tremendous 
 
 335 See Charles W. Calomiris, Deposit Insurance: Lessons from the Record, 13 Fed 
Res Bank Chi Econ Persp 10, 20 (1989). 
 336 During the savings and loan crisis, there were runs on thrifts that were ensured 
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FDIC-insured institutions by depositors with deposits exceeding the insurance limits. 
See Levitin, 99 Georgetown L J at 463–64 (cited in note 332). 
 337 See Levitin, 99 Georgetown L J at 446–51 (cited in note 332). 
 338 See id at 446–47. 
 339 See Gerding, Law, Bubbles, and Financial Regulation at 94–97 (cited in note 69). 
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political pressure.340 By making the money creation entirely a 
governmental matter, the need to protect the money supply—
perhaps the largest single impetus to engage in bailouts—
disappears. 
F. Effect on the Economy 
The choice between fractional reserve banking of any sort 
versus Pure Reserve Banking is a choice between volatile eco-
nomic growth versus contraction and economic stability. In a 
Pure Reserve Banking world, some part of the money supply will 
remain on the sidelines in deposit accounts rather than being 
fed into the economy. This money is functionally being placed 
under a mattress. While Pure Reserve Banking would engender 
greater financial stability, it would also presumably increase the 
cost of money for at least some borrowers and thereby possibly 
dampen economic growth.341 
But just as Pure Reserve Banking dampens economic 
growth, so too does fractional reserve banking “juice” the econo-
my. Fractional reserve banking is a subsidy for economic 
growth, but it is one that is unmanageable absent the bank reg-
ulatory apparatus, as has been shown by the United States’ pre-
1933 experience with depositories, its 1980s experience with 
private and limited state deposit insurance for thrifts, and its 
2008 experience with shadow banking. Therefore, unless we are 
willing to extend the bank regulatory apparatus of express 
guaranties and concomitant ex ante regulation to the shadow-
banking sector, we will be faced with a juiced but unstable mar-
ket that will produce spurts of greater economic growth but also 
much greater volatility. 
There is an argument for expanding the express guaranty 
and concomitant regulation to all deposit substitutes, as Ricks 
 
 340 To be sure, the Obama administration has enacted some de minimis assistance 
programs—but very little of the 2008 bailout funds went to help homeowners, and many 
programs were really disguised payments to financial institutions. See Levitin, 127 Harv 
L Rev at 2004–07, 2021–23 (cited in note 67). 
 341 See Wolf, The Shifts and the Shocks at 344 (cited in note 227) (“A consequence 
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rowers are cut out of the market. The net effect on economic growth ultimately depends 
on our assumptions about investors’ risk preferences.  
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has proposed.342 Doing so would deploy the government’s superi-
or ability to credibly commit to deposits that are immediately 
redeemable at par. Presumably, however, the government would 
charge for the guaranty. The cost of the “eagle” would offset the 
subsidy to the shadow-banking sector. (The extent of the offset 
would depend on the pricing of the guaranty.) Therefore, expand-
ing the regulatory system to encompass shadow banking would 
eliminate volatile growth, but with the additional cost of expand-
ed regulation as well as the risks that the guaranty would be 
mispriced or that regulation would otherwise fail. Accordingly, 
regulatory expansion is the more expensive and risky route of 
arriving at the same point as Pure Reserve Banking with its 
combination of 100% reserve banking and the elimination of 
safe-asset facilitation. 
The choice we are faced with, then, is volatile growth versus 
economic stability.343 Which regime will produce greater net 
growth is an unanswered empirical question. It is clear, however, 
that volatile growth will never be Pareto superior to stability. 
Not everyone can be made better off in a volatile economy with-
out some being made worse off, because those who have fewer 
means or who are more highly leveraged cannot easily weather 
downturns in a volatile economy. It is possible that volatile 
growth could be Kaldor-Hicks superior, meaning that those 
made better off could, in theory, compensate those made worse 
off. But that result would be solely theoretical given our limited 
system of wealth redistribution. Preventing the regressive dis-
tributional consequences of a volatile growth economy would re-
quire a significant expansion of the social safety net. The social 
safety net is currently insufficiently developed to shield against 
the costs of volatility when market collapses erode savings, be 
they in pension plans, the stock market, or housing. Thus, the 
choice between volatile growth and stability is not solely an effi-
ciency question but also a distributional one. 
Volatile growth has a price tag, be it in the form of greater 
social insurance or greater hardship for those of lesser means. 
We should recognize the distributional choice we are making by 
sticking with fractional reserve banking and the facilitation of 
shadow banking. This Article’s Pure Reserve Banking proposal 
aims to force recognition of the policy choice that we implicitly 
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make by retaining fractional reserve banking and doubling down 
on regulation. 
G. Effect on Regulation Internationally 
Any transition to a Pure Reserve Banking system would be 
complicated by the international dimensions of financial regula-
tion. International regulatory coordination presents a major chal-
lenge in modern financial regulation given the ease with which 
money moves around the globe.344 Thus, if the United States were 
to adopt a Pure Reserve Banking regime, one of the concerns 
would be the flight of US financial institutions to other countries 
with fractional-reserve-banking systems to take advantage of 
international regulatory arbitrage. 
Such an arbitrage problem seems unlikely, however, at least 
in response to US adoption of Pure Reserve Banking. Foreign 
governments will not want to continue fractional reserve bank-
ing because, to the extent that fractional reserve banks and 
shadow-banking markets in their countries finance US firms, 
they will be subsidizing US markets. For example, if US banks 
fled to London to escape a US Pure Reserve Banking regime, 
they would continue to provide financing to US businesses. The 
cost of that financing would be subsidized by the regulation and 
guaranties, both explicit and implicit, that are provided by the 
UK government. 
The UK government would not want to subsidize US bor-
rowers, making it difficult for the UK to maintain a fractional-
reserve-banking system. Moreover, given the relative size of the 
financial services industry to the UK economy, it could not cred-
ibly guaranty the industry, thus undermining the subsidy bene-
fits from fleeing US regulation. To the extent that either US or 
UK regulation insisted on a ring-fenced lending business—
meaning no international lending—banks would be reluctant to 
lose access to US markets, thereby reducing the flight risk.345 
Thus, while international regulatory-arbitrage problems nor-
mally operate to frustrate increased regulation, the dynamic 
would be reversed for Pure Reserve Banking. 
 
 344 See generally Chris Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule 
Making in the 21st Century (Cambridge 2012). 
 345 For a discussion of bank ring-fencing, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Ring-Fencing, 87 
S Cal L Rev 69, 78–80, 98–104 (2013). 
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H. So Why Aren’t We There Yet? 
If Pure Reserve Banking is feasible and is such a good idea, 
why haven’t we adopted it? Much of the answer is path depend-
ence. 100% reserve banking did not exist in the first place be-
cause of the historical development of US financial markets. For 
most of US history, capital markets were quite limited and pro-
vided financing solely for large business concerns. Moreover, capi-
tal markets were confined to a few very large urban centers. Con-
sumers and smaller businesses that needed retail contacts had to 
rely on local financial institutions, which were banks. In other 
words, as the Depositor’s Tale and the Banker’s Tale would have 
it, fractional reserve banking may have been historically the best 
system possible. Today, that is no longer clearly the case, but we 
persist in a fractional-reserve-banking system held together with 
ever more extensive bank regulation because we are so used to 
the arrangement that it is hard to imagine alternatives. 
There are also entrenched interests that like the current 
system. Banks like having the ability to engage in riskier (and 
potentially more rewarding) lending behavior using deposits. 
They like the moral hazard that is created through the govern-
ment provision of liquidity and deposit insurance facilities to 
protect the Deposit Function. Similarly, in the capital markets, 
retail and government MMMFs continue to enjoy the regulatory 
subsidy of stable-NAV accounting and the implied government 
guaranty of the money market. And tri-party-repo participants 
also enjoy the implicit government guaranty of that market 
through the two megabanks that provide clearing services for 
the market. 
Likewise, financial regulatory experts are invested in the 
current system. Experts craft regulations, and experts—here, 
economists and lawyers, including the existing bank regulators—
like the current system. Combining the Deposit and Lending 
Functions requires an enormous amount of regulation. Experts 
flourish in complex regulatory systems, which render their ex-
pertise relevant. The combination of Deposits and Lending pro-
vides full employment for experts with deep-pocketed clients. 
Financial-regulation experts are deeply invested in maintaining 
the current system that validates and pays for their expertise.346 
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And more generally, private control of currency is a core part of 
the interpartisan, neoliberal bargain that recognizes certain roles 
as appropriate for the state and others for private parties.347 
CONCLUSION 
The institutional combination of the Deposit and Lending 
Functions of banking through fractional reserve banking likely 
began opportunistically, but it was relatively efficient compared 
to other possible alternatives prior to the development of deep, 
efficient capital markets in the latter half of the twentieth cen-
tury. Fractional reserve banking’s persistence today, however, is 
a matter of path dependence and of the financial services indus-
try’s interest in maintaining a regressively volatile economy. 
Today, capital markets are sufficiently developed both in 
terms of capital and technology that it is possible to split the 
Deposit and Lending Functions to create a more rational struc-
ture for the financial services industry that would produce a 
more stable financial system and economy. Given that a superior 
alternative to fractional reserve banking is now possible, there is 
no longer reason to tolerate the significant costs of fractional re-
serve banking. 
Splitting Deposits and Lending in both traditional-banking 
and shadow-banking markets would free banking from the prob-
lems created by the combination of these fundamentally contradic-
tory functions. Deposits would be safe from the risks of Lending, 
Lending would be safe from the moral hazard of Deposits, and 
banking would be safe from the current inefficient, overly complex, 
and opaquely politicized system of bank regulation. 
Deposits would be truly safe without needing massive gov-
ernment support in the form of deposit insurance and liquidity 
facilities. Thus, much of the current, problematic system of bank 
regulation could be largely eliminated. There would be no need 
for the Federal Reserve System, or the FDIC, or most of the 
structure of prudential bank regulation. Lending institutions 
would be subject to greater market discipline. This would reduce 
the risk of credit-fueled asset bubbles, and Lending institutions 
could be allowed to fail without endangering Deposits. Moreover, 
separating Deposits from Lending would enable monetary policy 
 
shadow-banking assets would cause those assets to lose value. A runoff period might be a 
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to be separated from financial regulation, resulting in better fi-
nancial regulation and more democratically accountable mone-
tary policy. 
Safe banking will require deep structural change in bank-
ing, and that will require political change. We can have safe 
banking, but to do so, we must wean ourselves from the subsi-
dies of a government-supported financial system and disenthrall 
ourselves from the illusion that we can successfully and continu-
ously regulate banks through market and technological innova-
tions and political cycles. 
Safe banking is not likely to become a political reality in the 
foreseeable future—we seem socially committed to redoubling 
our efforts to make the Deposit and Lending Functions operate 
within the same institutions, no matter the cost and complexity, 
while simultaneously denying the existence of the implicit guar-
anties of shadow banking that are as obvious as the earth’s rota-
tion around the sun. Nonetheless, seeing the possibilities for 
safe banking helps us to understand why our financial system is 
rigged for instability and why our regulatory system is headed 
for ever more unmanageable complexity. 
